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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. THE PROBLEM AND PROCEDURE
The problem of this dissertation is the understanding
of Christian love by means of psychological data and theory.
The problem concerns the whole of human personality as
organized in a character dominated by love. Hence, from the
standpoint of personality development, the problem is to
determine by what psychological means one can achieve char-
acter dominated by the trait of love.
The investigation will assume four factors basic in
personality development: 1) the physical with physiological
processes; 2) the psycho-dynamic with mental organization;
and 5) the personological with self-activity. These three
factors found within the individual, actual or potential,
are characteristic of all human persons. The fourth 4) fac-
tor is that of environment and its influence on developing
personality. The first three factors set limits to person-
ality development, determining the range of possibility.
The fourth factor determines the extent to which personality
possibilities are realized.
Investigation of love from the standpoint of these four
factors is a procedure of convenience, not nearly so clear-
cut, or final, as it must be made to seem. These factors
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2cover the several recognized aspects of personality; namely,
the physical (organic), 1 the psycho-dynamic (mental),
2
the
personological (self), 5 and the social (environmental)
Though each factor is considered separately it will be im-
possible to do so without encroaching on the domains of the
others, for in reality they are closely interrelated, ap-
pearing in the end as but aspects of the development of
love. This is so by reason of the nature of personality.
Personality is not, primarily, one factor or the mere total
of the factors involved. Thus each factor necessarily must
be considered in relation to the others and in relation to
the whole of personality. 5
Chapter I is the introduction of the subject. Chapter
II is a consideration of the Christian doctrine of love
which issues in a statement of the doctrine for the purposes
of this investigation. Chapters III to VI are formulations
of ,Ta psychology of love” through consideration of love on
the basis of the four above mentioned factors. Chapter VII
1. The emphasis of behaviorism and physiological psy-
chology.
2. The emphasis of depth and dynamic psychologies.
3. The emphasis of Gestalt and self psychology and
personology.
4. Recognized by all psychologies, particularly by
Gestalt and topological psychology, emphasized by anthro-
pology.
5. Cf. Allport, PER, 131 f. "Factor” is here used in
the sense that Allport uses the term "aspect." Cf. the
bibliography for the meaning of abbreviations used in foot-
notes .
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3is a formulation of the conclusions that issue from "a psy-
chology of love” as it bears on Christian love from the
standpoint of the specific approach of this investigation.
2. AIM, METHOD AM) LIMITATIONS OF STUDY
The aim is to establish psychological bases adequate to
explain the development of Christian love. Realization of
this aim will lead to a theoretical formulation of the proc-
ess which culminates in the achievement of Christian love.
The understanding that accrues from this investigation will
contribute to our ability to guide, control and thus to pro-
duce Christian personalities.
Following the plan of procedure outlined in the previ-
ous section, the method will be that of bringing relevant
psychological data and theory to bear upon the problem. It
will be eclectic, drawing on all psychological studies and
"schools” of psychology whenever they offer enlightenment on
the problem. The master-motive behind this study is to un-
derstand love as it develops in human persons. Hence there
are no particular psychological approaches to defend or
criticize.
The limitations attending this study are natural. As
an attempted scientific study drawing material from the sci-
ence of psychology it is subject to the limitation of science.
Science can only explore the facts; interpretation belongs to
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4theology and philosophy. This is apt to lead to disappoint-
ingly meagre conclusions, but, if one bears in mind the
proper function of science, such perspective allays disap-
pointment. The most direct result of scientific limitation
is the exclusion of Divine love from the realm of psycholog-
ical study. That, properly, is within the realm of theology.
Also, the inherent complexity and elusiveness of the
subject, love, carries limitations. Love eludes analysis.
This is one of the difficulties attending the study of the
most fundamental processes of life, the inner or subjective.
However, despite such limitation, the value and necessity of
understanding the development of love demands the study.
Recognition of difficulties injects the quality of humility,
much needed in an investigation of this sort.
3. ORIENTATION: PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE
Philosophy of love lies close to theology of love. The
difference is to be found in the relative spheres each con-
cerns itself with. Theology in the historical sense has
limited itself to one system of doctrine or belief which it
has received through tradition or revelation. In this sense
theology is more the defender. However systematic theology
of the present era has deserted authoritarian basis. In
this sense it is practically identical with philosophy; both
seek to interpret the whole world of experience. They are
' ;
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5the interpreters
. Philosophy and theology will answer the
question: "What is the meaning and value of love?"
The Christian tradition shows itself concerned with
love in the theological sense. That is, Christian apolo-
gists have accepted the revelation of the law of love in
Jesus and attempted to relate it to the whole body of Chris-
tian doctrine; at the same time expounding it to believers
and defending it against infidels.
Christian theologians, especially Augustine, have shown
insight into the basic nature of love, its rise and develop-
ment. And on the whole the historic church has revealed
insight in its defense and protection of the family as inte-
gral to Christianity. ¥/hat they as a group have made plain
is that love expresses the inner meaning of the universe.
Their expounding of love has been not merely an attempt to
commend love but express the fact of love. That is, love is
the law of the universe.
Psychology is in one sense the handmaiden of theology
and philosophy, furnishing them the data of experience to
relate to the wnole of life and the universe. Psychology,
because of its limitation of method, cannot go as far as
theology or philosophy. It is limited to the realm of human
experience; e. g. , in this investigation, to love as experi-
enced by human persons. On the other hand philosophy and
theology are not subject to the limitations of science.
..
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6Hence they properly consider and interpret divine as well as
human love.
Psychology concerns itself with the finite expressions
of love. It seeks through investigation of experience for
understanding of the origin and development of love within
individuals, and from this formulates hypothetic principles
for all individuals. Psychology of love will study only
that which it can measure in some fashion; using whatever
means it can to apprehend the subjective aspect of life as
well as the more objective (but more often superficial)
aspects. 6 It will describe, and in the description answer
the question: "How does a person achieve the ability to
love?"
Summarily, the differentiation between psychology and
philosophy and theology of love can be thus expressed: psy-
chology seeks for description of the facts while philosophy
and theology seek to interpret them.
4. HISTORY AM) SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUBJECT
Love is as old as man. Christian love has a history
beginning with the life of Jesus, continuous into the pres-
ent. But psychology of love, in the formal sense, born in
6. Cf. Brightman, POR, 18 f. for a discussion of the
differences of philosophy, theology and psychology of re-
ligion.
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7the rise of psychology as an independent science, is of re-
cent origin. Its genesis was the realm of sexology, the
pioneer works of Ellis, 7 Kraft-Ebing, 8 Forel, 9 et al. These
pioneers, however, were more concerned with love in the bio-
logical aspect, sex and sexuality.
The love life received new emphasis with the work of
Freud and the consequent school of psychology, psychoanaly-
sis. This school enlarged the concept of love to include
sex as the biological basis of the affective life. However
its main emphasis is on the sexual side of love. Psycho-
analysis draws a genetical picture of the love life. Be-
ginning in infancy with erotic interests primarily in self
and sexuality centered at the mouth, anus and urethra, the
love (libido) center shifts to others (alloerotic) with
parallel investment of sexuality in the genital zone. The
love life of the individual can take innumerable directions
more or less determined by the environmental pattern, the
family constellation. Usually it is in the family that
patterns of love are worked out.
The foregoing summary of the psychoanalytic position
is, of course, far too inadequate. It does not indicate the
many possible variations in love, the divergence of viewpoint
7. Ellis, SPS.
8. Kraft-Ebing, PS.
9. Forel, SQ,.
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8that exists within the psychoanalytic group, nor the major
critics and dissenters from psychoanalytic theory and method.
But it does indicate that Freudian psychology has dealt ex-
tensively with the crux of our problem, love. Hence, due
respect, however critical, must be accorded Freud and the
tradition that stems from his pioneer work.
On the whole Freud and his followers have not found much
worth in religion; Freud himself calling it an "illusion,” a
"universal neurosis," finding that the God-idea arises as a
substitute for the feared father in the Oedipus situation.-1-0
Few of his adulating followers have ventured to find other-
wise.
But the psychoanalytic attack on the validity of re-
ligion is not our problem. 11 Though it is concerned with
the love life, psychoanalysis is primarily therapy minded.
Therefore most of the literature in the field concerns
special problems, particular patients, abnormalities. This,
combined with the fact of its antithesis to religion, has
precluded the consideration of love as an aspect of Chris-
tian character by those within the Freudian fold.
10. Cf. Freud, FI; also Wittels, Art. (1935). For a
typical psychoanalytic view of religion cf. Moxon, Art.
(1921), Forsyth, PR, and Martin, MR.
11. cf. an unpublished dissertation by H. A. Deabler,
"Freud * s View of Religion," Boston University, 1936, for a
thorough treatment of this problem.
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9One notable exception exists here, the work of Oskar
Pfister, a Christian pastor of Zurich, Switzerland. His
work has been carried on within the religious field . He
adapted psychoanalysis to his work as pastor. In Love in
Children and its Aberrations -*-^ he deals with our problem at
great length. His work is deficient in light of the criti-
cism that all psychoanalysis merits; namely, it disregards
the work and contributions of other schools of psychology
consequently overemphasizing its major contribution, sexu-
ality.^-3
Two recent studies bear relationship to our problem:
Menninger f s Love Against Hate and Suttie’s Origins of Love
and Hate .-*-4 These authors might well be termed "Neo-Freudi-
ans" in that both acknowledge and build upon Freudian con-
cepts but are not limited by them. Menninger seemingly
accepts the Freudian concept of pan-sexuality and proceeds
to explain the origin of love and hate through the child 1 s
relationships to the mother. Suttie rejects the psycho-
sexual nature of the child but explains the origin of love
and hate in the dependency relationship between child and
mother. Both of these authors are limited in their approach
12. 0. Pfister, Love in Children and its Aberrations
(tr. E. and C. Paul), New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1924.
13. One critic writes that for Pfister psychoanalysis
is his religion.
14. Cf. Menninger, LH, and Suttie, OLH.
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to understanding of love by reason of the fact that they
consider love only from the psycho-dynamical aspect. There
is more to the process of love than the psycho-dynamic organ-
izations that result from the child* s relationship to the
mother.
Turning to the field of religious psychology one finds
amazing neglect in view of the practical importance of love
in Christian character. It is not understandable why the
Christian experience of love has been omitted from the usual
group of religious experiences analyzed by Christian psy-
chologists. When one runs down the list of important fig-
ures in religious psychology (James, Starbuck, Leuba, Ames,
Coe, Pratt) one finds no contributor to the problem of love.
Nearly all these writers pay their respects briefly to sex
as an influence, especially in adolescent religious experi-
ence, but that is all.
Nor is the situation much different in the field of
present writers (Ligon, Stolz, Wieman, Kupky, et al). The
only treatment beyond the incidental is to be found in the
chapter on "The Dynamic of Fatherly Love" in Ligon* s Psy-
chology of Christian Personality .^-5 This author* s treatment
of the subject is interesting but hardly enlightening. His
chapter consists in stating that fatherly love is dynamic
15. Cf. Ligon, PCP.
. .i
.
.
. ;
: a 0
-
-
.
, ,
..
.
.
11
and proceeds to show it in operation. But he does not in-
form us as to the origin of such love; how it differs, if
at all, from other love; nor how to develop such love. In
short, Ligon contributes little to the study of love as a
factor in Christian character.
One work within the field of religious psychology de-
serves mention here. Although Grace Stuart T s little book,
The Achievement of Personality
.
16 does not limit itself to
considerations of love, it does deal in a stimulating fash-
ion with the general lines of character formation and love
is dealt with as one of the fundamentals.
Survey of the field of religious psychology, revealing
the paucity of study on the subject of Christian love, sug-
gests the pertinence of this investigation. It is needed,
if for no other reason than to understand the essence of
Christianity. 17 Love, central to and emphasized by Chris-
tianity and its servant, the church, is only vaguely un-
derstood. The church clearly sees the "law of love" as
the cornerstone of "goodwill to men; peace on earth." It
16. Cf. Stuart, AP.
17. "The New Testament love constitutes the essence of
Christianity. It is its ultimate standard of faith. It is
its distinctive and determinative pattern which gives mean-
ing and proportion to all other Christian doctrines. It is
the master key which alone unlocks the depths in Christian
faith. Agape is the unique and absolute truth revealed to
man in Jesus Christ. It is, as Augustine says, the very
substance of God." Ferre, CF, 182.
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emphasizes the importance and function of the family in the
creation of character that loves. But on the whole it has
not availed itself of psychological studies that are perti-
nent to the understanding and production of character domi-
nated by love. Within the field of psychology the church
has turned its back on the freudian school, frightened
away by its misleading "metapsychology" (substitute for
metaphysics). Hence it has through intentional neglect,
disdain or active opposition failed to appropriate the
valuable offerings of psychoanalysis.
Finally, the understanding of love could not be more
urgent than in this day when the opposite of love, hate, is
so rampantly dominant to the grief and suffering of both man
and God. This author can only hope that his efforts in this
investigation will shed some light pertinent to the process
of creating (religious education) characters dominated by
love and through them a world dominated by love and freed
from war.
5. DEFINITION
What is meant by the use of the term "love?"
Who does not know what "love" is? Books are written
about it; drama and movie turn about it; poetry sings of it;
and almost everyone experiences it. Love is so common that
few pause to ask what it is. One is supposed to know what
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it means. Perhaps this explains why definition is seldom
offered and when offered no two are alike. 18
Freudian interpretation finds the key to the meaning of
love in sexual feeling and attraction. As Freud puts it:
"The nucleus of what we mean by love is sexual love with
sexual union as its aim." 19 Sexual love, of course, is
expanded to include all that is commonly comprised by the
term love, but this is basic oversimplification. Freudian
definition falls with its narrowly sexual interpretation of
life. But this definition does emphasize one fact always
characteristic of love. It unites persons. Love leads to
relationships.
Warren* s Dictionary of Psychology places greater stress
on the relationship aspect of love when it defines it as:
Love is a feeling or sentiment of attach-
ment toward some person, often growing out
of sexual attraction, relations, or situa-
tions, and exhibiting a great diversity of
psychological and physiological manifesta-
tions. 20
however Warren confuses feeling with sentiment (they are not
identical) and limits love to sexual feeling.
Nygren also emphasizes the relationship aspect of love
when he writes: "Love expresses a relation between a subject
18. It is notable that two recent publications on the
psychology of love do not give explicit definition of their
subject; so in Menninger*s LH and Suttie's OLH.
19. Freud, GPAE, 73.
20. Warren, DP, 155.
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who loves and an object that is loved.” 2! He defines the
relationship to include lover and beloved but gives no hint
as to the quality of the relationship created by love.
Baldwin 1 s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology of-
fers the following definition:
(Love is a) Dispositional interest of an
exclusive kind, having a person for its
object, and manifesting itself in the
following emotional states: (1) pleasure
in the presence of a person or other
communion with him, and in the thought
of him; (2) pain occasioned by his absence
or estrangement; (3) pleasure in his
welfare* (4) pain occasioned by injury
to him. 22
This definition sets clear a characteristic of love hitherto
unnoticed, namely, love is a permanent organization (dispo-
sitional interest) in character. It has the further merit
of revealing the feeling blends possible in love, but fails
to emphasize the relationship aspect.
Webster’s Hew International Dictionary enlarges on the
nature of the feelings possible in love. Love is defined as
”A feeling of strong personal attachment induced by that
which delights or commands admiration, by sympathetic under-
standing, or by ties of kinship.”
The varying emphases of the above definitions indicate
that comprehensive definition will include the idea of
21. Nygren, AE, I, 166.
22. Baldwin, DPP, 31.
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relationship and permanency in character, feelings, and
actions
.
Love as a permanent organization in character qualifies
it as a sentiment, the unit of character organization as
conceived by McDougall following Shand. 23
As shall be found, sentiment formation involves four
factors: 1) the experiencing center (self); 2) feelings;
5) ideas; and 4) objects. 24 Thus, love as an organization
of character will involve 1) a lover (self); 2) affective
tones (pleasure or pain); 3) ideas (of loved object); and
4) the beloved. 25 The significant characteristic of love is
the fact that 1) lover and 4) the beloved are united in
spiritual relationship. The dominant feature of love is
thus a relationship. But it is a relationship characterized
by the nature of the feelings involved. It is a matter of
common experience that the love relationship denotes warmth
(passion), acceptance, pleasure, desire and delight in the
presence of the beloved, and mutual concern between persons
which issues in common interests and endeavors (co-opera-
tion) .
In light of tne foregoing love may be defined as an
organization of character that leads to a relationship
23. Cf. below, p. 118 f
24. Cf. below, p. 119.
25. Cf. below, p. 119.
.'
; •
'
.
'
"•
•
'
t
f
:
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
?vo. :
16
(lover beloved), characterized by feelings and ideas
that make for acceptance and mutuality and by actions (co-
operation) that further the best interests of those involved.
Love as thus understood will be spoken of in company with
many correlates, i. e . 9 feelings of kindness, humility,
tenderness, admiration, respect; and actions of sacrifice,
productiveness, consideration, co-operation, forgiveness.
..
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CHAPTER II
THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF LOVE
The fact is that, in spite of miscon-
ceptions, and after making every due
deduction, we are entitled to hold that
Christianity from the first may justly
be called the religion of love. 1
To understand the nature of love central to Christian-
ity, to review historic development, and to conclude with
a conoise statement of the Christian concept of love is the
aim of this chapter. First, the New Testament basis of
the Christian doctrine of love is considered.
1. THE NEW TESTAMENT BASIS
In the main, authorities agree in considering the New
Testament teaching under three general topics: God’s love
for man; man’s love for God; and man’s love for man. 2 From
the standpoint of source, New Testament literature falls
into a fourfold division which roughly follows chronological
order. So, under the three topics teaching from four dis-
tinct sources is considered: 1) the Synoptic Gospels which
1. Moffatt, LNT, 34. Cf. also Stewart, DCG, 77, "In
the word ’love’ is concentrated, we may say, the essence of
the Christian religion."
2. Moffatt in LNT follows this division as does Orr,
Art. (1911), Stewart, Art. (1924) (though with extenuations),
and Walker in TJJTA. Consultation of indices in works on
the teachings of Jesus reveals widespread use of this divi-
sion.
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offer the source closest to the original teaching of Jesus;
2) the Paulines which contain the teachings of the Apostle
Paul; 3) the literature of the general church (the Epistle
of Peter, Judas, James, the hook of Revelation, Hebrews,
and the book of Acts); 4) and finally, the Johannine
Epistles. 3
These four phases, separated for convenience in study,
are questionable in many details. However, despite possible
disagreement that might place one Epistle or Book in this
group or that, the classification is adequate for our pur-
poses.
i . God * s Love
(1). The Teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels
It is to be noted that Jesus seldom speaks directly
of the love of God. 4 This lack of reference might be due
to the fact that it was taken for granted, or apt to be
bound up with Israel* s concept of God*s narrow concern for
his chosen people, or accidently omitted by the Synoptic
3. Cf. Moffatt, LNT, 57. Ldtgert, in his LNT con-
siders the subject of love on the basis of a more detailed
outline of New Testament sources. Moffatt *s organization
is based upon more recent New Testament studies. (Ltttgert
wrote in 1905.) Nygren in his AE approaches New Testament
sources with a definite thesis. Hence his considerations
are not on the basis of New Testament teaching from the
several sources, but rather on the basis of special topics.
4. Cf. Walker, TJJTA, 69; Moffatt, LNT, 67; and
Stewart, Art. (1924).
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writers, or that Jesus preferred to express his truth other-
wise, or that he sought to avoid unpleasant associations
with the word ’love.’ 5 But whatever the reason and despite
scanty reference, there are sufficient data on which to
formulate his idea of it. 6
Two lines of consideration warrant the conclusion that
Jesus taught the love of God for man. The first follows his
teachings and concepts. Foremost among these is his desig-
nation of God’s relationship to man in the familial sense,
as Father. 7 And there is no controverting evidence to the
fact that this term carries the full meaning of fatherhood
dominated by love in the earthly sense. Jesus directly im-
plies the love-meaning of ’’Father” when he bases his claim
for mutual love among his followers on the character of God
as the inspiration and exemplar of such love. 8 If God’s
desire of men is for love, then He must be lovable and
loving. And this love of God for man is not love for an "in-
group," the members of the Kingdom. It is a universal love
5. So Moffatt, LNT
,
79 f.
6. Walker, TJJTA, 69. Cf. also Moffatt, LNT, 80.
"The elements of divine love are present, at their highest
form of expression, even although the term is absent."
7. Cf. Stalker, EM, 259. "By modern theologians it
is usually taken for granted that the fatherhood of God
being so prominent in the teachings of Jesus, must be the
ultimate expression for the divine love."
8. Moffatt, LNT, 67. "You must be perfect as your
Father in heaven is perfect." (Mt. 5:48); "Be merciful as
your Father is merciful." (Mt. 6:36) All New Testament
references listed in this chapter are to Moffatt ’s trans-
lation.
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of all, the evil as well as the just; a love characteristic
of God the Father. ^ Walker finds particular reference to
God's love for man in the meaning of the parable of the
pearl of great price. 10
The second line of consideration is the person of
Christ. Who can deny that by teaching and example the his-
toric Jesus inspired his disciples and followers to preach
a "religion of love?" The entire New Testament focuses on
God through Jesus Christ. And if love was not taught or
lived by him, it is inconceivable how it could have found
its way to so central a position in scriptural teaching.
As Moffatt writes: "The very ministry and mission of Jesus
was the best proof that God in love was about to inaugurate
the supreme order of bliss among men." 11 And if love was
dominant in the character of Jesus, then it is so with God
the Father, for "whoever has seen me (Jesus) has seen the
Father .
"
(2). Pauline Teaching
In numerous references and situations Paul speaks di-
rectly and indirectly of God's love for man. For Paul the
9. Nygren
,
AE, Vol. I, 51 f. and 54; Stewart, DCG, 77;
and Stalker, EM, 256 f.
10. Walker, TJJTA, 69. (Mt. 13:45) Nygren, AE, Vol. I,
56 ff. finds that all the parables bear testimony to the
nature of God's love.
Ill Moffatt, iNT, 80.
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gospel is a gospel of redemption and redemption is the su-
preme manifestation of God’s love. 12 Paul saw clearly the
desperate moral situation of his day; recognized in it man’s
estrangement from God and need of reconciliation to Him.
And the source of this reconciliation was the love of God
expressed in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 15
It is to he noted that Paul tends to limit the Father-
hood of God to God’s people, i. e.
,
those who accept him.-*-4
But the range of God’s love is universal. God is willing to
be the Father of any and all who accept him. 15 And the na-
ture of love is to be found in Christ’s love which is God’s
will for man. Christ’s love and God’s love were one and the
same. 16 So Paul could write ”1 am certain that nothing will
be able to part us from God’s love in Christ Jesus our
Lord.”17
(3). General Church Teaching
The literature of the general church contains compara-
tively few allusions to God’s love. But the attitude of
12. Moffatt, LNT, 133. Paul himself experienced the
redeeming love of God. Cf. Nygren, AE, Vol. I, 81 f.
13. Cf. II Cor. 5:14 and Rom. 8:35-39.
14. Cf. Rom. 9:25.
15. Cf. Moffatt, LNT, 151.
16. Nygren, AE, Vol. I, 77, holds that Paul founds a
religious faith entirely different from that of Jesus. The
core of this difference is Paul’s act of placing Jesus at
the center in place of God. But however much Paul’s enthu-
siasm for his Master determines his emphasis, for him God
stands directly back of his Jesus.
17. Rom. 8:39.
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these writings reveal a deep and trustful reverence for G-od
underlying which is the common conviction that ”... God
was good and loving, and that the world was a place where
they could count on His presence and help, through Jesus
Christ."18 On the subject of God's love this literature
reflects the position of Paul, with less theological inter-
pretation but with similar moral implications. 19
(4). Johannine Teaching
Here for the first time definition is offered: ”God
is love.”20 But God is not love in any abstract, metaphys-
ical sense . God is love in the personal and moral sense of
self-sacrifice and vicarious suffering, a deduction from
the revelation of God in the life of Jesus Christ. 21
God's love knows no limitations of race for ”God so
loved the world.. . . ”22 it is a love that forgives; 25 that
renews and regenerates human life in its self-sacrifice.-^
Prominent in John is the concept of the Father loving his
25
son (Jesus); "... as the Father has loved me . . .”
18. Moffatt, LNT
,
212.
19. Cf. ibid., 248.
20. I John 4:16. Nygren, AE, Vol. I, 108. "John
gives us the phrase in which the formulation of the idea of
agape reaches finality, God is Agape .
”
21. Moffatt, LNT, 253.
22. John 5:16.
23 . John 4:10.
24. John 17:19.
25. John 15:9; cf. also John 5:20; 10:17.
*,
-
'
'
.
. . ,
.
. .
•
.
.
r
:
.
•
.
.
:
. ;
:
-
:
23
And as the Father has "loved me and sent me" so Jesus loves
his own fellow men and in his love is seen the Father who
is love.
The Johannines follow the spirit and teaching of the
Master closely, giving clear and lofty expression to the
concept of love. As Phelps writes:
Now the Fourth Gospel and the Three
Letters insist on the primacy of love,
and thus these documents are closer
to the teaching of Jesus than any
other. 26
Nygren, however, finds that the Johannine formulation of
God and love goes a step beyond that of the gospels and of
Paul. In the latter God and love are brought near together
but John takes the final step: "God is love and love is
God." 27
ii. Man’ 3 Love to God
(1). The Teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels
Man’s love to God is clearly set forth in Jesus’ affir-
mation of the Old Testament injunction: "Thou shalt love the
nord thy God . . ," 28 Jesus’ teaching that man’s relation
26. Phelps, HNB, 284.
27. Nygren, AE, Vol. I, 109.
28. Mt. 22:34 f; Mk. 12:28 f; and Lk. 10:25 f. Luke’s
variation in the setting of this injunction alters not its
significance. Of. Moffatt, LNT, 83.
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to God is to be one of love harmonizes with his teaching as
to the nature of God as well as with his own teaching and
character.
But beyond the above reference Jesus refers only twice
to man’s love for God. In his denunciation of the Pharisees
he charges them with having "omitted the weightier matters
of the Torah, justice and love of God." 29 The second allu-
sion is in a passage which shows that love to God means
serving him. 39
(2). Pauline Teaching
Here, also, we find few references to man’s love for
God. 3 ^- There are five such references, but three of these
speak of love to Christ, tooffatt’s treatment32 of all five
in the sense of love for the divine object, holding that
Paul in these references draws no distinction between God
and Christ, is open to question for Paul does distinguish
between them.
29. Lk. 11:42. Mt . 23:23 records the same incident
having mercy in place of love and adding faithfulness.
30 . Mt . 6 : 24
.
31. I Cor. 2:9. ". . . God has prepared all that for
those who love him." I Cor. 8:3. "... But if anyone
loves God, he is known by him." I Cor. 15:21 f. ". . . If
anyone has no love for the Lord, God’s curse be on him."
Eph. 6:24. ". . .• Grace be with all who have an undying
love for our Lord Jesus Christ." And Rom. 8:28. ". . .
Those who love God ..."
32. Cf. Moffatt, LNT
,
159.
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The question occurs again concerning this deficiency
of reference to man’s love to God in view of its practical
importance in the life of Paul. Perhaps Paul wished to
safeguard the meaning of love by scanty reference to it.
Love, for Paul, is not the indulgence of facile emotion,
but rather, a serious and stable experience which often
.
amounts to loyalty. Paul’s concept of love undoubtedly was
in danger of discredit by association with moral vulgarities
associated with the term. Hence, we find him using more
often the term ’’faith” to designate man’s relationship to
God, but ’’faith” does not do away with love. On the con-
trary, love is the center of a ’’faith” that trusts God.
(3). General Church Teaching
The literature of the church in general contains but
five references to love for God. Three of these occur in
connection with suffering and two contrast love for God
and love for the world.*^ These passages do not exhaust the
references that could be interpreted in light of love to
God. Certainly, in spirit, these general epistles continue
in the framework of love as constructed by Jesus and con-
tinued by Paul.
33. James 1:12, 2:5; I Peter 1:8.
34. II Timothy 4:8-10, 3:1-4.
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(4)
.
Johannine Teaching
Much more rich in allusions to love are the Fourth
Gospel and the Three Epistles. In particular the First
Epistle of John has for its theme love to God. This love
to God is the natural outcome of love divine. Love seeks
love. And man's love means essentially the keeping of
God's commandments. 35
The First Epistle, in which love to God (rather than
to Christ) is uppermost, treats of two difficulties that had
risen in connection with love to God. The first, reflected
in chapter 4:20 — "If anyone declares, 'I love God,* and
yet hates his brother, he is a liar," deals with the "emo-
tionalists" who cry "I love God" but whose actions reveal
no moral content to their feeling. The second deals with
love of the world as a deterrent to love of God
,
as chapter
2:15 f. states:
Love not the world, nor yet what is in
the world
; if anyone loves the world
,
love for the Father is not in him. 36
The Johannine emphasis upon love as doing the will of
God through obedience to his commandments reveals the active
nature of such love. It enlists the mind and the will.
35. John 15:9, 10.
36. In contrast to this is John 3:16. "For God so
loved the world ..."
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iii. Man’s Love to Man
(1). The Teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels
The Synoptic literature is much more rich in references,
direct and indirect, to the fact and duty of love to fellow
man. But it is to be noted that this brotherly love is
closely associated with God’s love and love to God. 37 Be-
cause God loves his children all, our fellow men, so we are
to love. And we are to love God by loving our brothers.
Love of brother is love to God and is Godlike love in man.
It is understandable that the human element in the
Christian concept of love should receive greatest stress.
This is needed for God’s love is the certain quantity, man’s
the uncertain. And if love of God is love of brother, then
the promotion of love to God lies in the furthering of
brotherly love. Furthermore, it is more difficult to love
God, one unseen. And if we cannot love our brothers whom
we see, how can we love God? So we see implied in New
Testament teaching that love is of ’’one piece” or of common
origin, and the point of origin is man and relations with
37. As Nygren points out, ’’The love of one’s neighbor
ceases to be Christian love if it is separated from its
religious context," i. e., its relationship with God’s
love. Cf. AE, Vol. I, 68; also 171, "God’s own love is the
ground of all love and the pattern of all love . . ."
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men. 38 Hence the stress of man’s love to man, for that is
the source of love, even to God.
In addition to the organic connection between man’s
i
love to man and his love to God, there are several distinct
emphases that are summed up in Jesus’ teaching. There is
love of neighbor ”as one’s self,” suggesting love of self.
This certainly does not refer to overfondness of self, ego-
centrism, but rather to the appreciation of God in one’s
own person where one first encounters the ends of God the
Father. ^0
Another emphasis is found in the new interpretation of
neighbor, who is anyone who needs our personal service and
interest. This is made plain in the parable of the Good
Samaritan. 4 -*- And the fourth emphasis is the extension of
love to one’s enemies, "... love your enemies and pray
for them."42
38. Nygren, AE, Vol. I, 68. However Nygren’s thesis
denies the New Testament implication that Christian love of
man for man has its origin in man and his relations with
men.
39. Mt. 19:19; Mk. 12:51.
40. Moffatt, LNT, 97. Nygren contends that the New
Testament does not imply love for self. Self-love is the
root of all evil. Cf. AE, Vol. I, 7£ and 170. Nygren,
though he sees the dangers of self-love, fails to appreciate
its values. Good, affectionate relationships within person-
ality are necessary to mental health. It is hate for self
or elements thereof that is ground for neurosis.
41. Lk. 10:33 f.
42. Mt. 5:43 f. Mk. 6:27 f.
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The coupling of love of G-od and of neighbor, making
them inseparable, is unique with the Master. So is the
expansion of meaning in the concept of neighbor. But no
element is more striking or radical than "love your ene-
mies."
Few sayings have received such varied treatment as this
difficult passage; difficult only in realization. Indeed,
interpretation, this author suspects, is determined to a
great extent by one’s temperament. The militarist explains
it away with extenuating circumstances; while to the paci-
fist it remains the cornerstone of his ethic.
But despite controversies, so-called realistic consid-
erations, and all question of "interim ethic," there is no
New Testament ground for finding the nature of "enemy love"
any different from that of "divine love." The love that
one has for enemy should be similar in nature to one’s love
for God. At least, in the teachings of Jesus, "enemy love"
is to be understood in the light of God’s love.
(2). Pauline Teaching
Paul carries on Jesus* emphasis on brotherly love fol-
lowing the main lines laid down by him. The equivalent
to the golden rule is twice mentioned. 43 And Ephesians,
43. Gal. 5:14; Ronu 8:8-10
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especially, marks the close connection between brotherly
love and God’s love. 44
New elements introduced by Paul include speaking of
love not as obedience to external code, but as vital re-
sponse to the spirit of the Lord; 45 the collocation of
faith and love; 46 and the combination of love with faith
and knowledge — brotherly love is a condition of religious
insight and grasp of spiritual truth. 47
(3). General Church Teaching
The literature of the general church offers more on
man’s love to man than on God’s love or man’s love of God.
Here brotherly love is the theme. "Beloved” occurs freely
as a title for Christians. The Epistle of James reiterates
the law of love laid down by Jesus. 48 The service of love
is particularly prominent in two passages from Hebrews. 49
44. Cf. Ephesians 5:1-8. ”... Copy God, then, as
his beloved children, and lead lives of love just as Christ
loved you and gave himself up for you."
45 . Romans 15:30.
46. Cf. Moffatt, LNT
,
170 f. "The combination of the
two is one of his creations." Cf. Gal. 5:6, ". . . faith
active in love . . .," also I Thess. 1:3; 3:6, II Thess.
1:3, and Eph. 1:15.
47. Cf. Eph. 6:23.
48. James 2:8.
49. Heb. 6:10; 10:24. The inclusion of Hebrews with
the general church literature, in contrast to the Paulines,
is subject to criticism. But in either case, the material
comes from the New Testament and bears witness to Christi-
anity as a "religion of love."
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The author of the book of Revelation reprimands the
Church at Ephesus for lack of brotherly love, saying,
.
-
you have given up loving one another as you did at
first. "50 in the same chapter the Church at Thyatira is
praised, among other things, for its brotherly love. I Pe-
ter admonishes "love another heartily and steadily.” 51
"Salute those who love us in the faith” occurs in several
passages. 52 Ana the conviction that brotherly love was the
means to complete life occurs in Hebrews 10:24 f. 53 It is
clear that the primitive church, as well as Paul, carries
on the spirit of love as established by Jesus.
(4). Johannine Teaching
Moffatt points out that the johannine epistles limit
the extensions of brotherly love to brothers in Christ;
"errorists and heretics" are not to be treated as objects
of love. 54 Hospitality towards travelling Christians55 and
50. Rev. 2:4.
51. I Peter 1:22.
52. I Tim. 6:11; II Tim. 1:13; and Titus 3:15.
53. Also, "It is the thought of Ephesians iv:15, 16
and of Revelations ii:4, that no church has any prospect of
stability or chance of existence in the sight of God if it
neglects brotherly love." Moffatt, LNT, 244.
54. Cf. Moffatt, LNT, 281. "When the Presbyter writes
grace, mercy, peace will be with us from God the Father and
from Jesus Christ the Son of the Father in truth and love
(2 John 3) he means that belief or the knowledge of saving
truth (with special reference to the divine person of Christ)
is organic to genuine love."
55. Cf. Ill John 5-8.
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exercise of charity toward the needy are the two specific
forms of brotherly love in Johannine literature. 56 This
love of the brethren is connected with the love of Christ:
"We know what love is by this, that He laid down his life
for us; so we ought to lay down our lives for the brother-
hood." 57
The Presbyter calls upon the church to practice brother-
ly love as a command: "To live by his commands, that is
what love means: and the command is, to love as you have
learned to do from the very beginning . . ."58 The chief
element in righteousness is brotherly love: "Anyone who
does not practice righteousness does not belong to God, and
neither does he who has no love for his brother." 59 This
brotherly love linked to divine love (evident in John 3:16)
is expressed in the new commandment:
I give you a new command, to love one
another — as I have loved you, you are
to love one another. By this everyone
will recognize that you are my disciples,
if you have love one for another. 6^
John portrays Jesus making the duty and order of love the
distinguishing mark of his followers. 61 So he pleads with
the Christians to love one another as Christ commanded.
56. I John 3:16-18.
57. I John 3:16-18.
58. II John 5 f.
59. I John 3:10.
60. John 13:34-35.
61. John 13:1-10.
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Love in conjunction with faith and knowledge and unity
is to be noted in the Johannines as well as the Paulines.
And in such combinations we note injunctions to love of
brothers; as in I John 4:21, ". . . he who loves God is to
love his brother as well;" 5:1, . . and everyone who loves
the Father, loves the sons born of him;" 4:7, 8, "Beloved,
let us love one another, ... he who does not love, does
not know God, for God is love;" and 4:11, "Beloved, if God
had such love for us, we ought to love one another."
These references suffice to show that the brotherly
love as Jesus taught it and lived it with the inner circle
of believers is carried to fine expression in the Fourth
Gospel and the Three Epistles of John. One regrets the
neglect of the universal elements of man T s love for man as
implied in the Synoptic records of Jesus* teachings. 62 How-
ever such universality is certainly implied in the Johannine
definition of "God is love" and the injunction that inasmuch
as God loved us we ought to love the "sons born of him."
iv. Summary and Conclusions
Our review of the New Testament has revealed the teach-
ing of love as prominent and taking three distinct forms:
62. Perhaps the fact that John wrote to the Christian
community explains the limits to his application of love
and the neglect of the universal aspects of God*s love.
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God*s love, man*s love to God; and man f s love to man which
includes self-love and love of enemy. And, on the whole the
various Hew Testament sources (authors) are in essential
agreement. 63
However, despite the prominence of love and the essen-
tial agreement of Hew Testament writers on the subject there
is no coherent and comprehensive theory of love found there-
in, only the foundation for such. Jesus was not so much
concerned about systematic formulation as he was about lead-
ing people to the experience of love. But as we shall dis-
cover, subsequent considerations of Christian love lead to
theoretical development based on acceptance of the cardinal
points as enunciated in the Hew Testament.
A further fact of interest is noted in the tendency of
Hew Testament writers to dissociate love, as they conceived
it, from the usual base and sensual associations denoted by
the term in the social life of that era. They speak of love
in the fine and ennobling sense. This emphasis is reflected
in the use of the noun, jiTO-ftp , and the verb, to
designate love. This leads to the next section which con-
siders the nature of New Testament love as reflected in
these terms.
63. Self-love, clearly implied in "love thy neighbor
as thyself," receives no extended expression in the Hew
Testament but is clearly assumed. Cf . Knudson, PCE, 126 f.
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2. THE NATURE OF NEW TESTAMENT LOVE
i. Agape and Eros
The New Testament choice of words to express love has
led to a great deal of speculative thought which continues
into the present day.
The Greek language has three words for "to love;" name-
iy,
,
^2v_, Izraffau*. 6
4
Of these e/£V does not
appear in the New Testament. Of 4>iAe7iS and To- Tfeul the
latter appears more often. 65 Although they are close in
meaning, in many cases used synonomously, 66 there is a
difference. denotes the love of natural inclination,
affection spontaneous and involuntary. 67 Although 4>iAe iv
has a wider range than the latter stands higher
because of its moral import. JA denotes love as the
direction of the will. One might say it is <j> \
A
f-T\J refined
and imbued with intelligence. "It denotes the love which
chooses its object with decision of will . .
.
,
so that it
becomes self-denying or compassionate . . . "68 The differ-
ence appears to be one between love in its expression as
64. Of. Cremer, LNTG, 10. The use of ATGlfes first
appears as a current term in the Song of Solomon. It occurs
in Greek literature in a few places. Of. Thayer, GLNT, 4- f.
65. Cf. Vincent, WSNT, Vol. I, J.35 f. "So love is ex-
pressed by two words in the NT, (biAt S3 and '’av&Ttauj ."
66. Cf. Cremer, LNTG, 11.
67. Loc. cit. Also, Vincent, WSNT, Vol. I, 315.
68. Cremer, LNTG, 13. Cf. also, Vincent, WSNT, Vol. I,
315; and M f Neile, GAM, 148.
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"instinctive feeling” — the more primitive aspect of love,
and love as united with all the higher functions of person-
ality — reason, knowledge, ideals.
Although does not appear in the New Testament
J
u To. Tri\) is often understood in contrast to it. ogy was
the common Greek term denoting love in the more common ex-
perience. And, as the era was marked by its sensuality,
its lack of perspective on the function and use of sex,
naturally carried vulgar, sensual, degrading associa-
tions. And, Richardson contends, "the scriptures studiously
avoid the term eros because of its sexual connotation.” 69
Richardson* s account for the absence of eros is ques-
tionable. It was not the sexual connotation of eros that
prevented its use in the New Testament . It is true
,
sex as
sex receives antagonistic treatment in the writings of St.
Paul. But most of his antagonism can be explained in terms
of his apocolypticism (his belief that the last days were
close at hand, hence marriage was a hindrance). It is clos-
er to the facts to view the absence of eros as due to the
degradation of sexuality, not to the fact of sexuality it-
self. Hence eros is abandoned in favor of agape because of
its vulgar, sensuous, degrading connotations, not because it
included sex. 70 This viewpoint does not set aside any
69. Richardson, Art. (1943).
70. Of. Cremer, LNTG, 10. Also Fisher, RE, 252.
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differences between the eros and agape concepts, but it does
deny that the finer elements embraced by the eros concept
are forever excluded from love as conceived in the Mew Test-
ament . 7 ^
It is on the basis of Mew Testament use of agape to the
neglect of eros that Nygren formulates the thesis of his
ponderous work on Agape and Eros. 72 He contends that agape
is divine love, totally different from human love, and when
found in man it is not the result of his creative growth but
rather of God's presence in him. Nygren thus postulates two
types of love, agape
,
God's love (unmotivated, spontaneous),
and eros
,
man's love (motivated). And Christian love is
agape . 75
Nygren' s thesis depends upon the New Testament author's
implied distinction between eros and agape elements as re-
vealed in the use of the term agape . Such a precise dis-
tinction appears more to be the result of interpretation
than clear-cut evidence. For, as shown above, the New Test-
ament as a whole reveals the qualitative interrelation and
direct dependence of man's love to man, to God, and God's
71. That there were included in the eros concept of
the Greeks finer, creative elements is apparent in Plato's
reflections on eros . Cf. Richardson, Art. (1943). "Eros
is the principle of movement in the soul, whereby it ascends,
step by step up the mystical ladder, to the contemplation
of Essential Beauty."
72. Nygren, AE.
73. Nygren, AE, Vol. I, 73.
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love to man. Furthermore, if the above explanation of the
absence of the eros elements in the New Testament concept of
love be valid, then there is no adequate basis for denying
the finer elements of eros love in Christian love. At any
rate the appearance of the term agape to denote love in the
New Testament is inadequate as a basis for a theology of
love that would deny the worth of human love in its finest
sense. Such a viewpoint is incongruous with the high regard
for and evaluation of human personality that characterizes
Christianity.
ii. Emotion or Sentiment
The use of the term, agape
,
to conceptualize Christian
love suggests the canonical writers’ desire to avoid eros
abuses. The New Testament use of agape also suggests the
nature of the love so designated by the term.
Relative to the nature of love, two points are notice-
able. First the authors of scripture plainly imply that the
love they speak of is more than mere feeling, temporary emo-
tion. Eros was associated with the hot but temporary passion
characterizing sexual license and abuse. If this be all
that love is, it only separates, divides, and leads to
strife. But love carried other meanings, even in that era
dominated by its abuse.
The second point noticeable is the emphasis on love as
a creative, cohesive force that establishes a relationship
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between persons. In fact it is the condition of Christian
relationships. 7^ Love is spoken of in the larger sense as
inclusive of many related emotions, ideas, and actions. New
Testament love is associated with faith, truth, knowledge,
forgiveness, humility, loyalty, duty, obedience, trust,
service, helpfulness, and sacrifice. 75
Summarily, we find love composed of combinations of
feelings and ideas, which combination dominates action be-
tween persons that can be called Christian or Godlike. And
these are the elements which in organization comprise a
sentiment. 76 It is obvious that love as conceived in the
New Testament coincides with our definition. Hence psy-
chology of love (as herein defined) investigates the devel-
opment of Christian love (as herein defined).
3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A detailed review of the historical development of the
Christian doctrine of love is beyond necessity for the pur-
poses of this study. It will suffice to present briefly the
main lines of development or, more correctly, of continua-
tion.
74. Nygren
,
AE, Vol. I, 56, points out that in rela-
tions between man and God agape opens the way of fellowship.
75. Cf. Thayer, GLNT, 4 f.
76. Cf. below, p. 119.
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In the line of historical development no more influ-
ential figure is to be found than in the person and work of
Augustine. Indeed, his formulation of the Christian concept
of love continues as most influential to the present day.
The medieval period presents Thomas Aquinaa as its dominant
influence. Hence his work is considered. The Protestant
Reformation in the person of Luther offers modifications
to prevailing concepts and thus merits consideration. The
section will conclude with a survey of present tendencies.
i. Early Church: Augustine
The law of love was central in the thought of Augustine,
receiving considerable attention. 77 And, according to Knud-
son, it was he who first offered a coherent and comprehen-
sive theory of Christian love. 78
Augustine affirms what we have found as the three
aspects of the Christian concept of love; namely, God’s
love to man, man’s love to God, and man’s love to man. 79
Of these it is God’s love that stands as the source and end
of all love. Hence its key position in his theory.
77. Cf. Augustine, WAA, Vol. IX, 275, "On those two
commandments of love to God and love to our neighbor hang
not only all the law and the prophets, . . . but also all
those books of divine literature which have been written at
a later period for our health and consigned to remembrance."
78. Knudson, PCE, 128.
79. Cf. above, p. 17.
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"God is love” Augustine affirms, and ”A11 the command-
ments of God, then, are embraced in love . . ."80 it was
the love of God that caused the advent of Jesus. And this
outpouring of Divine love is the force that creates love as
response in the human soul. As he writes:
If, therefore, it was mainly for this
purpose that Christ came, to wit, that man
might learn how much God loves him; and
that he might learn this, to the intent
that he might be kindled to the love of Him
by whom he was first loved . .
Love in man is thus created by God and as such is his gift;
".
. . love which the Spirit of God sheds abroad in the
heart.”82
Just as God’s love is responsible for man’s love to
him so God’s love is central in man’s love for man. Our
neighbor is to be loved "in God."8^ "Every man is to be
loved as a man for God’s sake . .
.
,"
84 and in this love of
neighbor, love for self is included. 85
Man does not love the sinner in man, but
rather, God in man. Hence, in loving
neighbor, and also self, one is really
loving the divine image of God in man. b
80. Augustine, WAA, Vol. IX, 259.
81. Ibid., 274.
82. Ibid., 259.
83. Loc. cit.
84. Ibid., 23.
85. Loc. cit., ". . . our love for ourselves has not
been overlooked."
86. Knudson, PCE, 128.
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Thus, Augustine relates the elements of the Christian
doctrine of love in coherent fashion. God loves men; God’s
love creates love in response. Man loves God and he loves
God in his neighbor and in himself.
The nature of love as conceived by Augustine is indi-
cated in his use of terms. In the final sense all love is
craving love for "love sustains some relation to our own
good."87 But there are different types of this love deter-
mined by reference or lack of reference to God. Love that
is directed heavenward, i. _e., to God, is caritas . Augustine
defines this:
I mean by Charity (love) that affection
of mind which aims at the enjoyment of God
for His own sake, and the enjoyment of
one’s self and one’s neighbor in subor-
dination to God . . . 88
The opposite of caritas is cupiditas ; that is, love of the
flesh and world; love that is not subordinated to God. In
his words this love is lust:
... by lust I mean that affection of the
mind which aims at enjoying one’s self
and one’s neighbour, and other corporeal
things, without reference to God ,
87. Knudson, PCE, 129.
88. Augustine, WAA, Vol. IX, 90.
89. Ibid., 90 f. Augustine’s delineation of caritas
and cupiditas probably is basis for the Catholic doctrine of
sacred and profane love. This investigation will not con-
sider Catholic doctrine except insofar as it is embodied in
the thought of Augustine and Aquinas as herein presented.
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Thus we see that Augustine finds the uniqueness of Christian
love not beyond man but within, in the reference or object
of that love. He finds no objection to eros — self-love,
desire — as distinguished from purely unmotivated, giving
love, agape
,
as does Nygren. Both elements are accorded
rightful place, being combined in personality. In this
Augustine carries out the spirit of New Testament love.
ii. Medieval Church: Thomas Aquinas
The great systematizer of thought in the medieval
period, the "Angelic Doctor,” owes much to Aristotelian
influence, but in the realm of love his debt to Augustine
is more apparent. Aquinas, like Augustine, affirms the
basic elements of the Christian concept of love as ex-
pressed in the New Testament.
Reasoning from analogy to human love, Aquinas finds
that in God there is love, 90 and God loves all existing
things because he has created all. 91 But God does not love
all things equally. No, he loves more the better thing. 9 ^
Furthermore, God loves himself as well as others for, as he
qa
loves the good, he wills his own and other’s good. And
90. Cf. Aquinas, ST, Bk. I, Pt. 1, 286.
91. Ibid., 290.
92. Ibid., 291 f.
93. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. I, 191.
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the nature of God’s love is to be seen in its seeking good
for and union with the loved object. 94
Relative to man’s love, Aquinas finds four words
referring in a way to the same thing: love, delection,
charity, and friendship. 95 Of these ’’love” has the wider
significance. In man love is a passion, meaning that it
carries warmth. u Furthermore
,
to love is to wish someone
good. 17 ' As such it can move in two directions: towards
the good that is wished someone; and toward the object to
whom one wishes the good. 98 The former movement is ’’love
of concupiscence,” and the latter, ’’love of friendship.”"
Also, the former is "relative love,” and the latter, ”love
simply. The conditions of man’s love, Aquinas intimates,
are three: the good is the proper cause of love; knowledge
(intelligence) is necessary in love for ”... love demands
some apprehension of the good that is loved;" and likeness
(similarity)
Man’s love to God is a friendship with God, and, as
such,:’ is the gift of God due to the infusion of the holy
94. Aquinas, SCG, Bk. I, 191 f.
95. Aquinas, ST, Bk. II, Pt. 2, 315.
96. Ibid., 313 f.
97. Ibid., 317.
98. Loc. cit.
99. Loc. cit.
100. Ibid., 318. Also Flew, IPCT, 241.
101. Aquinas, ST, Bk. II, Pt. 2, 320 f.
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spirit. God is to be loved for himself and through him
other things may be loved.-1-02
Love first is to God; secondarily, to neighbor. But
man should love himself more than his neighbor, for God’s
sake.-1-03 The lover of others and God loves himself in
willing the good he desires. He also loves himself more
than another because of "likeness,” ". . . he is one with
himself substantially . . .”104
With Augustine, Aquinas finds that man loves because
God loves and gives love; that one, because of God’s love,
should love one’s neighbor; that in loving one’s neighbor
one loves God, so also with self.
It is most significant for Christian thought that these
two great churchmen agree, in the main, on the interpreta-
tion of love. This fact serves to provide Christianity with
a more or less unified concept of love and accounts for the
relative lack of controversy on the doctrine of Christian
love.
iii. Early Modern Church: Martin Luther
According to Nygren, Luther occupies a significant
place in the development of the Christian concept of love.
102. Cf. Flew, IPCT
,
241. Also, McGiffert, HCT, Vol.
2, 285.
103. Cf. Flew, IPCT, 286.
104. Cf. Aquinas, ST, Bk. II, Pt . 2, 323 f.
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He opposes the traditional Catholic view of love as deter-
mined by Augustine. Specifically, so Nygren maintains, he
purifies Christian love of the eros elements and reaffirms
agape . 1Q5
Luther affirms the New Testament basis of love: God's
love; man's love to God; and man’s love to man. God is love.
He affirms love as "that one, eternal, unutterable good and
supremest treasure which is God himself." 106 And God's love
is to be seen in the presentation of his son.
Love, according to Luther, is the essence of Divinity:
"It is . . . God himself." And, "If anyone would paint and
aptly portray God, then he must draw a picture of pure love
. . . God is nothing but an abyss of eternal love. "I07 As
love, God seeks to impart from the fullness of his riches.
Therefore he seeks out those "who are sinners, evil, foolish
and weak, and demonstrates its creative power in them by
making them righteous, good, wise and strong." 108
Luther's concept of God as love is the key to his total
concept. The Christian when he is dominated by love for his
neighbor is simply the channel for God's love. Jean's love
comes not from man but God himself. Divine love employs man
as its instrument. As Nygren summarizes it:
105. Cf. Nygren, AE, Vol. II, Bk. 2, 521.
106. Quoted by Nygren, ibid., 501.
107. Quoted by Nygren, ibid., 521.
108. Quoted by Nygren, ibid., 501.
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The Christian is set between G-od and his
neighbour. In faith he receives God f s love,
in love he passes it on to his neighbour.
Christian love is, so to speak, the extension
of God f s love. The Christian is not an in-
dependent centre of power alongside of God.
The love which he can give is only that which
he has received from God. Christian love
is through and through a Divine work.^09
The real opposition between Luther and Augustine is to
be found in the validity of self-love. Augustine finds this
love implied and accepts it in his theory; eliminating the
crude, selfish type of course. Indeed, Augustine finds
self-love fundamental in his framework of love. It is the
basis of human love and when refined leads to love of God.
But Luther will have nothing to do with self-love. It is
utterly perverse; to be totally annihilated. "Love to one*s
neighbour, he holds, has the task of completely disposses-
sing and annihilating self-love ."HO
Although Luther fathers the Protestant Reformation and
has exerted great influence, his concept of Christian love
has had little acceptance. But he together with Augustine
and Aquinas represent the two different constructions that
have been put around the teachings of love as found in the
New Testament.
109. Nygren, AE, Vol. II, Bk. 2, 516.
110. Ibid., 495.
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iv. Modern Church: Present Tendencies
Present tendencies relative to the issue of Christian
love can be dealt with summarily. It can be said that the
aspects of Christian love are affirmed today, as in all
historical development, in full support of Hew Testament
teaching.
Practical dealings with Christian love follow two gener-
al movements. The church, in general, affirms the central-
ity of love and preaches the "way of love" as alternative to
present chaos and strife. But there is widespread disagree-
ment as to the workings of and the means of establishing love
with consequent confusion of meaning. However all agree on
"love" and, probably, agreement is possible because of con-
fusion.
The second general movement of practical import is em-
bodied in the pacifist movement which interprets love in
terms of non-violence and active goodwill and takes an "all-
out" stand on relevant issues.
Within the theoretical realm a similar dichotomy of
movement is discernable. The so-called "crisis theologians"
with their "interim ethic," ^transcendent God," and "impos-
sible, irrelevant ideals" tend to neglect, negate or post-
pone the ethic of love. 111 This group has more in common
with Luther.
111. So Niehbur, ICE.
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The second movement is made by those who consider love
of immediate and practical relevancy. This movement has
more in common with Augustine. The major concern of this
group centers around the nature of love as indicated in the
terms agape and eros . This whole question was opened by
I\ygren*s historical study of the Christian concept of love,
Agape and Eros.^® This author finds three concepts of
love — Greek, Hebrew and Christian — mingling in the
historical development of the Christian idea of love.
Nygren*s thesis (two kinds of love, eros and agape , and
Christian love is agape ) is suggestive; his labors ponder-
ous; but his basis of differentiation of agape and eros
,
the
New Testament use of agape to denote love, is the Achilles*
heel of his labor over love. Though the New Testament omits
the common Greek term for love, eros, and though it uses
agapan instead of philein .^14 this does not provide suffi-
cient basis for the conclusion that Jesus and Canonical
authors referred to a totally new and different kind of
love, agape .115
The desire to avoid the sensual, crass and vulgar
associations of love in the term, eros
,
is explanation
112. As Knudson in PCE, 118-134.
113. Nygren, AE.
114. Cf. above, p. 35.
115. Cf. above, p. 36.
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sufficient for the use of agape and justification insuffi-
cient for Nygren’s peregrinations among love writings, re-
sulting in Procrustean separation of love that desires
(so-called eros ) from love that gives (so-called agape )
.
Nygren T s work has set both theologians and psychologists of
the present day in pursuit of two kinds of love (desiring
love vs. giving love) only to stumble over problems of
reconcillation
.
4. STATEMENT OF TEE DOCTRINE FOR PURPOSES
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
Extended consideration of the New Testament concept
of love and its historical treatment reveal two foci: God
and man. God is love and loves; and man is to love. This
is the heart of the Christian doctrine of love.
As previously stated, the limitation of psychology as a
science precludes the attempt to study God’s love. That is
the proper scope of theology and philosophy, which leaves
for study man’s love, the proper province of psychology.
However this is not to contend that psychological study of
man T s love is of no significance to the concept of God’s
love. On the contrary, psychological study of man’s love will
reveal many facts which any view of God’s love must explain.
116. As does Richardson, Art. (1943).
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This investigation, then, concerns those elements of
the Christian doctrine that relate to man’s love. Statement
of those elements could not be more precisely formulated
than in the original statement found in the Gospels: "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and
mind and strength; and thy neighbour as thyself." Man’s
love — that is the problem. We turn next to modern psychol-
ogies to formulate from their studies a psychology of love
which will give understanding of the processes through vrtiich
man achieves the ability to love God and his neighbor.
.•
'
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CHAPTER III
THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LOVE
Love defined as a sentiment concerns primarily mental
organization. However the accepted principle of psycho-
physical correlation-*- establishes a physical basis for the
sentiment of love.
This chapter considers as significant to the under-
standing of love three aspects of the body-mind problem:
1) organic structure; 2) physiological function; and 3) or-
ganic experience. Data and theory sufficient to establish
the relevance of these three aspects are considered.
1. ORGANIC STRUCTURE
Organic maldevelopment
,
injury, and disease can render
the development of love impossible or result in character
organizations that exclude love.
Organic maldevelopment is most clearly revealed in
intelligence differences. The constancy of intelligence
quotients points to an inherited cerebral difference. Like-
wise the wide differences in mental abilities point to wide
1. As William D. Nietmann expresses it: "So long as
there is an organism that mediates between stimulus and re-
sponse, physiological psychology is possible, and psycho-
physical correlation obtains in some sense." Cf. unpublished
dissertation, A Philosophical Principle for Interpreting
Psychological Data and Theory
,
1945, Boston University.
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differences in mental structure. Below the normal range of
intelligence occur in descending order the stages of moron,
imbecile, and idiot. Individuals falling within these stages
cannot achieve the normal ranges of character development.
The idiot is little more than a living organism. As shall
be shown in Chapter V,
2
the ability to conceive adequately
what is beyond the human is necessary to the development of
Christian love. This ability is not within possibility to
the lower levels of subnormal mental capacities.
Numerous studies point to differences in brain structure
as basis for differences in mental abilities. Knott reports
a small but positive correlation between alpha frequency and
intelligence level on the electroencephalogram. 5 Anatomical
studies reveal correlation between myelin sheath development
and intelligence and motor co-ordination. 4 Old age brings
shrinkage of the brain correlated with senility and senile
dementia. Also, loss of mental ability is to be seen in
tertiary syphilis or paresis in which the resultant brain
lesions cause atrophy of the gray matter. 5 Knott reports
the effect of encephalitis (a disease of the brain) upon the
intelligence quotient of a child. Before the illness the
I. Q,. was 145; during the course of recovery I. Q,.'s of 118,
2. Cf. below, p. 137.
3. Knott, Art.
-
(1934), 949.
4. Cf. Woodworth, AM, 81, and Allport, PER, 148 f.
5. Cobb, Art. (1944), 559.
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134, and 145 were obtained. 6 Cobb reports that injury to
both frontal areas of the brain results in n a limitation of
the capacity to associate and synthesize (impaired selec-
tion, retention, and learning).” 7
The established effects of organic disease and injury
on character also indicates the importance of physical basis
to love. Senility is often accompanied by deterioration of
character controls that permit dominance by sexual feeling
exhibited in flagrant sexual behavior. The onset of paresis
begins the progressive deterioration of mental ability and
character organization. Cobb summarizes the advanced symp-
toms of paresis as coarse, ill-mannered, irritable, forget-
ful; or euphoric, omnipotent, dishonest, spectacular. 8
Brain injuries and tumors can result in marked person-
ality changes. 9 Muncie and Meyer report that cerebral arter-
ioschlerosis results in headaches, insomnia, irritability,
temper outbursts, psychoneurotic traits (obsessions, hypo-
chondrias), sexual adventuring of a flagrant type, and
alcoholism. 10 Henry Head found that thalamic lesions corre-
late with disturbance in emotional experience. 11
6. Knott, Art. (1934), 950.
7. Cobb, Art. (1944), 569.
8. Ibid., 559.
9. Ibid., 571-559; Muncie and Meyer, PP, 433 f.
10. Muncie and Meyer, PP, 434.
11. Reported in Morgan, PP, 136 f.
.'
'it . .-•!
’
.
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
55
Studies in sex reveal that sex structure influences
psychic life. Castration, especially in youth and young
manhood brings marked psychic as well as physical changes.
Pre-pubertal castration prevents normal development of
secondary sexual characteristics. Hormonal treatment of
castration and eunachoidism results in marked mental chang-
es.
I
2 The experimental transplantation of testes and ova-
ries in animal females and males reveal character differences
directly related to physical structure.-1'3
Endocrine dysfunctions due to organ insufficiency or
maldevelopment also affect interrelated organ structures.
For example it is definitely established that intellectual
development is dependent upon normal secretion of the thyroid
gland . -1-4
The foregoing studies indicate the dependence of normal
mental organization upon normal organic structure. However,
closely related to and as significant as organic structure is
organic function.
2 . ORGANIC FUNCTION
Although organic structure and function are closely
correlated, distinction in influence on character can be made.
12. Moore, Art. (1940), 421. Cf. Stone, Art. (1940),
1219, for report on reaction of a young medical student to
injection of male hormones.
13. Cf. Steinach, SL, 73 ff., 84; Domm, Art. (1940),
276 f.; and Hoskins, END, 202 ff., and 224 ff.
14. Shock, Art. (1944), 603.
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Normal structure is not always necessary to normal function
as revealed in brain injuries and operations in which normal
bilateral functions can be carried on unilaterally. Nor, on
the other hand, does normal structure guarantee normal func-
tion.
The relevance of physiological processes to the develop-
ment of love is clearly revealed in the role that abnormal
function plays in character abnormalities. The influence of
normal thyroid secretion upon intellectual development has
been noted. Thyroid deficiency causes cretinism. In such
cases both physical and mental development follow with the
administration of thyroxin.! 5 Anoxia brings a more or less
regular progression of psychological events, "the first of
which is the loss of critical ability, including the capaci-
ty for self-criticism."^6 Blood sugar levels affect behavior.
Deficiency affects first the more complex mental functions
as association and memory, as well as bringing alterations
in mood, increased irritability, and vague feelings of appre-
hension.!7 Increased alkalinity of blood chemistry increases
muscle and nerve excitability.!®
Endocrinological studies of gonadal hormones reveal the
physiological effect on mental organization. Steinach by
15. Vaughan, GP, 199.
16. Shock, Art. (1944), 585.
17. Cf. ibid., 589.
18. Cf. ibid., 591.
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transplantation of ovary to castrated male rat produced a
’’feminized male” which suckled young and permitted attempts
at intercourse. 19 Allen reports experiments in which use of
estrogen on males revealed its inhibitory effect on normal
masculine reactions. 20 Studies of homosexuals have revealed
a disturbance of normal balance of hormones in the urine and
disbalance of secondary sexual characteristics, suggesting a
physiological basis for some cases of homosexuality. 21
Eunachoidism, so named because of its similarity to euna-
chism, is ascribed to the subnormal presence of the male sex
hormone. 22 The climacteric of woman is closely associated
with the cessation of ovarian function.
The effect of drugs upon motor and mental efficiency
also shows the dependence of mental organization upon the
physiological state of the organism. Alcohol reduces effi-
ciency and, as commonly known, lowers the controls of char-
acter. Benzadrine sulphate and caffeine, in proper amounts,
increase efficiency, heighten confidence and general mood.
Barbiturates, aspirin, bromides are depressants. Marihuana
distorts perception of time and space and confuses orienta-
tion and memory. Morphine and other opium derivatives in
19. Steinach, SL, 64.
20. Allen, Hisaw, and Gardner, Art. (1940), 507.
21. Pratt, Art. (1940), 1277.
22. Moore, Art. (1940), 421.
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non-addicts, result in depression and lowered motor and
mental efficiency. 23
Concluding evidence establishing the close relationship
of physiological and mental processes comes from Benedek and
Rubenstein f s correlation between ovarian activity and psycho-
dynamic processes. They found that following menstruation
there is a gradual increase for ten days to two weeks of the
estrogenic or follicular hormones and paralleling this,
psychologically, an outward emotional orientation, marked by
interest in the opposite sex. Thus estrogenic hormones
stimulate sexual interests and activities.
The relationship of organic structure and function to
mental organization warrants the postulation of a physical
principle: within wide limits proper organic structure and
function and associated experience are necessary to the
organization of character around the sentiment of love .
The necessity of organic structure to love is most clearly
revealed by the extremes, <e. £., the idiot is incapable of
love; the advanced paretic is incapable of normal love rela-
tionships; and likewise with organic function and love,
e. £. , the cretin is incapable of love, the dope addict is
lost to love relationships. Influential experience associ-
ated with organic areas is considered in the next section.
23. Spragg, Art. (1941). The material in this para-
graph follows Spragg's summary closely.
24. Benedek and Rubenstein, Art. (1939).
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Organic development, dysfunction, illness and health
are the traditional concerns of medicine. However, as
revealed above, Christianity has a stake in physical health
to the extent of organic influence upon love. The church as
the institution promoting Christian love must encourage and
co-operate with health agencies and professions. Public
sanitation through relation to bodily health is related to
love. Especially important is the field of preventive
medicine. Organic maidevelopment and dysfunction needs to
be discovered early in life for then correction is more
effective. Summarily, it may be stated that organized
Christianity contributes to the realization of Christian
love in individuals by promoting physical health measures.
3 . ORGANIC EXPERIENCE
Normal organ structure and function are necessary to
the development of love. However physical influence goes
beyond these. The aspect most significant is the influen-
tial role the physical basis plays in infantile experience.
In infancy bodily organs are the center of experience, and
character trends are established in relation to them.
Psychoanalytic psychology has explored the period of
infancy, establishing its significance and incorporating the
findings in theoretical formulas. This section summarizes
the findings and at the same time critically considers
psychoanalytic theories.
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i. Psychosexuality
The psychoanalytic concept of psychosexual development
is clearly related to physiological development. 25
Freud’s studies led him to sex as the all important
factor in personality development. Two aspects of sex were
discernible and incorporated in the term psychosexuality,
psyche (mental) and soma (organic). Separation of the two
aspects is possible only in theory. 26
Psychosexuality includes more than commonly comprised
in the term "sex." The term "sexuality” goes "lower and
also higher than the popular sense of the word."27 It in-
cludes, in addition to sexual love with sexual union as its
aim,
. . . self love, . . . love for parents
and children, friendship, and love for
humanity in general, and also devotion
to concrete objects and to abstract
ideas. 8
Thus, following Freud, Hendricks defines psychosexuality as
comprised of
25. Freud saw the correlation of psyche and soma when
he wrote "We must recollect that all our provisional ideas
in psychology will some day be placed on an organic substra-
tum." Cf. Freud, CP, Vol. IV, 56.
26. Cf. Peck, MP, 37, "Briefly, Freud found that the
sexual function in very early years was fused and merged
with many body functions, such as those of the mouth, rectum
and others ..."
27. Quoted in Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 4.
28. Quoted in loc. cit.
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all aspects of love and pleasure-seeking,
and their mutual interrelationships; it
emphasizes unconscious wishes for sensual
gratification and their conscious de-
erotized derivatives, normal and abnormal,
as well as wishes which culminate in
complete and mature heterosexual union. 29
Allport finds such a definition as typically Freudian
and so inclusive as to be meaningless; that in practice, the
Freudians translate this broad concept into a doctrine of
sexuality in its narrower sense. 30 If Allport meant that
they reduce psychosexuality to its physiological aspect, his
criticism merits agreement. For the Freudians do set up a
formula including psyche and soma, but reduce it to soma
with its effects on psyche.
The psychoanalysts, studying infancy through the neu-
rotically ill, discovered in that period the dominance of
soma and concluded that it extended throughout life, an
obvious overgeneralization.
Soma does play its determinative part in the early
years, though psyche is not absent or inactive. In the
later years beyond childhood the psyche exerts its influence
and comes into its consequent dominant role. 31 This inter-
pretation holds that the psychoanalytic emphasis is valid
£9. Hendricks, FTP, 299.
30. Of. Allport, PER, 187.
31. This view accounts for the fact that neurotic
breakdowns come most usually in later years when the psyche
has asserted itself and can oppose soma and its influence.
..
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as it pertains to infancy and early childhood. But to ex-
tend the over-all dominance of soma, as they have, is one-
sided and misleading. As Jastrow writes:
The cardinal error of Freud T s conjectural
genetic psychology is the assumption that
the primal form in psychic development is
in essence the final form . . .32
ii. Infantile Psychosexuality
Mo discovery of psychoanalysis has been more contro-
verted than that of the sexual life of infant and child. To
regard sex, defined narrowly or broadly, as the whole story
of infantile development is certainly questionable, but that
the infant and child have significant sexual experiences is
definitely established.
The fact of infantile sexuality was first noted by Freud
and formulated in detail in his paper "Drei Abhand lungen zur
Sexualtheorie " (1905). 33 And his theory has been accepted
and continued with few extensions by his followers. True,
his position was arrived at through study of adult neurot-
ics, ^ but careful observation of normal children has added
32. Jastrow, MFB, 197.
33. In translation, Three Contributions to Sexual
Theory . Cf. Freud, BW, 553 ff.
34. Cf. Freud, BW, 598, MThe assumption of the pre-
genital organizations of the sexual life rests on the ana-
lysis of the neuroses and can scarcely be appreciated without
a knowledge of these." Cf. also, 941.
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its data in support of material gained through psychoanaly-
sis. 55
The psychic energetic counterpart of psychosexuality is
termed "libido." 56 This is a quantitative concept of psychic
energy, the investment of which constantly varies. It is
present in childhood (though its manifestations there differ
from those in the adult) . It does not belong exclusively
nor primarily to the sexual organs but may become associated
with any body area. However, in the normal individual, lo-
calization in the genitals occurs by the end of the fifth
year. 57
The psychic experience of libido is pleasure. The
erogenous zones when stimulated result in pleasure and
gratification. And pleasure with its opposite, pain, is the
basis for the psychic organizations that take root in infan-
cy, such as love for and dependence on the mother. Psychoan-
alysis early recognized the significance of the "pleasure
principle," asserting its primacy. But later developments
35. Cf. Hendricks, FTP, 52 ff
.
,
for a summary of the
material concerned. Cf. also Freud, CP, Vol. Ill, 149 ff.,
and Bell, Art. (1902). Sullivan, Art. (1926), refers to a
case of a ten months old boy manipulating the penis. The
most thorough objection to the psychoanalytic position is
that of Jastrow in EFB. However he accepts the fact of
psychosexuality. Cf. 226. He objects to the "amazing
derivations" illogically derived from the fact.
36. "That force by which the sexual instinct is rep-
resented in the mind, we call libido." Freud quoted by
Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 2.
37. Cf. Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 3 ff.
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•led Freud and his followers to conclude that the "reality
principle" eventually takes precedence over the "pleasure
principle."38 Freud and psychoanalysts see the relation
of the "pleasure principle" to the soma aspects of life and
the "reality principle" to the psyche aspect. They see that
the soma aspects are more determinative in infancy and
childhood, especially so in the sexual aspect of life, so
the "pleasure principle" is therein dominant. 39
(1). The Oral Stage
The first natural erogenous area consists of the lips.
This is the first center of pleasure and appears to be
essential to the maintenance of life for it assures the in-
take of necessary food. The pleasure and gratification of
lip stimulation is the first source of stimulus to psychic
orientation. The mother becomes associated with the pleasure
and gratification of the oral receptors and soon stands in
her own right as necessary to the needs and satisfactions of
the infant; so also, in the case of the father but relatively
less because of the less intimate role that cultural pattern
assigns to him. In this situation can be seen the mutual
38. Cf. Freud, CP, Vol. IV, 13 ff.
39. Ibid., 17.
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operation of psychic and somatic factors that militates
against separation of the two, even theoretically. 4^
Abraham enlarged Freud’s concept of the oral stage to
include two subdivisions: first, the sucking; and second,
the biting which naturally occurs when the child develops
teeth and finds pleasure in chewing. 41
It is of significance to character development that
oral needs be met. Vicissitudes follow both deprivation and
overindulgence. The overindulged can become the overly
optimistic adult who "expects the mother’s breast to flow
for him eternally . . ."42 He is the individual to whom the
world owes a living. He knows how to get but not how to
give. This is antithetical to the development of love. On
the other hand, undue deprivation in the sucking period can
lead to the grasping, demanding, aggressive, talkative or
frustrated type of individual. 43 He feels unwanted, lacks a
sense of security. Such an individual is always seeking for
something (love) that cannot be found for he is often fixated
on the deprived infantile level.
40. That the psyche is active in the infant as well as
the soma is indicated by the fact that the infant establishes
a dependency relationship to the mother and not to the
nursing bottle.
41. Abraham, SPP, 19 and 396. Also Allen, MDMP, 121.
42. Abraham, SPP, 399.
43. Ibid., 400 f.
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The foregoing characteristics do not exhaust the possi-
ble influences for all sorts and ranges of combinations are
possible both within the oral stage and its combination with
the anal and genital stages. It is obvious that deprivation
or overindulgence can result in character formations that
render an individual unsuitable for any established rela-
tionship, hence unable (or able only with greatest difficulty)
to love.
The analysts make extreme claims and far reaching inter-
pretations of oral influence on character. Their evidence
(though not always cogently presented) and practical results
establish the validity of their general position. However
in view of the evidence that is still lacking, it seems that
their work substantiates a much more modest position than
what they assume. Such a position is well taken by Murray
who finds sufficient basis for three oral complexes only;
namely, "the oral succorance complex" (dependence), "the
oral aggression complex," and "the oral rejection complex."44
It is not necessary to posit an inherent oral drive to
account for the influence of oral activities on character.
One needs only to remember that the overindulgence or depri-
vation can usually be traced to the character of the mother
44. Murray, EP, 370 ff. This author thinks of "com-
plex" in terms of "need integrates" and as such basic in
character formation. For a critical review of theory on
oral character formation, cf. Glover, Art. (1925).
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who cares for oral needs, and to realize that environment
greatly influences this stage of development. The nature of
this influence is more than apt to remain beyond infancy.
Hence, resulting character traits begun in the period of
oral dominance are continually trained into the growing
child.
(2). The Anal Stage
The oral period does not expire with the advent of the
anal period. There is overlapping. The anal period begins
around the age of six months, and lasts until approximately
the third year.
As in the oral stage the pleasure of the infant is
still autoerotic, but it is now centered around the anal
region. In this period the child *s ego becomes better
established in the realization that a world exists which
makes necessary demands upon him. However the pleasure
principle is still dominant over the reality principle.
According to Jones there are two phases to what Freud
originally formulated as a single stage; namely, pleasure
in the act of defecation (twofold, expulsion and retention)
and pleasure in the product. 45 The retention of feces
45. Cf. Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 320. Abraham
concurs in this division. Cf. SPP, 373. Cf. also Murray,
EP, 380.
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and urine can induce pleasurable sensations as can also the
act of expulsion. And the feces and urine, warm and fragrant
(to the child), add to the pleasure of achievement. 46
The production of feces and urine represent a power to
the infant. He can present them as a gift of love or as a
present, for they are his creation. At the same time he can
withold them and thus refuse demands made upon him, or he
can use them to soil and trouble and thus revenge himself.
Thus the sadistic element is often associated with the anal
functions. The period is sometimes referred to as "anal-
sadistic.”
The child learns early that the parents place great
weight on stool training. So he acclimates himself out of
love for or fear of the parent. But the demand for cleanli-
ness is a frustrating experience to the child. Too much
emphasis on stool training can contribute to developing
characters abnormally concerned with cleanliness or punctil-
iousness, which characteristics can rule individuals and
their relations with others. 47 Too early demand on the part
of parents for sphincter control can produce submissive,
resigned children who may harbor tremendous unconscious
desires for revenge. 48 Too much emphasis on the anal functions
46. Abraham, SPP, 372 f.
47. Cf. ibid., 376, for an example.
48. Ibid., 374.
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can lead to retardation or to later regressions to the anal
stage of libido development.
The influence of the anal stage on character was dis-
covered earlier than that of the oral stage, and has, con-
sequently, been more fully explored. Freud found love of
orderliness, parsimony (miserliness) and obstinacy as anal-
erotic character traits in the neurotics. From this begin-
ning many character types have been traced to the influence
of the anal-erotic stage: stinginess, miserliness, stubborn
ness, perseverance, independence, and tendencies toward
collecting — of stamps, coins, and what not.
Despite some overenthusiast ic developments, the general
position of psychoanalysis on anal-erotic influence on
character is tenable and demands consideration. 49 Signifi-
cance for the development of love lies in the possibility of
abnormal development through distorted emphasis or influence
on the part of the child’s intimate environment. Character
can be fixated on the anal level, and the formation of
character can be dominated by preoccupation with anal in-
terests. That such domination is detrimental to love is
seen in the characteristics that can result from fixation
49. As Murray in EP, 379, "The psychoanalysts have
clearly demonstrated that the association in infancy of
certain general attitudes with defecatory activities may be
of considerable importance in the later development of the
personality."
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due to retardation or regression: Characteristics, such as
preoccupation with excretory activity (overemphasis, worry,
and the like), lewd thoughts and language, throwing things
about, firing guns, disrupting, dismembering, mutilating,
untidiness, disorganization, disrespectfulness
,
wastefulness
,
withdrawing, reticence, secretiveness, distantness, miserli-
ness, greediness, hoarding, fearfulness of dispossession,
resistance, obstinacy, negativism, rejection, obsessive
tidiness, being easily upset. 50
It follows that it is important for the development of
love that the child be properly trained in anal and urethral
functions and in his attitude toward them. Common sense
dominated by love, practicing patience, guided by under-
standing, and issuing in self-sacrifice, is the best guide. 51
The final frustration in the anal period ( c . fourth
year) comes when the world through the media of parents and
siblings sufficiently impresses upon the child that he is
not the center of interest. He realizes that the loved
parent loves the other parent, perhaps even in preference to
him. This is a hard blow for the child. The conditions of
this struggle are contained in the so-called ’’Oedipus situ-
ation” dominated by the ”castration complex." These factors
50. Murray, EP, 381 f.
51. Lorand, PT, 27.
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are prominent in the next stage, the "phallic" or early
genital. They are considered in the next section.
(3). The Genital Stage
In the genital period of psychosexual development the
genital zone becomes the primary erotic area. This period
has two substages, the phallic or early genital and the late
genital. 52
The phallic stage is entered usually by the fourth year
of the child’s life. However, the entry of this stage does
not necessarily mean the complete cessation of the oral and
anal. 53 Erotic interest is primarily narcissistic with
interest centered in the child’s own genitalia.
This period is marked by the spontaneous awakening of
sexual curiosity associated with sexual excitation. 54
Masturbation is dominant in this period. Sexual curiosity
gives rise to sexual theories in which the facts of sexual
life are characteristically distorted by the child mind. 55
The determining sexual concept of the child arises from
observed or suspected male and female differences. Its
52. Cf. Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 86; also
Brown, PAB, 193.
53. Brown, PAB, 194.
54. Cf. Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 99.
55. Cf. ibid., 94 ff. for a summary of the child’s
sexual theories.
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setting is known as the "Oedipus-situation," the key to
which is the so-called "castration complex. "^6
The centering of erotic interest in the genitalia and
the consequent expanding love interest brings the child to
desire, for the first time, a sexual object outside and
other than itself. Because of the nature of family life
this choice naturally falls on parents. The mother, because
of her role, is the first love object of both male and
female child. The male child, however, soon discovers his
father as competitor and fearful rival. At this point he
interprets the absence of penis in the female as due to
castration and fears similar consequences from his love
rival, such fear being made real by threats made against
masturbation. 58 This fear forces the boy to repress his
sexual love for the mother and to include his father. This
repression of infantile sexuality includes repression of the
oral and anal interests as all are associated, no differ-
entiation being made as yet. The boy, then takes within his
56. These concepts are evaluated below, p. 75 ff.
57. Brown, PAB, 194.
58. In psychoanalytic psychology castration means more
than fear of actual castration. The term covers all sorts
of painful retaliations on the part of parents because of
the infant’s sexual and aggressive desires. Freud called it
the castration complex for the reason that in its severe
pathological manifestations it is always actual castration
that is feared. Cf. Brown, PAB, 197. Sullivan, Art. (1926),
9 f. points out that the castration complex is the result of
the impression of threats made as disciplinary measures, in
other words, a product of the environment.
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mental life ( "intro jects" ) the attitudes of the father.
This is the origin of the superego.
The results of the Oedipus situation are similar for the
female but accomplished through a different sequence. 59 Her
results are repression of infantile sexuality, identification
with the mother, and acceptance of the feminine role. 60
The repressions that bring to an end the phallic period
culminate in the "latency period" which extends from ap-
proximately the fifth year to puberty. This is a period in
which the issues of the love life lie dormant with love
energy sublimated to the other interests of life.
At the dawn of puberty there is a gradual revival of
all the infantile sex stages. 61 The phallic stage again
dominates but soon phallic interest turns to objective geni-
tal interest. Characteristic of this change is the change
from self-love to object love. However, the castration
threat still remains. Consequently the first love objects
59. Less is known relative to the development of the
girl in this stage. Theory is highly speculative at this
point.
60. The foregoing description of the Oedipus situation
and operation of the castration complex follow the typical
portrayals that are found in psychoanalytic literature.
Freud* s basic work is presented in CP, Vol. II, 244 ff. and
269 ff. For summaries of the phallic period cf. English and
Pearson, CNCA, 35 ff., Brown, PAB, 193 ff.; Hendricks, FTP,
39 ff.; and Lorand, FT, 76 ff. On the Oedipus situation and
castration complex cf. Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 128 ff
.
61. Cf. Brown, PAB, 202.
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of puberty are apt to be of a homosexual nature. But the
renewed sex interest leads to the investment of love in the
normal heterosexual object.
Whether one accepts the sexual interpretation of the
Oedipus situation, as the Freudians, or looks upon it, in
general, as the romance of family relationships, it is
beyond doubt of great significance to the development of
love. It is fact that one T s relationships with mother and
father to great extent determine one’s relationships to
other men and women. 62 For relationship with parents comes
first and during the most impressionable years. 63
In general there are two types of relationships to
parents that are inimical to love relationships: fixation
on parent and rejection by parent. The former prevents
development to the point of loving culturally approved ob-
jects, therefore development of love to the greater relation-
ship with God is hindered. The latter sets a pattern of
refusal of love object that can extend to all persons (even
God) similar to the rejected parent.69 The child needs love
62. Cf. Sears, SOSPC, 136, "From the analysis of data
relating to object choice, it is apparent that in this mat-
ter perhaps more than in any other the nature of the chosen
object and the reactions to other similar or dissimilar
objects are dependent on the early home environment of the
child ."
63. Cf. below, p. 192 f.
64. Dr. Carrol Wise told of speaking to a boy’s group
to whom he spoke of God as like our fathers . To which a
young redhead replied, "If God is like my father, to hell
with him’.’’
«
•
r
~
-
'
. .
.
• '
.j .1 ? ... .-li » :• J 'ft
:
n c- i * al
.
.
.
.
’
o
. t
;i. , . •
.
.
.
;
’
75
but not overlove that conduces to fixation; needs a wise
love that is willing to trust the child to do for itself;
needs a love that is devoted to the life interests of the
child and not to the self-satisfactions of the love rela-
tionship.
iii. Evaluation
This investigation reveals basis for agreement with
psychoanalytic psychology on the place and importance of
infancy and childhood in character formation. And, though
many psychologists find it impossible to accept psychoanal-
ysis as a whole, there is little dispute about what should
be considered the important activities of infancy. 65
The Freudians applied the properties of adult genital
sexuality to infantile activities and interpreted them as
broadly sexual. Freud based his interpretation on several
clinical observations: the fact that sexual strivings are
directed not exclusively toward heterosexual objects, but
also toward homosexual objects, or the self, or animals;
and the fact that sexual aim is aroused not always by a
partner of the opposite sex, but also by sadistic, maso-
chistic, voyeuristic, and exhibitionistic practices. 66
65. Murray, EP, 286 f.
66. Of. Horney, NWP, 48 f.
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In light of these observations Freud concluded that the
sexual instinct is not a unit but a composite. The sexual
instinct is thus characterized by sexual energy (libido)
which may be localized with equal intensity at the mouth,
anus, eyes or other erogenic zones as well as at the genitals.
And since the ’extra-genital’ expressions of sexual energy
prevail in early childhood they are labelled ’pre-genital.*
Horney has pointed out that the basis for interpreting
pre-genital activities as sexual is in the Freudian concept
that correlates sexuality with all bodily sensations of a
pleasurable nature. 67 Evidence in support of this concept
is slim. Freud pointed to the similarity of expression
between childish satiety in oral or anal activities and
adult genital satiety. But analogy is not evidence and this
is an unwarranted inference.
Further evidence is on better ground but hardly cogent.
Freud points to the fact that non-sexual body cravings may
alternate with sexual desire, but such substitution does not
prove that one is related to the other; and to the fact that
adult sexual regressions often settle on the oral or anal
level, but this proves only the extreme lability of the sex-
ual drive.
On the whole the Freudian view of oral and anal pleasure
as sexuality is unproved. It can hardly be denied that
67. Cf. Horney, JMWP, 50 f.
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pleasure zones exist. But are these pleasure zones qualita-
tively different from the genital zone?
The nature of infancy and childhood makes any interpre-
tation an inference. But in view of the fact that oral and
anal activities come into prominence before the genital, it
seems more consistent to regard the pleasurable activities
of infantile organ areas as undifferentiated, with later
developments influenced by experience and self-activity
introducing differences. Thus oral and anal activities and
interests can or cannot acquire sexual significance for the
individual. This is in accord with the facts.
The concept of the erotic nature of infantile activities
boils down to little more than the fact that several sources
of pleasurable stimulation are somehow related to one anoth-
er. 68 Evidence supports the view that infantile activities
are pleasurable and of great significance to character
formation. 69
Various studies reveal that activities and interests of
a sexual nature do exist in childhood. The most extensive
study is that of Isaacs who noted among other factors the
genital activities of 31 English children in her nursery
school. Her observations agree with the Freudian position
68. Sears, SOSPC, 21.
69. Objective (scientific) studies which substantiate
the Freudian emphasis on oral, anal, and genital activities
are reviewed by Sears, SOSPC, 1-22.
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that genital activities are very common among children of
pre-school age. 7^ Hattendorf’s study (in which Minneapolis
mothers were queried on the sex questions of their children)
revealed that 1800 children of the co-operating mothers had
asked questions revealing sexual interests. Between the
ages of two and five years the ranking question concerned
the origin of babies, closely followed by the question of
physical sex differences
.
7 1
But the sex activities and interests of children do
not establish oral and anal activities and interests as
basically sexual in nature. They can be described in sexual
terms of the very broad sense, but not in the Freudian terms,
insofar as they are actually on the more narrow basis of sex
(genitality)
.
72
The foregoing criticism seems to ignore the protesta-
tions of the Freudian school. They quite easily claim that
they have been criticized under the influence of a concept
of sexual that is quite narrow and limiting, hence beside
the point. They might prefer to label their sexual instinct
the 'love’ or 1 life’ instinct, as they do! They think not
of sexual in the genital sense as is the common habit.
70. Cf. Isaacs, SDYC
.
71. Cf. Hattendorf, Art. (1952). Cf. also, above,
footnote, p. 63, for references on the subject of infantile
sex life.
72. Cf. above, p. 60 f.
•'
.
. .
.
.
.
•
•
.
,
.
-
.
.
79
Thus, perhaps, Freud is the victim of terminological diffi-
culties .
If we substitute the term ’love’ for sex and interpret
the essence of love, especially in its origins, as pleasure
that conduces to the establishment of personal relationships,
then we find little to criticize in the Freudian interpre-
tation of infantile sexuality. But, though the Freudians
insist on a broad and inclusive interpretation of sexuality,
it is one so broad as to have little application. Hence in
practice they reduce the concept to sexuality in the narrow
sense.
Objective studies do not support the Freudian formula-
tion of the universal Oedipus situation and castration
complex, The Oedipus situation is summarized in these
general statements. Sexual attachment for the parent of the
opposite sex develops originally as a result of the mother’s
stimulation of the child and giving gratifications (feeding,
fondling). This eventuates in an actual genital love re-
sponse. Further development occurs by reason of the mother’s
inevitable discriminative reaction (opposite sex attraction)
to the boy, and father to the girl, both correlating with
antagonisms for the parent of the same sex.
75. Of. Allport, PER, 187.
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Preference for the parent of the opposite sex is the
indispensable correlate of the Oedipus situation. On the
question of preference for parents, Tennan (his subjects
rated their parental attachments and conflicts on a five
point scale) found little or no difference between the
sexes in amount of attachment to each parent, but in both
cases it was greater with the mother. Conflict between
boys and their mothers was somewhat less than between boys
and their fathers. 7^ Stogdil^s review of this subject
revealed no reliable difference between boys and girls as
to preference for either parent. 7 5 Ana stagner and Droughts
study of this same question relative to college men and
women gave similar results. 76 Hence the details of the Oed-
ipus situation are not supported by objective studies.
On the question of the castration complex Hattendorf's
study revealed that only three of the 137 questions asked by
children of two to five years of age indicated the thought
that the girl*s lack of a penis was the result of injury.
And there was no evidence that the girls envied the boys
their possession or wanted to be boys. 77
74. Of. Terman, PFMH. These results of Terman’ s study
on this point are summarized in Sears, SOSPC, 42.
75. Stogdill
,
Art. (1937).
76. Stagner and Drought, Art. (1935).
77. Hattendorf, Art. (1932).
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The foregoing consideration does not deny that the
psychoanalysts have found conditions described by the Oedi-
pus formulation. But it does suggest that these have been
individual findings only, and denies the universality of
the Oedipus situation. Perhaps the Oedipus situation
dominated by the castration complex is one of the conditions
of neurosis, hence the Freudians have come across it quite
frequently.
In general the Freudian interpretation of its discovered
facts places much too great a responsibility for character
formation on the somatic aspects (biological) of personality.
It neglects the influence of the self and its activities, 78
and the influence of culture. 70 By reason of the nature of
culture and its influence on personality the universal pat-
tern of development assumed by Freud would depend upon the
existence of a universally common cultural pattern. But
there are no universal patterns, even of family life. 80
Thus, discarding the Oedipus complex, what remains is,
as Korney summarizes it, "the highly constructive finding
that early relationships in their totality mold the character
to an extent that can scarcely be overestimated."81
78. Of. below, p. 137 ff
.
79. Cf. below, p. 161 ff
80. Of. below, p. 188 . Cf. Sears,
81. Korney, NWP, 87.
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4. SEXUALITY AM) LOVE
In view of the foregoing criticisms of the Freudian
position it is pertinent to consider the relationship of
sexuality and love.
The general relation of body and mind is an accepted
fact. Mind influences body much more than is commonly
believed. The war neuroses are drastic instances of such
influence; as are the so-called T neurotic ills’ so prevalent
in the hospitals and in doctor’s offices. Much work of
recent origin demonstrates the influential relationship of
mind to body, as Dunbar’s82 and Cannon’s. 83 Franz Alexan-
der’s work on the mental factors in gastrointestinal dis-
orders reveal a psychic component as a prime etiological
factor.84 The work of Saul, Alexander, and others on the
psychic factors in bronchial disorders result in similar
conclusions. 85 Saul and Bernstein also report psychic
causation for certain cases of skin disease. 86 Another
evidence of mind’s influence over body is to be seen in
’false pregnancy’ in which condition most of the physical
conditions of actual pregnancy are experienced.
82. H. F. Dunbar, Emotions and Bodily Changes (2nd ed.).
New York: Columbia University Press, 1958."
83. W. B. Cannon, Bodily Changes in Pain
,
Hunger
,
Fear
and Rage (2nd ed.). New York: D. AppleTon and Co
.7 1929
.
84. Cf. Alexander, MVP, 200.
85. Saul, Art. (1941).
86. Saul and Bernstein, Art. (1941).
..
. 'P
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
• .
•
-
.
-
.
.
-
•
83
.body can also influence mind. This fact of relation-
ship has been accepted longer than its opposite. Among tne
substantiating facts can be listed the toxic psychoses due
to the action of drugs upon the body, alcoholic hallucinosis
and delirium tremens. The action of opium, morphine, co-
deine, heroin and marihuana are well known. Brain injuries
can radically alter the nature of life. Syphilitic infec-
tion that leads to paresis results in mental deterioration
corresponding to the progressive deterioration of the spinal
column and brain, body influences over mind are also appar-
ent in differing mental abilities that extend rrom idiocy
to genius. Endocrinological studies have revealed some of
the more precise relationships of body and mind. Growth is
a function controlled by the anterior pituitary. Basal
metabolism is under control of the thyroid. Secondary sex
characteristics, physical and psychical, are due primarily
to the action of gonadal normor.es.
The influential relationships or body and mind are thus
easily demonstrated in terms of broad influences. But. this
investigation concerns the specific relationship of sexuality
and love, a problem posed by the position and claims of
psychoanalysis
.
It is common knowledge that psychoanalysis claims a
direct relationship between sexuality and the content of
mental life. Specifically, it identifies love and sexuality.
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The primal life instinct is the sexual instinct and from it
are derived all the constructive energies of life. Through
sublimation of sexual energy into many channels life devel-
ops in its many complex forms. Yet in this view all is
sexual. 87
As pointed out, evidence does not support the pan-
sexual theory. However, the evidence, it is here maintained,
proves sexuality to be a basic factor to the formation of
the love attitude, though not in the sense nor to the extent
claimed by the psychoanalytic school. The following para-
graphs are a consideration of the evidence in terms of
physiology, psychology, and sociology.
The review of endocrinological studies88 resulted in
the conclusion that gonadal hormones were influential both
physically and mentally. This conclusion resulted from
investigations of castrates, experimental grafts of ovaries
and testes, and homosexuals. However on the basis of these
investigations no direct and indispensable relation of love
and sexuality can be assumed. The most that can be claimed
is that sexuality can affect mental organization.
Psychological evidence comes largely from the psycho-
analytic school. Though it appears that they overgeneralize
87. Of course, the opposing instinct is that of death,
but life develops from the sexual instinct which meets oppo-
sition in the activities of the death instinct.
88. Cf. above, p. 56 ff.
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from their factual data, 89 their evidence demands considera-
tion.
Pertinent to the relationship of sexuality and love is
the fact of infantile sex life, discovered by Freud and
corroborated by later studies. 9^ Hov/ever the inclusiveness
of Freudian interpretation of infantile sexuality raises
questions. Specifically, are oral and anal activities
sexual in nature?
From objective studies it was concluded that psycho-
analytic claim for the over-all dominance of sexuality was
not verifiable
. Existence of childish sex activity and
interest is substantiated by objective studies, 92 but this
does not establish the sexual nature of oral and anal activ-
ities. The basis for interpreting these as sexual lies in
the Freudian correlation of pleasurable and sexual. 93 But
the evidence supporting this correlation is slim. Freud
also reasoned that childish satiety is analagous to adult
genital satiety. But analogy alone is not evidence. 94 Nor
do objective studies support the formulations contained in
the Oedipus situation and castration complex. 95 Hence
89. As in castration and Oedipus complex.
90. Cf. Sears, SOSPC, for a survey of objective (sci-
entific) studies on this point; also above, p. 63 ff.
91. Cf. above, p. 79 f.
92. Cf. above, p. 62, 77
93. Cf. above, p. 76
.
94. Cf. above, pi 76.
95. Cf. above, p. 79 ff.
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sexuality is not fundamental to the formation of love in the
sense nor to the extent claimed by the Freudians. What they
have discovered is the over-all importance of infancy and
childhood. The point to note here is the close relationship
of genital interests and activities to those of the oral and
anal areas.
Sociological evidence centers in the cultural patterns
that, in general, determine the environmental influences
surrounding the infant and child. The very nature of life,
the processes of birth, and child care giving to the mother
the major role, determines to large extent the cultural
pattern that has grown around family life and organization.
Nature has placed the origin of life in keeping of the fe-
male. This conduces to a primary social structure centered
around the mother. This, in most cases and certainly in
Western cultures, is to be seen in the family organization.
The life of the individual is intimately related to the
life of the mother, especially in the foetal stages. At
birth this relationship to mother or mother substitute con-
tinues. The newborn infant brings to life definite needs
which are necessary to the maintenance of life. To insure
their satisfaction nature has given these needs a physical
or organic basis (oral, anal and urethral) endowed with the
capacities of pleasure and pain when satisfied or deprived.
Our cultural pattern supplies the mother as the most intimate
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environment. And as mother serves, primarily, to satisfy
needs she becomes associated with the pleasurable aspects
of infant experience. Thus the infant soon forms a rela-
tionship with mother or mother substitute. 96 This is the
child’s first love relationship.
It is to be noted in the foregoing description that the
needs of the infant centered in oral, anal, and genital
areas come into contact with the environment in the person
of the mother. It is this relationship that makes sexuality
fundamental to love, even in the narrow sense, for the
genital area is one whose needs are taken care of by the
mother. It is a primary factor in the formation of the
first relationship that can be called love. Thus sexuality
in the narrow sense is essential to love not because of any
inherent unfolding sexual instinct that reaches out for a
sexual object (as the Freudians claim) but because of the
association that is formed on the basis of need and need
satisfaction. This interpretation points out that dominance
of love in its more narrow sexual aspect occurs through
accentuation or stimulation by the mother or father, or
both. 97 And on the other hand, absence of accentuation or
96. It is to be noted that mother can refuse the child,
thwart it, and thus become associated with frustration and
hate.
97. Eorney, NWP, 82.

88
stimulation accounts for the absence of sexual love in many,
if not most, children.
It is thus concluded that the nature of infantile needs
(endowed with areas of pleasure) and their means of satis-
faction (by mother care) account for the establishment of a
love relation; 98 that because the genital area with the oral
and anal areas constitute dominant centers of infant pleas-
ure, sexuality in the narrow sense is essential to love, but
only as a component part; and that environmental influences
account for the possible dominance of the genitals in child-
ish love relations." However, infantile sexuality has no
great significance to love except in those abnormal cases
resulting from overstimulation.
Cultural factors add their emphasis on sexuality thus
enlarging its significance to love. As will be pointed out
the foundation of family organization in Western cultures is
the spouse unit based on the erotic relationship. 100
Western culture joins sexuality and love. 101 That
these can be dissociated by cultural patterns is revealed by
98. This is the position of Menninger in LH, and
Suttie in OLH.
99. So Horney, NWP, 82. As suggested by the fact that
the Freudians find a dominant sexual factor in neuroses,
such dominance is strongly conducive to abnormal development.
100. Cf. below, p. 190.
101. The identification of sexuality and love in Wes-
tern culture is seen in the common tendency to define love
in sexual terms.
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the fact that sex practices and love forms are separated by
the tribal patterns of the Trobriand Islanders. 102
The joining of sexuality with love renders reciprocal
service. It gives new meaning, purpose, and responsibility
to sexuality. It places a dynamic of energy into the keeping
of love. However, there are dangers which occur when experi-
ential factors lead to dissociation of sexuality and love
within a person. Sexuality and love are both powerful and
dynamic uniting forces; both lead to the establishment of a
relationship with another person or persons. If they do not
serve the same end or ideal, they work against each other by
setting up contradicting relationships. If sexuality does
not serve the ideal of love, the result is conflict which
often witnesses the sexual interests overthrowing love.
Culture patterns tend to reject the person who does not con-
form and merge sexuality and love. Cultural rejection means
rejection by fellowmen, an impossible situation for love
relationships
.
It is thus concluded that sexuality is basic to love
partly because infantile needs are associated with the first
love object, but more so because Western culture associates
sexuality and love.
102. Of. Suttie, OLH, 73, 92.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i . Summary
Investigation of the physical basis of love was ap-
proached from three aspects of the body-mind problem:
1) organic structure; E) organic function; and 3) organic
experience. Consideration of organic structure and function
revealed the relationship between love and physical nature
and warranted the postulation of the physical principle.
Normal organic structure and function are necessary to
the development of love. They perform an influential role
together with environmental and psycho-dynamic components
.
Organic areas are endowed with capacities for pleasure and
pain (attraction-repulsion). Organic experience is central
in infancy during which character development begins
.
Psychoanalytic psychology emphasizes the role of the
organism (soma) in infantile psychosexual development.
Organic influence is seen mainly in the oral, anal and
genital stages. Freud interprets physical nature as sexual.
He defines sexual to include all aspects of love and the
instinct to live. But in practice he reduces it to geni-
tality. Physical influence in character development cannot
be interpreted as sexual in the narrow Freudian sense.
Sexuality is basic to love because it is associated
with love in the mother-child affectional relationship, and
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because Western culture associates sexuality and love.
Physical influence deserves more consideration than commonly
accorded it in Christian thought.
ii. Conclusions
The investigation followed by this chapter warrants
several conclusions relative to the physical basis and love.
1) Organic structure and function influence mental
organization. Their quality sets the limits of possibility.
Dysfunction, maldevelopment
,
or both are obstacles to the
development of Christian love.
2) Infancy is the period in which physical elements
exert the greatest influence on the development of character
and, hence, upon love.
3) Normal physical nature is necessary to proper devel-
opment of love. This influence operates through the abili-
ties of pleasure and pain. It works in conjunction with the
other bases of love, in other words, through the totality of
experience that centers on organ areas.
4) Psychoanalytic psychology has explored the influ-
ence of organic stimulation. It has discovered the facts of
infantile experience but its interpretation of the facts as
narrowly sexual is unwarranted. Specifically, oral and anal
interests and activities are not inherently sexual in nature;
nor are the experiences summarized in the Oedipus and castra-
tion concepts universal.
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5) Insofar as character development is dependent on
organic structure and function the development of love
begins with the origin of life itself. Thus love, as shall
be confirmed elsewhere, involves the whole of life and the
whole of experience.
6) Sexuality as the sole physical basis of love is
unconfirmed
.
7) To encourage the development of Christian love or-
ganized Christianity will promote programs to insure healthy
bodily development.
6. TRANSITION
This chapter has investigated the physical basis of
love; important but only a part of love. To explain love
only by reference to physical nature and its influence is
the error of psychoanalytic psychology. Other distinguish-
able aspects of personality are also involved in the devel-
opment of love.
To consider the physical basis apart from other influ-
ences is an abstraction for at no stage of life, unless it
be in the foetal period, is a personality independent of
social relations. Thus, the physical energies operate in
conjunction with the psycho-dynamic and environmental influ-
ences and increasingly with the personological forces as
they develop. In more specific terms character develops in
•
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those experiences first arising from organic areas, influ-
enced by the emotional effects of the environment, and re-
sulting in organization of mental energy into habitual
responses
.
The next chapter contributes to psychological under-
standing of Christian love through consideration of psychic
energy in organization: the psycho-dynamic basis.
.:
CHAPTER IV
THE PSYCHO-DYNAMIC BASIS: LOVE ENERGY
Life is characterized by energy. In Chapter III it is
revealed that this energy is first expressed through physi-
cal areas and needs. But life energy is not made up of two
components; one, physical; the other, spiritual. "There is
only a physical life-energy which must be transformed into
spiritual energy of love." 1 The process of transformation
is embodied in the concepts of sublimation and sentiment
formation. But, first, section one considers various con-
cepts of the life energy that is transformed into love
energy. The terminology "love energy" has been adopted not
for the purpose of setting up a new and different conceptual
scheme, but rather to indicate an eclectic approach to the
problem.
1. INSTINCT, LIBIDO, DRIVE AND TRAIT
i. The Theory of Instinct
The theory of instinct to account for the energy that
motivates behavior has been advanced more thoroughly and
consistently by the well-known American psychologist,
1. Stuart, AP, 132.
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William McDougall, in his An Introduction to Social psy-
chology . 2
McDougall* s emphasis is on the psycho-physical nature
of instinct. Instincts are more than innate tendencies or
dispositions to certain types of movement. They involve
psychical as well as physical processes. As a mental proc-
ess they can be described in terms of the cognitive, affec-
tive, and conative aspects of all mental processes. However,
these are only distinguishable aspects, not separable. 3 In
its cognitive aspect instinct must be regarded as of the
nature of perception, for involved in instinctive response
is reception of and response to a definite impression.
Affectively, instinct is always accompanied by some emotion-
al excitement peculiar to it. Conatively, instinctive
behavior is distinguished from reflex action by some per-
sistent striving characterized by desire or aversion.
The psychical processes involved in instinctive action
have their physical counterpart. And this physical basis is,
2. William McDougall, ISP. Cf. 20 ff . for his dis-
cussion of the nature of instinct. Later developments led
McDougall to substitute the term "propensity” for the term
"instinct." The reason for this change was the many contro-
versies that the term "instinct" led to. However this
change does not mean a change in basic viewpoint. "This
concession to my critics does not imply any radical change
of view . . ." Cf. EM, vi.
3. McDougall, Eld, 146.
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probably, of the nature of a compound system of sensori-
motor arcs.
4
Thus, McDougall defines instinct as:
an inherited or innate psycho-physical
disposition which determines its pos-
sessor to perceive, and to pay attention
to, objects cf a certain class, to ex-
perience an emotional excitement of a
particular quality upon perceiving such
an object, and to act in regard to it in
a particular manner, or, at least, to
experience an impulse to such act ion.
5
Subsequent controversies centering around the term
"instinct” influenced McDougall to adopt a different term,
"propensity," and introduce some slight modifications. The
basis of activity is a propensity which seems to be an
innate tendency toward a certain type of activity (as under
the influence of the maternal propensity the mother tends
the child). This propensity carries feeling tone and is
allied to certain innate abilities that aid in the achieving
of some particular goal. 6 Thus, McDougall writes:
A propensity ’geared' to certain
abilities is, then, the innate basis
of a train of instinctive activity
directed to some particular goal, such
as mating, feeding, or building. And
where such a complex unit of organi-
zation matures in virtue of the momen-
tum of heredity and operates effectively
the first time it is brought into play,
we properly call it an instinct
.
7
4. McDougall, ISP, 30.
5. Loc . cit.
6. Of. McDougall, EM, 49, also, 78 and 203.
7. Ibid., 49.
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Thus, McDougall enlarges on his original concept of
instinct, analyzing it into propensities and abilities with
emphasis on the primary nature of propensity. This analysis
adds great flexibility to the instinct hypothesis. This is
seen in comparing birds and men. In birds propensities are
more definitely linked to abilities and very specific goals
(as, the swallow catches insects on the wing and places them
in the mouth of its nestlings). In the human mother the
propensity must become attached to a particular individual.
In general, native ability linked with propensity is highly
specialized in the lower animals, less specialized in the
higher. 8 Thus instinct is a more common and appropriate
term as applied to animals; whereas the distinction between
propensity and ability allows for the greater variability
of human behavior. McDougall’ s enlargement of the instinct
hypothesis gives due place to the fact of individual experi-
ence and its influence on instinctive behavior.
The key to McDougall ’s concept of instinct is emotion,
the affective feature. This always remains the same, ”re-
taining its specific character and remaining common to all
individuals and all situations in which the instinct is
excited.” 9 But not so with the cognitive and conative
features. Experience and the environment can alter the
8. McDougall, EM, 203.
9. McDougall, ISP, 35.
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impressions that stimulate and the particular strivings that
satisfy instinctive action.
The end of instinctive action is some goal. Hence
JkiCDougall* s psychology is purposive. 10 Instinctive action
is distinguished more by the type of goal towards which the
activity is directed, rather than by any rigidly prescribed
sequence of movement.
Instincts as thus conceived are the prime movers of all
human behavior. "Take away these instinctive dispositions
with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become
incapable of activity of any kind . . . m11 But these in-
stincts are not the whole story of behavior and character,
only the basis. Action, especially in humans, is seldom
due to the function of a single instinct; more often there
is a complex of instincts contributing. And the formation
of behavior is to be understood in terms of organizations
of ideas and objects around the emotions that accompany
instinctual action. This organization is known as a senti-
ment. 12
The well-known criticism of instinct theories applies
to LcDougall’s conceptualization. The difficulties become
10. Cf. Murchison, P1930, 12 ff. for McDougall’s expo-
sition of "Hormic" psychology as purposive.
11. McDougall, ISP, 45.
12. Cf. ibid., 164 ff. for his discussion of the
development of sentiments. Also, EM, 219 ff
.
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apparent when one compares one instinct theory with another.
No two lists of instincts agree. 15
G. W. Allport points out that the instinct theory with
its inevitable ramifications violates the law of parsimony.
Action attributed to instincts can be adequately accounted
for on a much simpler basis. 14
On the other hand, Allport contends, the instinct theory
is guilty of oversimplification. The purposes and endeavors
of human beings are far too diverse and numerous to be
attributed to a few primal motives shared by all. This
criticism holds with regard to instinct hypotheses in gener-
al but hardly to McDougall in particular. McDougall by no
means contends that the instinct hypothesis is sufficient
explanation for all the motives of all men. It is only the
basis and from that basis development can take complex
courses. McDougall’ s use of the concept of sentiment forma-
tion to supplement the instinct basis carries him beyond
the charge of oversimplification. However, McDougall would
agree that not all behavior is necessarily explained by
referral to instinct. He could accept Allport’s principle
of functional autonomy with little difficulty.
Vaughan further points out the tautalogical nature of
the instinct explanation of human behavior. It is said one
13. Even McDougall sets forth different lists of
instincts in his several works. Compare his ISP, 47 ff
.
with his CCL, 16 ff. and his EM, 97 ff.
14. Allport, PER, 112.
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fights "because of the instinct of pugnacity, which is noth-
ing more than the assertion: we fight because we fight.-1*5
However McDougall T s analysis of instinct does not warrant
the criticism that in the end his conceptualization rests
on a vague concept. He has clearly distinguished the com-
ponents of an instinct (propensity, ability, goal) in such a
fashion that life in its relatively simple beginnings (yet
with such variations) is adequately conceptualized.
In face of criticism, McDougall T s ”hormic psychology”
has much in its favor. It takes adequate account of the
purposive nature of human behavior; it renders an intelli-
gible account of the organization of the affective-conative
side of mental structure; and through its use of sentiment
organization as key to character formation it accounts for
the relatively simple nature of infancy, and, on the other
hand, for the relatively complex structure of the mature
personality.-1-6
ii. The Theory of Libido
Properly, consideration of the Freudian theory of
libido comes under the class of instinct theories, for
libido is to be understood against the background of Freud-
ian instincts. Yet, as Stagner points out, classification
15. Vaughan, GP, 248 ff.
16. Cf. McDougall, Art. (1930), 26 ff
.
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of the Freudian position should come under the heading of
"drive" theories. Freudian instincts came into being when
the German word Trieb, connoting impulse or drive phenomenon,
was translated "instinct ."1? But in either case the partic-
ular development and prominence of Freudian theory warrants
its independent consideration.
The development of the Freudian concept of instincts
has in its history taken three distinct trends. The first
formulations postulated a dichotomy of instincts, those of
sex and those of ego and the libido seem to have been the
peculiar psychic energetic counterpart of the sexual or love
instinct. Intermediary developments saw the concept of
libido modified with changes in the theory of instincts.
When the ego instincts were dropped and the sexual reigned
supreme the libido also came into complete dominance as
basic psychic energy. The third trend is marked by the
postulation of the bipodal instincts of love or life and
destruction or death, eros versus thanatos, with libido the
indefinite energetic counterpart of both.-^ 9 In eros libido
is employed constructively toward self or others or both;
17. Stagner, PP, 236.
18. Cf. Freud, BN, 610 ff. Also NILP, 132 ff.
19. Cf. Freud, El, 54 ff.

102
in thanatos it is likewise employed but destructively so. 20
The libido concept is not clearly differentiated from
the instinct concept. At times it appears as if libido is
but a synonym for instinct. Instincts are endowed with
energy, known as libido. As they, instigated by bodily
excitation, seek to remove the excitation the instinct be-
comes operative mentally. We, thus, see the psycho-physi-
ological nature of instinct whose source of energy lies in
the physiochemical nature of life. 21 As such Freud pictures
it as a "certain sum of energy forcing its wray in a certain
direction.” 22
But, on the other hand, the final postulation of two
opposing instincts prevents identification of libido with a
particular instinct. The opposite aim of libido in the love
or life instinct, in contrast to that in the death instinct,
marks the different nature of libido in each case.
20. This analysis, perhaps, suggests orderly develop-
ment when such was not the case. Confusion exists all along
the line of development. But the confusion was due perhaps
more to the fact that Freud refused to cast his findings
into hard and fast formulas. Even to the present, a lack of
agreement on the subject of Freudian instincts prevails.
Hendricks in FTP finds three main groups of instinctual
activities: sexual, ego, and hostile. On the other hand,
Menninger builds his book, Pan Against Himself around the
eros (life) and thanatos (death ) instincts
.
21. Freud, CP, Vol. 4, 64 ff.
22. Freud, NILP, 135. Cf. also Hinsie and Shatzky,
PD, 318.
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The earliest freudian conceptualization of instincts
into the classes of ego and sexual did not carry confusion
of the libido concept, for then it referred to the energy
of the sexual instinct s. 2^ jn the intermediary stage which
saw the passing of the ego instincts and the sole dominance
of the sexual the libido became the energy of all instinc-
tual impulses and as such Freud could refer to it as psychic
energy in general. 24 But the fate of libido is not clear
in the third stage which led to the postulation of two funda-
mentally opposed groups of instinctual impulses, the life
(eros, sexual) instincts and the death (thanatos, destructive)
instincts. We can regard libido as the energy of the life
instincts, but whether it can be also regarded as energy
that finds its expression through the death instincts is
uncertain. Freud leaves the concept hanging in the air.
But throughout Freudian discussion libido in itself appears
to be of a neutral quality. Freud refers to libido as a
"neutral displaceable energy." 2 ^ Hence it would be a short
and consistent step to regard libido as psychic energy in
general; v/hich energy can be canalized in life or death
impulses
.
26
23. Cf. Freud, NILP, 132
24. Ibid
. ,
141 •
25. Freud, El, 62.
26. Cf. Freud, NILP, 141
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But in spite of the fact that libido is the psychic
energy of the instincts, the theory has been developed
largely in terms of the sexual instincts. This relationship
is seen in the enlarging concept of sexuality which comes to
include all activity of a pleasurable, gratifying nature. 27
And since sexual drives can easily be attached to various
objects, and since sexual excitement and gratification can
be found in many ways, the sexual instinct is a composite.
That is, sexual energy, the libido, is non-specific. It can
be excited and satisfied in many objects and ways. The
libido may be localized in the genitals, or it may be con-
centrated at the oral, anal or other erogenic zones. 28
The libido theory is a quantitative concept of psychic
energy. As Freud states:
We have laid down the concept of libido
as a force of variable quantity by
which processes and transformations in
the spheres of sexual excitement can
be measured. 29
This is one of the most criticized postulates of Freudian
theory. Each individual, so the theory contends, has only
one kind of energy and a limited quantity of it at a given
time. If this is being spent in one form of activity it can
not be used for another. This assumption has been riddled
27. Of. Horney, NWP, 50.
28. Freud, El, 62.
29. Freud, BAf
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by critics, and yet, as Stagner points out, common sense re-
veals we do have one, and only one, kind of energy. 30 When
one is ill, life T s energy is channeled almost exclusively to
physiological processes and mental functions are interfered
with. When worry and anxiety are intense the organic func-
tions are impaired, less efficient. A person freed from
excessive worries finds new interests and activities. Stud-
ies in the physiology of sex, especially endocrinological
studies, find a correlation between energy and quantity of
hormone, thus supporting the quantitative concept of psychic
energy and love force. Murray in his formulation of the
drive concept thinks of energy in quantitative terms but as
yet unmeasurable .31 The whole problem of motivation with
the question of adequate and maximum incentive suggests that
psychic energy is to be considered quantitatively. Thus the
quantitative concept of libido has much in its favor.
Summarily, the theory of libido contends that there is
a basal psycho-physical energy of definite quantity and neu-
tral character, that, through the instincts and above all
the sexual, is the dynamic basis for the organization of
character and life.
30. Stagner, PP, 236 ff.
31. Murray, SP, 129 ff.
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The Freudian theory of instinct differs from that of
McDougall in several respects. The former finds two basal
impulses while the latter finds seven or nine or more. Mc-
Dougallian instincts emphasize an energetic counterpart
described in terms of emotions with each instinct carrying
its particular emotion. Freudian instincts draw upon the
same basic energy which is characterized by the particular
impulse through which it is expressed. Thus, we see, basi-
cally these two theories are very close. 32 The differences
enter in terms of quantity and quality of instincts; McDou-
gall postulating several instincts over against two, and the
Freudians placing greater stress on the sexual impulses. A
final difference is to be noted in the nature of instinct
interaction. McDougallian instincts can check, fuse, and
aid each other. But in the Freudian theory life is the
result of a balance of Wo instincts that by nature oppose.
The most thorough criticism of the libido theory is
that of Horney who regards the issues involved as of impor-
tance by reason of the significance of libido to character
formation. Upon examination of the conditions which Freud
considers in formulation of the concept of libido she,
finding them insufficient basis for his generalizations,
32. "McDougall and the analysts have been kept apart
by numerous differences, but in respect to their fundamen-
tal dynamical assumptions they belong together." Murray,
EP, 37.
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concludes that the concept stands unproved. She finds that
pleasurable activities are not necessarily sexual; that pre-
genital (oral and anal) activities are not proved as sexual;
that Freudian conclusions are based on unwarranted analogies
(which are not proof); and that Freudian conceptualization
is based on much overgeneralization. 33 But Horney’s objec-
tions are based not on the fundamental considerations of
instinct energy or drive, rather, on the facts of sexual
deviation — homosexuality, oral and anal sexuality, sadism,
masochism, voyeurism and the like. 34 Hence her criticisms
are pertinent to the nature of libido rather than to the
general theory itself.
The Freudian theory of instincts is dualist ic, but, if
the libido concept is taken as the basic life energy that
finds expression in life or death instincts, then it is
basically a monistic concept. This is in contrast to the
usual instinct theory which is pluralistic in nature. Thus
the Freudian concept is but a conceptualization of the will
to live, the elan vital of Bergson.
But Freudian theory does not remain on this too simple
explanation of life. The basic (sexual) energy of life
through the process of sublimation soon enters into compli-
cated relationships and combinations. This theory thus has
33. Korney, NWP, 52.
34. Cf. ibid., 48 ff
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the merit of being sample enough to account for the relative-
ly simple beginnings of life, and at the same time complex
enough to account for the complexities of developing life.
Difficulties of acceptance arise when the development
of life is conceived largely in terms of the sexual life in
the narrow sense. But objections to this interpretation are
obviated by the facts: that ’sexual’ in the Freudian sense
corresponds closely to the common meaning of ’love;* that
Freudians stress the physiological aspect of love; the fact
that early life is a matter of establishing affective re-
lationships with the environment; and that the nature of
these early relationships are influential in all of life.
If the energies of infant life are channelled into the
processes of maintenance and continuance (physiologically —
food; psychologically — security through affection) and
these processes be conceived in terms of sexual activities
and interests, it is not difficult, inconsistent, nor belit-
tling to life to conceive that through such activities and
interests the energies of life push out to ever larger and
widening horizons. But, as concluded above, oral and anal
activities and interests cannot be accepted as sexual in
nature. 35 Hence the concept of libido is much too simple to
account for the complex nature of life, even the comparatively
55. Cf. above, p. 78.
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simple (but still complex) nature of infancy. However,
Freudian psychology has served the purpose of drawing atten-
tion to the important but neglected phase of sexual life
and its influence in personality development.
iii. The Theory of Drive
H. A. Murray, in collaboration with others, 36 has pre-
sented a dynamic concept of life in terms of ’need’ or
•drive.’ 37 His theory is dynamic, admittedly drawing from
Breud, Jung, Adler, McDougall and Lev/in. 38
Murray’s concept is derived from considerations that
begin with a definite temporal unit which holds together
psychologically and is marked by a definite beginning and
end. In a unit the beginning and end situations are distin-
guishable from the action pattern involved. And in action
there can be distinguished the action patterns (actones)
and effects of the action patterns.
It is of more significance to differentiate behavior
in terms of effects rather than action patterns for, among
other considerations, effect determines the establishment of
action pattern. 39 But the question of importance is,
36. Explorations in Personality
,
London: Oxford
bniversity Press, 1938.
37. Murray uses these terms interchangeably.
38. Murray, EP, 38.
39. Ibid., 57.
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"What process or force within the organism brings about the
observed effects?"40 Here we deal with nervous energy that
is vaguely analagous to physical force. Such a concept as
1 drive,’ is thus needed to account for the achievement of
certain effects.
Murray cogently summarizes the data that favor the
postulation of need as a directional force behind behavior.
All of which may be described as evidence of goal-directed
or directional behavior which in its complex organization
can be accounted for by the theory of drive as a psycho-
physical force. 4! Formally, need or drive is defined thus:
A need is a construct (a convenient
fiction or hypothetical concept) which
stands for a force (the physico-chemical
nature of which is unknown) in the
brain region, a force which organizes
perception, apperception, intellection,
conation and action in such a way as
to transform in a certain direction an
exciting, unsatisfying situation. 42
Under the term ’variable system’ Murray and his associ-
ates have classified the variable elements dynamic in charac-
ter formation. 43 This system includes two general classes of
needs, primary or viscerogenic and secondary or psychogenic
needs. 44 Viscerogenic needs, such as need of air, food,
40. Murray, EP, 59.
41. Ibid., 61 ff.
42. Ibid.
,
123 f
.
43. Of. ibid., 142 ff.
44. Of. ibid., 76 ff.
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water and sex, are of organic origin and satisfaction is in
terms of organ activity, but not so with psychogenic needs.
In all, some forty-one needs of both classes are distin-
guished.^ And personality is the hierarchical organization
of need complexes or need integrates. 46
A distinguishable feature of Murray 1 s concept of need
is his notion of finalism. 47 Need can be thought of as a
state of disequilibrium which stresses toward equilibrium.
In other words a need rises and does not subside until a
situation of a certain kind has been reached. The stimula-
tion or arousal of need sees energy at its highest (tension)
and satisfaction or achievement of goal (removal of tension)
finds it at its lowest.
Murray 1 s dynamic psychology 1 has much in its favor.
Its ambitious analysis48 of the formative factors of human
behavior and character seems to omit no possibility, thus
avoiding charges of oversimplification. It does not limit
itself to needs that can be proved innate as the instinct
theories do. It takes account of purposive factors, striking
45. Murray, EP, 79-83.
46. Ibid.
,
109 f
.
47. Ibid., 67 ff.
48. The variables system formulated at the Harvard
Psychological Clinic includes viscerogenic needs (primary
needs as need of air, water, food, sex) and psychogenic
needs (secondary needs as need to acquire, conserve, order,
retain, exhibit, depend on, dominate, abase self, affiliate).
Murray, EP, 76 ff.
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a healthy balance between subjective and objective. All
this in combination with the meritorious methods of study in
which it was formulated; methods that adapted the best of
scientific method to the difficult study of subjective ex-
periences.
Allport criticizes the need theory. 49 Needs are few
in number and to them are traced all motives of men. This,
Allport contends, fails to portray with exactness the special
foci of organization existing in each individual. "Desire
is always integral with its object, and its resulting forms
are more varied than such a limited list of needs would
allow." 50 However, the pertinence of Allport 1 s criticism
is somewhat obviated when it is remembered that classifica-
tion of behavior as dominated by a certain need does not
prescribe limitations of object, activity, or expression.
In other words, the impress of each individual is made upon
the need rising within and demanding distension.
The need concept has features in common with the in-
stinct and libido theories. All three are dynamic, have a
psycho-physical basis, and take account of purposive goal-
directed behavior. On the other hand, the need theory does
not limit itself to needs that are innate as do the other
two theories.
49. Allport, PER, 240 ff.
50. Ibid., 241.
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iv. The Theory of Traits
Allport finds merit in the usual genetic concepts of
motivation and character formation but contends that the
normal mature personality demands a new and somewhat radical
principle of growth which he labels "the functional autonomy
of motives." 5 -*- His concept is both protest and supplement to
those whose systems disregard the uniqueness and complexity
of mature life. The difficulty with the current forms of
dynamic psychology lies in their reduction of the endless
variety of human interests to a few basic motives. 52 Such
forms are psychologies of mind-in-general, seeking to clas-
sify the common and basic motives of men, but mind-in-general
cannot explain mind -in-particular for every individual is
totally different from every other.
Allport admits that a concept of motivational force is
necessary. 53 However he finds it not in any concept of
energy as libido or drive that finds expression in innate be-
havioral tendencies (instincts) but rather in personality or-
ganizations or dispositions that motivate in their own right.
These Allport calls 'traits.* "As each sub-structure (trait)
develops it becomes a system of energy sui generis . . . " 54
51. Allport, PER, 240 ff.
52. Ibid., 192 ff.
53. Ibid., 239.
54. Ibid., 245. The material in parenthesis is in-
serted by the author.
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The infinitely varied, and self-sustaining motives of
adults are contemporary systems. However, they are related
to past experiences or past motivational systems for out of
such have grown contemporary systems but they are function-
ally independent of the past. Instincts or tension systems
may have been the origin of the first motivational systems,
but as the individual matures the bond is sundered. "The
tie is historical, not functional.” 55
The process by which new motivational systems succeed
the old is explained by the principle of functional autonomy.
For this principle Allport cogently marshalls his evidence. 5S
All of which might be described as evidence of new functions
emerging from old functions as independently structured
units. Stated simply the principle means that earlier
purposes lead into and are abandoned for later purposes.
And the activity of the new purposes do not depend upon the
continued activity of the old purposes from which they de-
veloped. They stand in their own right.
The
55. Allport, PER, 194.
56. Cf. ibid., 196-202. Typical evidence is that
termed H common sense” illustrative of which is this: ’’Many
young mothers bear their children unwillingly
,
dismayed . . .
At first they may be indifferent . . . hate . . . The only
motives that hold such a mother to child-tending may be fear
of what her critical neighbors will say, fear of the law . . .
However gross these motives, they are sufficient to hold her
to her work, until through the practice of devotion her
burden becomes a joy. . . . Earlier practical motives are
forgotten. In later years not one of these original motives
operate
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The dynamic approach of Allport rightly gives due cred-
it to the uniqueness of individual personality. Likewise
it affirms what common sense asserts that the individual
as a unique self is the most determinative factor in self-
development. Thus adequate place is given in character
formation to intelligence, ideals, and reason through the
medium of self-determination and self-realization. It is
precisely these factors that too often are discounted by the
instinct and drive theories, especially in psychoanalytic
psychology. In this emphasis on self and its activity All-
port^ position is a necessary supplement to other theories.
Criticism enters on the seemingly one-sided emphasis on
functional autonomy. Although Allport finds genetic con-
cepts of value relative to the origins of life it seems that
he neglects the fact that archaic or infantile canalizations
of life energy can persist into adulthood and dominate or
complicate life by its presence. This is the principle of
fixation. The principle of functional autonomy does not
adequately explain all cases of infantile fixation as evi-
denced by the clinical fact that reliving the original
fixating (traumatic) experience robs it of its drive and
motivating power in present personality organization.
v. Criticism and Conclusion
Our study of the several theories regarding the psycho-
dynamic basis has found much value in all. It is not here
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necessary to discard all in favor of one for it is maintained
that these theories when viewed in perspective conflict less
than commonly believed. It is evident that these theories
have been formulated largely out of studies centered on one
of the several possible stages of life. Thus psychoanalysis
has formulated its theory of instincts and libido largely
through its studies of infancy and Allport’s theory of traits
and principle of functional autonomy come from studies of
mature personality in its full complexity. In keeping with
this view it follows that the instinct psychologies are more
valid relative to the origins of life and trait psychology
more valid relative to maturity of development. Instinct
psychology as developed by McDougall and drive psychology
as developed by hurray occupy positions between Freud and
Allport. In general they present a more adequate over-all
conceptualization of the process of personality development.
Also we may conclude that the origins of life are marked by
a basic urge to life (life energy, horme, or libido) expressed
in few interests and activities, but soon life’s energy en-
ters into complicated relationships and complex formulations
far removed from the primal urge.
More specifically we conclude that the earlier psycho-
dynamical basis of love may be regarded as the energy that
finds expression through those channels known as sexual in
' ' *
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the larger psychoanalytical sense. 7,7 Supporting this conclu-
sion are several considerations. First, the psychic energy
of infancy is comparatively simple in expression and probably
all directed to the continuance and maintenance of life
(Freud, McDougall). Second, the typical expressions of this
primal life energy in the infancy stage is centered around
the organs of mouth, anus, and genitals and their functions
(Freud). Third, investment of energy aroused by need cen-
tered in these organic areas leads to the establishment of
affective relationships (Freud, McDougall, Murray). Thus
the procedure and position of Chapter III, "The Physical
Basis of Love," is supported by and related to the psycho-
dynamic basis. Self as a factor influencing the organization
of psychic energy is supported by Allport’s emphasis.
The psychic energy involved undergoes transformation,
entering new combinations, finding new channels or outlets
of expression or investment. The next section takes up the
problem of psychic energy transformations.
2. THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT: SUBLIMATION
In the early period of life the psychic energy of the
individual is invested in but few interests which are closely
associated with the physiological equipment and function so
57. The larger sense as claimed by psychoanalysts but
seldom adhered to in actual interpretation of experience.
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fundamental to the preservation of life. But life energy is
not dichotomized into a physical energy and a spiritual
energy. 58 Life energy begins perhaps as physical life energy
but it must be transformed into a spiritual energy of love.
As life develops the psychic energy moves out in other and
widening interests. The process that involves a shift or
recentering of life’s energy is called sublimation.
To the Freudians, who first used the term, sublimation
means a shifting of energy from sexual to more socially ac-
ceptable objects. 59 The term has come to signify different
things to many persons. But if we regard it as referring to
a recentering or reorganization of psychic energy, we are on
definite ground. 60 Now the question involves the nature of
reorganization. This is best described in terms of sentiment
formation.
i. The Formation of Sentiments
The term sentiment is adopted for designation of the
dynamic organization of life because of its priority in the
field. It was first introduced by Shand and shortly after
58. Cf. Stuart, AP, 132.
59. As Freud defines it sublimation is ’’the capacity
to exchange an originally sexual aim for another one which
is no longer sexual, though it is psychically related to the
first.” (Quoted by Jones, EAP, 386.) For a critical study
of the Freudian concept of sublimation cf. Taylor, Art.
(1933)
.
60. Murray concurs in giving sublimation a broad mean-
ing, EP, 394. As does de Sanctis, RC , 127.
V‘
.1 :
< i:
•
i.
•
r
'
.
'
'
. x • -
•
.
*
.
'
•
:
•
.
* ...
•
-
.
.
. 1
. :
119
taken up and expanded by McDougall. Disregarding termino-
logical differences and other slight variations the theory
of sentiment formation as propounded by Shand and McDougall
is closely approximated by the complex concept of the ana-
lysts, the trait theory of Allport, the psychic system of
de Sanctis, 6 -1- and the unity-thema concept of Murray. 62
Hence our exposition of sentiment formation will draw from
all these sources.
There are four factors in sentiment formation: 1) the
experiencing self, the personality as constituted at the
moment of experience; 2) feelings; 5) ideas; and 4) objects
or the environment. 65 It is apparent that sentiment forma-
tion involves the organic (through feeling); the persono-
logical (the self that loves), and the environmental (ob-
jects). Thus it is the crux of the development of love.
The role of self is to be developed in detail in the
following chapter. Suffice it here to point out that the
focus of sentiment formation is the conscious center of
being (self) in which is centered the needs of the psycho-
physical organism — desires and ideas -- and the demands
61. De Sanctis, RC.
62. Murray, EP.
63. The New Testament command to love contains the
elements of a sentiment. "Thou (self) shalt love the Lord
thy God (object) with all thy heart, strength (feelings)
and mind ( ideas ) .
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of the world. This center of experience, the self, though
the result of past experience and perhaps under its influ-
ence, plays a determinative role for it chooses among pos-
sible choices. 6 -
Now the self, with all its needs, organizations of past
experiences and feelings, experiences (in reality or imagina-
tion) objects (persons, things, ideas) outside itself. The
result is an idea or ideas carrying feeling tone. Through
repeated experiences, actual or imaginative, a constellation
of ideas and feelings forms around the object experienced and
tends to become permanent and is aroused when that object or
similar ones are experienced. 65 Thus the sentiment is, as
de Sanctis describes the psychic system, " . . .a represen-
tational-affective-motor grouping . . ."66
If we may infer that a dog is capable of ideas and
emotions, then this process is to be seen in Pavlov’s famous
experiment with the dog. And the organic basis of sentiment
permanency is to be found in neural conditioning.
The process of sentiment formation is to be seen in
the psychoanalytic ’Oedipus complex.’ Such a complex is
64. Freud's position that neurotic illness is desired
supports the determinative role of the self.
65. As Flower describes the readiness of a sentiment
to act, "... the perpetual readiness of the person to be-
have in a way consistent with the call that is made by that
cause, about which the sentiment centres." Cf. PSRQ, 63.
66. De Sanctis, RC, 98.
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adequately accounted for in terms of the four factors in-
volved in sentiment formation. The child with all its needs
and possible feelings (self) is taken care of by the mother
(environmental object); characteristic ideas and feelings
come to be attached to mother; all of which, with possible
variations due to constitutional makeup of child or varied
treatment at the hands of the mother, crystallizes into a
more or less permanent organization wrhich guides the behav-
ior of the child toward his mother and father. Due to the
nature of human life the sentiment of love is, perhaps, the
first and as such is not only necessary to life but a de-
terminative influence on later developments.
Character is made up of sentiments for they determine
the nature of the individual’s responses to the world, in-
cluding self. There is more than one sentiment in each
individual. The varied nature of the environmental objects
that are experienced necessitates varied sentiment forma-
tions. And sentiments can conflict as evidenced in neurot-
ics. Sentiments are formed around particular objects or
classes of objects. But Hartshorne and May’s studies reveal
tnat one can be honest in one situation and dishonest in
others. 67 Thus sentiment may or may not include objects or
situations similar to the one around which it is organized.
67. Hartsnorne and May, SD, pp. 382, 384 f. and 411.
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Hadfield has pointed out that sentiments can be accept-
ed consciously, unconsciously or rejected as unacceptable.
These he terms respectively sentiment, disposition, and
complex. 68
Character is the organization of sentiments. And
usually the key to character can be found in one sentiment
which stands at the center of or dominates all the rest.
This is called a ’master sentiment’ (McDougall)
,
a ’cardinal
trait’ (Allport), or ’unity-thema’ (Murray). The problem
of Christian education then is the creation of character
dominated by the master sentiment of love. 69 And the problem
centers in the question, "How are master sentiments formed?"
Psychoanalytic psychology has pointed out the part that
traumatic events can play in character formation. Beginning
with birth the individual confronts a procession of traumatic
experiences: weaning, stool training, birth of sibling, and
so on. Such events are encountered in the normal course of
life and are more or less natural. In addition to these are
an infinitely possible number of unnatural traumatic events,
such as death of loved one, parental favoritism, sexual
seduction, parental rejection, or some terrifying experience.
Such events can fixate an individual on the level of
68. Hadfield, HI, 26 ff.
69. As with Paul, ’’. . . I am controlled by the love
of Christ ..." (II Cor. 5:14).
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development at which it is experienced. One’s emotional,
intellectual and physical life can so organize around it
that it determines the character of all life. Such is a
master sentiment in the negative sense.
but in the normal course of development traumatic events
are adequately dealt with by the individual. In this course
the sentiment that becomes master originates in experience
as any other. Three factors contribute to the eventual
dominance of any one sentiment. First
,
the dominant need of
the individual, perhaps due to the innate structure of the
individual or to experiences of deprivation, overindulgence
,
or overemphasis (experiences that are set by the environ-
ment) can lead to the dominance of a particular sentiment.
Second, the cultural pattern and condition of the individu-
al’s environment leads one to accept and incorporate into
personality the standards of his society or of his particular
group. The gangster’s sentiments differ from those of the
social reformer. Also the changing emphasis of one’s group
can bring change in dominant sentiment within the individual,
as today in war time U. S. A. Also the changing condition
of environment from one that satisfies hunger to dissatis-
faction can center one’s energies and interests around food. 70
And third, the self through intelligent understanding and
70. Chapter VI considers in detail the factor of
culture. See below, p. 161.
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choice can select and encourage the sentiments it desires to
dominate. A Here ideals exert their influence and teaching
has greatest significance. 72
In the interests of Christian character formation all
three factors plus the factor of trauma should be recognized
and provided for. Understanding the patient, parents can
guide children through the natural traumatic experiences of
childhood. Adequate facilities should be provided for the
early recognition and treatment of personality difficulties
due to traumatic experiences. The church should create ac-
tive societies for children and adults in which patterns of
love are actively dominant. And Christians also should
approach the problem with appeals to intelligence through
reason and ideals. It is obvious that the Christian commu-
nity does little along these lines. Even the efforts of the
church school are notoriously half-hearted and inadequate,
perhaps more by reason of neglect of the other factors,
equally important.
71. The role of self is considered in detail in Chap-
ter V. See below, p. 137.
72. Here the Pauline injunction applies, "Finally,
brothers, keep in mind whatever is true, whatever is worthy,
whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is attractive,
whatever is high-toned, all excellence, all merit." (Phil-
lipians 4:8).
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ii. The Processes of Sublimation
Central in the formation of sentiments stands emotion.
Emotions not only determine the qualitative nature of any
particular sentiment but also channel the energy of life
into it. The process of sublimation has to do with the
affective-energetic center of sentiment. 73
Generally speaking there are three distinct processes
of energy transformation encompassed by the term sublimation.
In the first , the constellation of ideas and objects breaks
up, but the affective-energetic center of the sentiment re-
mains and associated around it are new ideas and objects.
This process is illustrated by a young man whose affection
centered on his mother-in-law after the death of his wife.
Illustrative, also, of this process is the reformer who finds
new interests (ideas, objects) and outlets for his energies
when his original cause has been won. Conceptualizations of
this particular process of sublimation are the psychoanalytic
concepts of: ’displacement,’ conceived as the process by
which one idea may surrender to another its volume of cathex-
is (libido investment); ’condensation,’ the process by which
an idea may appropriate the whole cathexis of several ideas;
73. This analysis of the processes of sublimation
owes much to de Sanctis who considers the subject relative
to religious conversion. Cf. RC, 127 ff
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’transference,’ thought of as a shift of sexual object; and
’symbolization,’ standing for that process in which one ob-
ject comes to represent or stand for another object.
The second process is the reverse of the first. The
sentiment situation (objects, ideas) remains but the par-
ticular type of affective energy is changed or radically
altered. Illustrative of this process is a wife who finds
hatred taking the place of love for husband. Here too ap-
plies the psychoanalytic concept of ’ react ion-format ion’
which is characterized by a Qualitative reversal of feeling
affect
.
The third process is marked by the withdrawal of the
affective energy and the dropping or repressing of the ide-
ational and motor elements. Not to the point of disappear-
ance but to the point where neither sentiment energy or the
constellation of ideas and objects around it remain in
effect. In other words the sentiment disintegrates. 74 Il-
lustrative of this process is the ’converted’ or ’born-again’
man of the evangelistic sects.
The foregoing description of three processes of subli-
mation is, of course, much too simple to describe the process
of character formation. All three processes may occur in one
74. De Sanctis points out that the ideational and
motor elements (objects, ideas, action patterns) are submerged
but not destroyed and can be reactivated by endowing them
with energy . RC
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individual with many possible variations in each. But in any
case or combination sentiment formation through the process
of sublimation is going on, relatively more in childhood and
youth, relatively less with advancing age.
In this consideration of mental organization, conceived
in terms of sentiment formation through the process of sub-
limation, nothing has been pointed out relative to the role
of self as manifest in reason and choice. And, whereas
sublimation concerns the direction or redirection of life’s
basic energy, it would seem that self-determination plays
no part in sentiment and hence character formation. Such is
the case according to the Freudian interpretation for they
see the process of sublimation as an unconscious one. How-
ever, de Sanctis has pointed out the fact that though the
process may begin in the unconscious realms eventually it
comes into consciousness and there must be accepted or re-
jected . 75
iii. The Stages of Development
It is obvious that the infant and child cannot love in
the same sense as the adult. This fact suggests stages of
development which are now considered. It is to be understood
that the stages as herein set forth do not appear in the
75. De Sanctis, RC
,
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individual with corresponding clarity and conciseness. They
overlap in development, and in some individuals, even, one
stage may be absent (due to fixation in the earlier stage).
The stages are delineated according to the nature of
the love object. Thus, in psychoanalytic terms, there are
the autoerotic (self-love: self-regard, narcissism) and the
alloerotic (object love: homoerotic, heteroerotic ). 76
(1). The Autoerotic Stage
The newborn infant is by necessity wholly self-centered.
Feelings are experienced only through areas (bodily) that
are more narrowly those of the self. Pleasure is experienced
not in others (as pleasure in the success of a loved one) but
only in self. The body of the infant is its love object. 77
The inference from this condition is that the infant
loves only itself. As yet it is incapable of loving any
other than self.
Elements of the autoerotic stage persist throughout
life. 78 It is the basis of self-respect, self-acceptance
.
76. However this portrayal of development though
incorporating the psychoanalytical viewpoint does not accept
it in toto . For an outline of the psychoanalytical position
see Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, SMP, 100 ff.
77. Of. Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SHIP, 100. These
authors point out that autoerotism results from the frustra-
tion of nursing. To compensate for the loss of the nipple
the infant for satisfaction turns to its own body.
78. Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, SHIP, 17.
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The extremes of development within the autoerotic stage
are narcissism on the one hand and self-rejection on the
other. Which extreme may he approached depends to great
extent on the influence of the environment (esp. mother’s
care). It is obvious that a middle course of development
is desirable: enough self-love for self-respect; little
enough self-love so as not to stand in the way of further
development
.
Narcissism is defined in the sexual sense by Freud as
the "attitude of a person who treats his own body in the
same way as otherwise the body of a sexual object is usually
treated.” 175 In the larger sense, inclusive of the sexual,
narcissism is the centering of love energy on the posses-
sor’s person, including his body. It is very difficult to
develop beyond love of self in this extreme, for it renders
the individual practically incapable of loving others, in-
cluding God. The narcissist is apt to love self in others
which, basically, is not true object love. The self-lover
is fixated in the primary stage of love development
.
Self-rejection, the other extreme in the autoerotic
stage, is likewise undesirable. For through rejection on
the part of those on whom the infant is dependent, he can
79. Freud, CP, Vol. 4, 50.
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similarly reject himself. This is the basic factor in the
sense of insecurity that can persist throughout life, making
affectional relationships a practical impossibility.
The autoerotic stage of development, in which sentiments
toward self are formed, is of primary significance in the
development of Christian love. Here two extremes are pos-
sible, narcissism and self-rejection; both of which militate
against the development of the ability to love. The Chris-
tian church must teach and the Christian parent understand
the techniques of reward and punishment as they pertain to
infancjr and childhood, by this means the individual can be
guided between the extremes, developing enough self-love as
basis for self-respect and yet little enough so as to remain
free of fixation at this point.
The nature of the autoerotic phase of development sug-
gests the basis of the Christian teaching of self-love as
implied in the phrase ”... love thy neighbor as thyself."
It has been pointed out that self-love as developed in
reaction to the environment is basic to security. The sense
of worthiness of other’s love is commensurate with acceptance
(limited self-love; more properly, self-respect) of self.
It is common clinical experience that the unloved person has
a low opinion of self. Common also is the fact that a per-
son tends to condemn in others what he rejects in self
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(projection — condemnation); 80 and the fact that the mark
of neurosis, from one standpoint, is the condemnation and
inability to accept self. These observations support the
thesis that a measure of self-love (issuing in self-respect
and acceptance of self) is basic to the ability to love,
for inasmuch as love is a relationship the rejection of self
makes that relationship impossible. 81
(2). The Alloerotic Stage
Through the care and attention (with affection) of the
mother the infant soon learns to associate warmth, satisfac-
tion, and pleasure with the mother’s person. Thus there is
formed very early a sentiment of affection for the mother.
This attachment of infant to mother (or mother substi-
tute) is of utmost importance for it is his first contact
with the world of persons whom he is to love, reject, or
hate. This first relationship can leave its impress on all
future relationships of the individual.
80. In the positive sense this is to be seen in "Alco-
holics Anonymous" as they aid others in overcoming chronic
alcoholism.
81. In connection with this point it is interesting to
note that the self-condemned sinner is able to receive the
forgiveness of God only when he realizes God does not con-
demn him and thus relinquishes his self-condemnation. Also
in cases where one cannot receive the forgiveness of God,
usually it is because the sinner cannot give up self-condem-
nation which condition prevents relationship with God.
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Flfigel has summarized the line of development of object
love. 82 The area of alloerotic development is normally the
family group. The infant ’s first relationship with the
mother is soon enlarged to include relationships with other
intimate persons of the family group, father and siblings.
The sentiment formed in reaction to the mother’s care can or
cannot be formed around the enlarging experience of the child
within the family. Normally and ideally the first love-
sentiment formed around the mother-object becomes the pattern
for similar sentiment formations around other family members.
Enlarging experience brings the growing child into con-
tact with greater numbers of persons, all of whom are beyond
the ties of family and with whom some kind of relationship
must be formed. The pattern developed in relation to the
mother, and further developed in the family, operates beyond
the family determining the quality of relationship to others.
In the above summary of object-love development the
importance of the sentiment developed in reaction to the
mother is clearly evident. It becomes the basic pattern that
influences the quality of relationship with other objects in
and beyond the family. The affectional relationship estab-
lished with the mother is transferred to new and different
objects
.
82. Cf. Flflgel, PSF, 88 ff.
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The sentiment pattern formed in relationships with the
mother is primary but by no means the only influential rela-
tionship. The relationship between parents can affect the
process of sentiment formation in the growing child. Con-
flict between parents can result in uncertainty in the child
(thus destroying the pattern earlier established in relation-
ship with the mother), or rejection of one parent (sentiment
involving hatred). Likewise the relationship between par-
ents and siblings can affect the child. Favoritism toward
one child can result in a pattern of hostility in the sib-
lings, which pattern can influence one’s relationship with
others
.
All the foregoing factors are pertinent to the process
of development that results in the ability to love.
3. SUMMARY AM) CONCLUSION
The argument outlined in this chapter began with a
consideration of the concept of psychic energy commonly ac-
cepted as basic in the formation of character. The energy
of the sentiment of love was considered from the standpoint
of the theories of instinct, libido, drive, and traits.
Consideration of these theories led to the conclusion that
in infancy the psychic energy is undifferentiated and in
expression comparatively simple. This means that love is
not innate. It is the result of learning in experience.
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It is in part the development of psychic energy in general
into love energy in particular.
The next section considered the process of development
through which the primal psychic energy becomes differentia-
ted. This process is conceptualized in sentiment formation,
.analysis suggests that the process of development can be
greatly varied in different individuals but every case fol-
lov/s a line of development which, if studied carefully, is an
intelligible process. This means that love is no haphazard
development, but rather an orderly development. Love can
be consciously and intelligently developed in character.
Itirther analysis revealed three processes of energy
transformation in sentiment formation. These processes in-
dicate the possible approaches to the development of love.
Consideration of the stages of sentiment development
formulated two general phases: autoerotic and alloerotic.
Here it was noted that self-love is basic to achieving the
ability of love. The extremes to avoid are narcissism and
self-rejection. In the infant’s relation to his mother the
first pattern of affectional relationships is formed. (This
means that the teaching of love must begin in infancy.)
This pattern can extend through family relationships to
those with all other persons, including God. Love may or
may not be developed in the child-parent relationship. Re-
jection or overacceptance by the mother or conflict in family
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relationships can hinder the infant and child in the de-
velopment of self-love (security, "wantedness" ) . The child
can consequently reject self or remain at an early level of
development (fixation). In general this means that the in-
fant and child, in order to achieve the ability to love, has
a series of emotional relationships (family) which it must
work through in the normal course of development. Failure
to progress properly in the affect ional relationships of
infancy and childhood can be a serious handicap to the
achievement of Christian love.
4. TRANSITION
It is commonly agreed, though in varied terminologies^3
that the process of sentiment formation is central in the
development of love. However the considerations of this
chapter, necessarily limited to the processes of sentiment
formation, fails to make clear the influence of self and
environment upon the formation of sentiments and thus upon
character.
The concept of sentiment formation portrays the develop-
ment of love as a process within the individual. It fails to
emphasize that the nature of the love object can influence
both the development and nature of love. 84 So Chapter VI
will consider the environmental basis of love.
83. Cf. above, p. 118 f.
84. Cf. Stuart, AP, 49 f.
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The concept of sentiment formation adequately describes
the various methods of transformation of life energy into
love energy, but it does not indicate the influence that the
self can exert upon its own development. Sentiment formation
indicates the means but not the agents. Self, as will be
shown, ranks with environmental objects as an influence in
the development of love. The next chapter considers the
self as personological basis for love.
3
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CHAPTER V
THE PERSONOLOGICAL BASIS: SELF
Love is not fully explained by organic processes, nor
psychic energy, nor cultural pattern, nor by all of them to-
gether. All are present and dynamic in any situation where-
in love is expressed. These three factors do not function
independently of each other. Rather they function as a
whole. Personality is not a simple aggregate of parts. It
is a functioning whole, and whatever affects it, affects it
as a whole
.
Personality functions as a whole. .And in the whole
activities of personality there are effects unaccounted for
by the organism, psychic energy or cultural influence. Some
of these effects are known as reasoning, willing, choosing,
knowing and doing. A third aspect of personality, the self,
is postulated on the basis of these and other similar ef-
fects. The subject of this chapter is the role of self in
the achievement of love.
Further considerations will lead to a conception of
self. But here a preliminary definition is necessary. For
the purposes of investigation self is defined as the organ-
izing center of personality characterized by a sense of
uniqueness (I am I, not you) and possession (this is my ex-
perience). In common experience the self is the "I".
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Objective evidence of self-activity will consist of activi-
ties of organization. And organization, in terms of per-
sonality, is conceived of in terms of unified (choosing,
rejecting), purposive (directive), coherent (meaningful)
behavior. It is obvious that self is not the body for self
is conscious. Self is not psychic energy for psychic energy
in itself is not directive or purposive. And self is not
the cultural pattern for self is owned by the person.
1. THE NEGLECT OF SELF
Allport has pointed out that recent psychology has
omitted or minimized the place of self. 1 Pioneer psychol-
ogy (1880-1900) spoke often of the ’soul.’ But under the
leadership of Wundt this concept was forfeited by psychology
to theology and philosophy. The unity, coherence and purpos-
iveness explained by the concept of ’soul’ was for awhile
transferred to the concept of ’self,’ a term used and de-
fended notably by James and Calkins. But even ’self* felt
the impact of positivistic psychology and fell into disuse.
Psychoanalysis arising at the turn of the twentieth
century fostered the concept of ’ego,’ closely akin to
’self.’ However ’ego* was for the most part passive and de-
termined, not sufficiently basic or dynamic to account for
1. Allport, Art. (1943).
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the unity, coherence, and purpose of personality. Allport
credits psychoanalysis with having preserved the term ’self’
for psychology. But equally deserving with the psychoana-
lysts is Mary Whiton Calkins who ably expounded and defended
’self’ and ’self-psychology.’
2
Recent years have witnessed the resurgence of the con-
cept ’self’ with corresponding emphasis on psychology as the
study of personality as a complex whole. Leaders in this
movement are Allport, 5 Stern, 4 and Murray
.
5
2.
EVIDENCE OF SELF
The commonest fact of experience is the experience of
self. It is the one fact of which every person is convinced. 6
All consciousness is owned ; experience belongs to an
experiencer. As Stern puts it: there is ’’no Gestalt without
a ’Gestalter .
*
7 As Calkins insists, behind each idea is a
thinker; for each function, a functioner; 8 ”to be conscious
is to be conscious of a self.’’ 9
Consciousness of self as reported by the self is hardly
cogent evidence for the fact of self. "That there is a vague
2. Cf. Calkins, FB.
3. Cf. Allport, PER.
4. Cf. Stern, GP.
5. Cf. Murray, EP.
6. Allport, Art. (1943), 451.
7.
- Stern, GP, 114.
8. Calkins, FP, 274.
9. Calkins, Art. (1906), 68.
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but firmly imbedded feeling of a self that lies deeper than
personality characteristics no thinking person can deny.” 10
But "vague . . . feeling” is vague evidence.
A number of experiments affirm common experience and
lead to the postulation of ’self’ as a dynamic, organizing
factor in character formation. In each of these experiments
there appears evidence of direction, purpose, organization
that is best explained by the concept of self.
Amen experimented with a small group of graduate stu-
dents in psychology. 11 She presented to each a series of
choice, recognition, and problem experiments. Centering on
the problem experiments, for in these self-experience oc-
curred more readily, she asked for introspective reports
following each experiment. The reports revealed a sense of
personal involvement peculiar to each individual ?/hich deter
mined the individual nature of their response and approach
to the situation. She concludes that there is an immediate,
unanalyzable experience of self, but self-experience is not
present in all the subjects12 nor do all experiments elicit
10. Healy, PFA, 13.
11. Amen, Art. (1926).
12. This is a hasty conclusion in view of the limita-
tions of Amen’s experiment. She makes no differentiation be
tween self-experience and self-esteem. The latter, when at
stake, involves the self much more intensely than otherwise.
And this factor is involved directly or indirectly in most
self-experience. Some persons are so far above criticism of
the self that self-esteem is seldom involved. It is this
factor that is discovered absent in one of Amen’s subjects,
not self-experience.
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the same self-experience. From this study Amen also con-
cludes that there is self-experience but it varies with
different experiences and with different degrees of fre-
quency. In other words each self is different from all
others as seen in different reactions to identical situ-
ations .
The field of experimental studies on motivation offers
corroborating data. Ilurlock studied the effect of praise
and reproof upon the performance of school children on the
Otis and the National Intelligence tests. 15 On the basis of
the intelligence test scores three groups of about equal
ability were formed, about 136 subjects in each group. The
tests were given a second time but with different instruc-
tions to each group. One group was praised for its vrork on
the tests; the second was reproved; and the third received
neither praise nor reproof. The results showed that praise
and reproof both raised the test scores. Of the control
group, 52 per cent raised their scores; of the praised group,
79 per cent; and of the reproved group, 80 per cent. The
significant rise in scores of the praised and reproved groups
points to the response activity of the self.
Gates and Rissland gave 300 college students, individ-
ually, two tests under different motivating conditions. 14
13. hurlock, Art. (1924).
14. Gates and Rissland, Art. (1923).
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In the first tests all were treated alike. On the second
test 100 of the students were encouraged, 100 were discour-
aged, and 100 served as control. On the motor coordination
test 89 of the encouraged group improved their performance
and 11 fell off; 70 of the discouraged group improved, 4 re-
mained the same and 26 fell off; and 64 of the control group
improved
,
8 remained the same and 28 fell off
.
Rounds studied the influence of money reward as incen-
tive, concluding that his results point to "an inner response
which makes the performance more eff icient . "-1- 5 This and the
two foregoing experimental studies from the field of motiva-
tion reveal a common factor, namely that increase in achieve-
ment or effort is due to an inner response. They point to
the activity and response of the inner organizing center of
personality, the self.
Kulp, in his study of 75 graduate students enrolled in
a course in Clinical Sociology at Teachers College, Columbia
University, found that those students who registered for the
course for the purpose of advancing professionally or for
the purpose of acquiring information achieved more and im-
proved more markedly than those who registered for the course
because they needed three credits, or because a friend ad-
vised them, or because the hour was convenient.-^ Crawford
15. Rounds, Art. (1955), 571.
16. Kulp, Art. (1935).
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also found that students with definite occupational purpose
excel in scholarship .
^
These studies also point to the
fact of an inner response that markedly influences behavior.
lersild's experiments with pleasant and unpleasant mem-
ory materials also indicates activity attributable only to
the self.
I
0 Fifty-one subjects in a college psychology class
were asked to write for seven minutes as rapidly as possible
of all the pleasant experiences of the last three weeks that
they could recall; then to do the same with their unpleasant
experiences. Twenty-one days later, with nothing said in the
meantime, the subjects were asked to repeat the experiment
covering the original three week period. On the first ex-
periment the subjects reported an average of 16.35 pleasant
experiences and an average of 13.7 unpleasant. The second
experiment reported an average of 7 pleasant experiences and
3.86 unpleasant. 42.8 c/0 of the originally reported pleasant
experiences were recalled on the second experiment, but only
28.18 c/o of the unpleasant. Greater retention of the pleasant
experiences might be explained as due to failure to rehearse
the unpleasant
,
or due to the fact that the unpleasant experi-
ence is a maladjustment and efforts to modify it obscures the
original experience, or due to suppression of the unpleasant.
17. Cf. Crawford, A. B.
,
Incentives to Study
,
New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1929.
18. Jersild, Art. (1931).
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But in any case the differences are not due to time for
pleasant and unpleasant were equal in this respect. The ex-
planation is to be sought for in the concept of self that
organizes and utilizes experience.
Raethlisberger and Dickson’s and Watson’s studies in
industrial psychology reveal the activity of self as a factor
in employee-employer relationships.-*- 9 These studies reveal
that employees want above all else credit for work, appreci-
ation, interesting jobs, approval, and good relations with
employers and fellow workers. In other words, above all
they seek for self-satisfactions.
Frenkel-Brunswik’ s study of the mechanisms of self-
deception reveal that self-protective devices were so power-
ful that her subjects would distort the facts of their own
deficiencies so as to improve their status. 20 This study
confirms common knowledge of the practice of self-defense
at the price of distortion. And this need of defense points
to a possessor of the need, the self.
The foregoing studies, it may be concluded, establish
the concept of self as the organizing center of personality,
stamping it with the characteristics of unity, coherence,
and purpose
.
19. Cf. F. J. Raethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Manage -
ment and Order, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939,
and 0. Watson, Chapter in G. W. Hartmann (ed.), Industrial
Conflict
,
New York: Cordon Press, 1939.
20. Frenkel- Brunswik, Art. (1939).
* *
.
,
•
-
* \ . t
.
. .
• •
•'
'
.
•
-
145
3. SELF AM) LOVE
It is not enough for psychology of love to establish
the validity of self. The significance of self in the de-
velopment of love is to be found in the nature of self as
revealed in its functions.
Amen's21 and Klein and Schoenfeld f s22 studies reveal
that the self is not active in all experience but when it is
active or involved then behavior is more consistent. Klein
and Schoenfeld tested 50 subjects on four crucial tests
(opposites, mental additions, definitions, and dot apprehen-
sion) under different situations. In the first group of
tests there was no undue emotional strain. But eleven days
later the tests were given again with the information that
they were intelligence tests and the results were to be re-
corded and compared. They were told to do their best. All
the subjects reported greater strain and greater effort was
expended and anxiety experienced. It was found that confi-
dence appeared more consistently as a trait when the ego
(self) was more concerned, i. e. under more emotional strain.
Self involves a core of emotional experiences.
However the conclusion drawn from the foregoing studies
is open to question. Due to the fact that under certain
21. Of. above, p. 140 f. for a review of Amen’s study.
22. Klein and Schoenfeld, Art. (1941).
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circumstances the self seems to be somewhat less active it
is suggested that the self is not active in all experience.
This is highly debatable. The data supports another inter-
pretation. The above studies make no distinction between
self and the core of self-activity, namely self-esteem. The
self is active in all conscious experience but to varying de-
grees. However when a situation involves elements that chal-
lenge the self's opinion of self (self-esteem) then the self
is more intensely concerned. This is the fact revealed in
Amen's and Klein and Schoenfeld’s experiments, but overlooked.
Erenkel-Hrunswik 1 s experiment which revealed tailoring of
facts for purposes of self-defense; industrial studies which
reveal that employees desire above all else credit for work,
appreciation, and approval; Kulp’s study which revealed that
students did better work when there was a personal relation-
ship (self-commitment) to the course; and the Hurlock and
Gates and Rissland studies of the effects of praise and re-
proof — all these indicate that self-esteem is a dynamic
core of self and its activity.
The dynamic nature of self-esteem is of great signifi-
cance to the development of love. In the infant and child
love must be related (through experiences) to the growing
23. This conclusion supports McDougall's emphasis of
self-regard as the master sentiment in character formation.
Cf. McDougall, ISP, 179 ff
. ,
and EM, 232 f.
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individual’s most intimate welfare. And this is normally
the case as when the mother and her love care for the child’s
needs. In this relationship love is associated (within the
child) with acceptance (security). It is thus, an easy and
most common achievement to love parents and family. But to
love universally (God and man) as the Christian must is not
as easy. For the child there is no universal father or uni-
versal man to love him and therefore to he loved in return.
The extension of love acquired in childhood to God and
man must therefore wait until the individual has acquired
the ability to personalize and establish relationships with
abstract objects. When the individual reaches that stage of
ability then training in the ability to love God and man
must relate itself to self-esteem as was the case in infancy
and childhood. But this fact is too often lost sight of.
Therefore love is taught in a much too abstract fashion.
The continued training in the art of Christian love must
take cognizance of the increased abilities of self (reason,
independent decision, action) and utilize them. But in all
it must seek to involve one’s opinion of self (self-esteem).
Failure to do this leaves universal love in the abstract
realms and fails to personalize it to the point that person-
al commitment to love is made.
It is just at this point that this author finds major
shortcomings in the methods of liberal religion and the
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strength of the more fundamental (but intensely evangelistic)
religion. Liberal religion has tended to de-personalize the
issues of love. Fine sermons are preached but often fail to
relate to the inner commitments of the self. Fundamental
religion often accomplishes what liberal religion fails at;
namely, it makes its teaching a personal issue with each per-
son and crystallizes the issue in a request for a decision.
In the interests of developing Christian love all per-
sons who seek to guide and encourage the development should
relate love to the inner needs of the self. If the self can
be convinced that love means something to it (challenges
through forms of praise or reproof), 2 - then the self becomes
more intensely involved and more apt to commit itself to
love.
Frenkel- Brunswik’ s experiment especially (as well as the
common known uses of rationalization and nrojection) points
to the fact that one’s view of self (what one thinks one is)
whether right or wrong is a dynamic factor in self-activity. 25
Self-esteem is an important determinant of self-activity.
Thus the self, reflecting on self, can judge self as adequate
or inadequate (accept or reject). It can incorporate into
24. It is noted that the concept of heaven and hell are
influential forms of praise and reproof that related to self-
esteem. Hence they are quite effective in producing results.
25. As Boring expresses it, "People not only adjust to
external forces but they also adjust in terms of what they
conceive themselves to be.” Cf. Boring, Langfeld and Weld,
ID, 84.
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self the desire for new factors which results in actual re-
alization, frustration, or conduct as if they were actual.
William James made some interesting observations on the
reflective nature of self, distinguishing the knower self,
"I,” from the known self, "Me,” 26 but finding that a separate
knower self is unnecessary and the activity assigned to it as
adequately accounted for by the knowing process, the "stream
of consciousness." 2,7 Apart from James’ criticism of a knower
self it is to be noted that he calls attention to a commonly
experienced fact, namely, that self can know and reflect and
pass judgment upon itself. The self is reflective.
This reflective nature of self is significant to the
development of love for it reveals the place and function of
reason and judgment. 28 The ability to reason means essen-
tially the ability to gather information, weigh the issues
on any subject, and in view of information and comparison to
make a decision (judgment).
The pathway of reason has been set forth, especially in
the present era, as a major approach to truth. Present day
emphasis has reached the stage wherein anything accepted must
26. James, PBC, 176 ff.
27. Ibid., 203.
28. Reason is herein thought of as Allport defines it,
".
. . one’s capacity to shape one’s belief and conduct to
accord with one’s knowledge of the world, and if one’s knowl-
edge is insufficient, the capacity to set out to acquire more
knowledge pertinent to the issue at hand." Cf. PER, 172.
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pass the test of reason. What we see here is the elevation
of one of self's capacities.
Love is more than a matter of reason, hut at the same
time to dominate the character of an individual it must be
accepted by his reason. ^9 it is obvious that one individual
cannot experience every other individual in the world, or
experience the whole of the person of God . It is through
reason that the limits of individual experience are pushed
back. It is this activity of self that makes possible the
extension of love to God and man.
The implications of self-reflection for the development
of love are plain. First, love must be presented as reason-
able for the critical consideration and acceptance of indi-
viduals. Second, through reason, the individual must be led,
encouraged, and taught to extend love to its universal
lengths. It is through reason that the self can realize
God and man as proper objects for love.
Reasoning leads to judgments. In light of these judg-
ments certain experiences become more meaningful (values)
and others more desired (ideals). Values and ideals are not
29. It is true that many individuals think on a purely
emotional rather than a rational basis (or a combination of
both). For such individuals it is an easy matter to love
but usually their love is limited to those near at hand
.
Extension of love to the universal lengths defined by the
Christian doctrine necessitates the activity of the indi-
vidual’s reasoning abilities.
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products solely of the individual’s reasoning ability. There
are affective components in both. However, it is reason
that adds the qualitative differences to values and ideals.
By gathering knowledge, weighing and judging, the individual
reaches the highest of values and ideals. In this way God
and man are accepted as most valuable and ideal recipients
of the individual’s love.
The self is involved in all aspects of personality as
it develops the ability to love. But the distinctive feature
of self-activity that is most pertinent to the continued
development of love is that of reason. The body, psychic
energy, culture — none of these possess the abilities of
reason. Reason is peculiar to self and as such its main
avenue of influence on love
.
The self has a social reference. Self-esteem determines
much of its activity, so also does social regard. Hartshorne
and May in their character studies found that honesty did not
appear to be a general trait, i. e., honesty in one situa-
tion did not necessarily carry over to another. 30 Allport
points out that Klein and Schoenfeld's experiment offers an
explanatory principle. In their study of ego- involvement
50. Hartshorne and May, SD, 582, 584, and 411. Like-
wise love can be extended to selected objects that exclude
other objects. One can love wife or husband but fail to
love God. Or one can love God and hate his brother. But
this is not Christian love for as I John 4:20 warns, "If a
man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar."
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and confidence they found those who were confident were
consistently so in those situations which involved the ego.
(The same holds for the trait of honesty.) Klein and Schoen-
feld’s experimental situation in which the ego became more
involved consisted of tests designed to measure intelligence
of which the results were to be recorded. In other words
,
it was a situation involving self-esteem in a social refer-
ence, actual or anticipated.
The social reference of self is an influential factor
in self-esteem. Self-esteem is maintained or lost in the
presence of social acceptance or rejection. But not all
v>
social customs and standards, values, ideals are accepted
by the self. The contradictory nature of systems of values
and ideals makes some choice or decision necessary. Choice
is influenced by training and self-reflection (involving
reason and judgment). But whether training or self-reflec-
tion be the basis of choice, the result is the same. The
self identifies with or intro jects that which it accepts.
In other words the ego extends its boundaries to include ob-
jects, values, ideals. Self is an assimilating organism.
^
The assimilative and reflective functions of self work to-
gether. Through its reflective abilities the self decides
what is valuable and desirable. These it takes into itself,
31. So Josey, Art. (1935), 52.
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intro jects. They become a part of self. In this way values
t
and ideals become personal.
In view of the social reference of self, it follows
that love is to be more effectively developed in company
with other persons who love. This is desirable not only for
the influence of example but for the social approval that is
necessary to self-esteem and the easier assimilation of pat-
terns of love. Social approval is an obvious necessity to
the development of any character trait. But the actuality
of social approval for love is quite difficult to secure.
One of the primary functions of church societies should be
the promotion and maintenance of groups dominated by love.
But this they do not do. And wherever such is accomplished,
the nature of Western civilization makes it impossible to
limit the individual’s contacts with any one particular
group. 32 Hence it is practically impossible to secure the
complete social approval of love and its correlates.
One further observation can be made on the nature of
the self. It is forward looking. Israeli has revealed that
normal people are much more interested in the future than
the past. 33 Otto Rank contends that preoccupation with the
past is determined and selected by the dynamic organization
32. For example, the individual (especially the young)
who goes to both church and movies is subjected to two dif-
ferent patterns of values and ideals.
33. Of. Israeli, Art. (1932).
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of personality in the present and used according to the
needs of the present personality
.
34
The "forwardness” or future reference of self is that
characteristic which influences Hocking to emphasize purpos-
iveness and hopefulness as the outstanding qualities of
self. 35 The future is viewed with hope of gain or achieve-
ment. The idea of the future, in the desirable sense, is
contained in ideals and goals. To realize ideals and a-
chieve goals adds purposiveness to the self. Thus, the self
is "a fighter for ends" as James called it. 36 The fact that
ends or goals are conceived in terms of values and ideals
bears evidence to the influential nature of self and self-
reflection.
Pertinent to love is the question of self-consciousness.
Is the self characterized by conscious processes, unconscious
processes, or both?
Huntley’s experiment suggests that self may be involved
without conscious awareness. 37 his experiment called for the
subjects, motivated in routine manner, to judge personalities
by handwriting, recorded voices, photograph of hands, and
style of story telling. In the midst of the series the
34. Otto Rank, Will Therapy
,
(tr. J. Taft), New York:
A. A. Knopf, 1936.
35. Hocking, SBF, 46. "The self is a system of pur-
posive behavior emerging from a persistent hope."
36. Allport, Art. (1943), 456.
37. Huntley, Art. (1940).
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subjects were suddenly confronted with samples of their own
expressive behavior which had been recorded without their
knowledge. In most cases the subjects did not recognize
their own records but their judgments were markedly affected.
The subject would give his own record a much better rating
than similar records from other subjects. Occasionally a
subject gave his record a negative rating, but never an in-
different rating. When the subjects fully recognized their
records as their own then judgments of them returned to the
impartial level.
In the above experiment it is to be noted that the par-
ticular stimulus to self-activity, in this case a challenge
to self-esteem, operated through unconscious processes. How-
ever, the active self was consciously active. This means
that conscious self-activity can be stimulated by unconscious
need. But, however unaware the self was of the source of
stimulation it nevertheless was the center through which
unconscious need was organized and expressed. The fact of
unconscious motivation has double significance for the de-
velopment of love. 3° It can be ally or foe.
The inimical influence of unconscious processes to the
development of love is most clearly seen in two general
38. See Hendricks, FTP, 4 ff. for a summary of the
psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. See Allport,
PER, 183 ff. for a critical review of the concept.
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areas of experience: childhood and war participation. Psy-
choanalysis has revealed the present influence of traumatic
experiences of childhood, long since forgotten. The study
by Pease of a young neurotic adult clearly reveals the in-
fluence of forgotten childhood experiences. 09 When the
content of unconscious processes consists of traumatic and
unassimilated experiences these constantly make their de-
mands on conscious self-activity and thus influence and
control or prevent development. 40
The effect of war participation (active combat) is to
introduce the element of conflict into the content of un-
conscious processes. However this conflict turns not on
love in general but on Christian love in particular. The
irreconcilable conflict between the way of war and the way
of Christian love is apparent to any who are acquainted with
the life and teaching of Jesus. To the individual so ac-
quainted the way of war comes as a patriotic necessity.
Many intricate arguments are advanced to reconcile the
way of love and this war; and the conscious self (out of
necessity to support self) may accept them; but underneath
(unconscious processes) the conflict goes on. Powerful
social forces and feelings are mobilized in war time to help
39. Pease, Art. (1929).
40. The experience of W. S. Leonard., described in The
Locomotive -god
,
Lev; York: The Century Co., 1927, is a
classic case in point.
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swing the individual to acceptance of his role in the war
effort. But inevitably peace comes and with it time for
reflection. Peace brings with it emphasis on ways of ac-
tion more closely correlated to love and a much lessened
social approval and support of war. In time of war self-
commitments to the ways of love are repressed. In time of
peace self-commitments to the ways of war are repressed.
But there is a difference. The times of peace do not carry
equal organization of social forces and feelings to support
it as does war. In fact war has resulted in institutions (as
the American Legion) that foster continued self-commitments
to it.^l Add to this the fact of war’s traumatic nature and
then it becomes plain that the way of war has great influence
on the development of love v/ithin the individual.
The inevitable conflict between war and love and their
correlates can remain in the unconscious processes. And
where the commitments to war are strong (as in most who were
completely identified with the war effort) the self is moti-
vated to actions and interests that are inimical to love (as
in glorifying the conquests of the war, extolling its heroes,
joining its organizations — such as the American Legion,
raiding the national treasury for "benefits”).
41. It is to be noted that the American Legion and
similar organizations owe much of their appeal and strength
to the fact that they glorify the individual’s participation
in war.
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If the way of love has been deeply ingrained in the in-
dividual, peace is apt to bring a revival of commitment to
love and a regret of participation in war; and the self is
motivated to actions and interests that promote love (such
as efforts on behalf of continued peace, or, negatively,
"debunking" the war) . Often conflict between the way of
war and love is fully recognized by the self and open stand
is taken on the issues involved. But the more insidious
attack on love, and hence on its development, is to be found
in those individuals not consciously aware of the fact of
conflict and the resulting motivations that stir the self
to activity.
In view of the influence of the content of the uncon-
scious processes on the development of love it is evident
that training of such processes be understood and undertaken.
Proper, normal development in childhood will insure proper
content of unconscious processes. It is pertinent, then,
that parents and ministers understand the course of normal
development; also that they be able to recognize maldevelop-
ment when it occurs.
The church could insure proper development of love in
childhood through psychological training of its ministers,
teaching parents, maintenance of child guidance clinics,
co-operation with such clinics, and promoting a Christian
ministry in psychiatry. On the question of influence of war
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it is obvious that the church should bend every effort toward
its elimination. But whereas elimination is not a fact, the
church can understand the issues of conflict between commit-
ment to war and to love, lead its constituents to self-
understanding, make clear to them the possible solutions,
and encourage recommitment to love.
In summary, the nature of self reveals several aspects
of great significance to the development of love; self-
esteem, self-reflection, and unconscious processes. The
function of self-esteem in self-activity warrants the con-
clusion that love must be made an intimate, personal issue
in which the welfare of the individual is vitally concerned.
The function of self-reflection in self-activity warrants
the conclusion that it is through values and ideals that the
self, in the true sense, determines the direction and end of
self-development . The function of unconscious processes
warrants the conclusion that their content must be of such a
nature as not to prevent the full exercise of self-activity
.
Love must be trained into the unconscious processes.
4. CONCLUDING DEFINITION OF SELF
The considerations of the previous section reveal the
following self-activities: self-esteem, social regard, re-
flection (reason and judgment which result in values and
ideals), and forward looking. In addition self-activity is
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marked by consciousness and it is in consciousness that the
self is motivated by unconscious processes. In view of the
foregoing the self may be defined as the conscious focus of
personality as it confronts the present and future ( forward
looking ) ; of which the emotional core is self -esteem (most
active in social situations that challenge it )
;
and whose
greatest achievements ( values and ideals ) correlate with the
development of its ability to reflect ( reason and .judge )
.
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CHAPTER VI
THE HNVXRONMENTAL BASIS: CULTURE
Up to this point love has been considered from the
point of view of its basis in body, in mind, and in self.
It is clearly discernible that personality is not alone
body, mind or self, or the sum total of the three. Previous
considerations have suggested a fourth factor which influen-
ces the organization of character. The family has been spo-
ken of as of central significance to the development of love,
as also have values and ideals. There are factors in the
family and elsewhere that for the individual originate not
in body, mind, or self-activity alone. In large part they
come to the individual through his social heritage. These
factors are now considered in their own right under the gen-
eral heading of environmental basis.
The term ,f environment” is used to designate the sum to-
tal of social forces and conditions surrounding any individ-
ual. In this sense the term is practically synonymous with
” culture." They differ in that environment includes all
conditions surrounding the individual, natural (climate) and
social (customs, mores). "Culture” is used to refer to one’s
social heritage, that is, the forms and patterns of living
developed by persons living together and into 'which the
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individual is born. "Culture comprises inherited artifacts,
goods, technical processes, ideas, habits, and values. Or
as Tyler expresses it, culture consists of "any . . . capa-
bilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." 2
It is well to differentiate between culture in general
and culture in particular. Mead's distinction makes for
clarity. Culture, she says, is the "whole complex of tradi-
tional behavior which has been developed by the human race
and is successfully learned by each generation." A culture
can mean the forms of traditional behavior characteristic of
a certain society, race, area or group.
3
^ se the term
"culture" in this paper will refer to culture in particular.
Basic in a culture are the folkways and mores. Folk-
ways are the manner in which men achieve desired ends (as,
manner in which dwellings are constructed ) . Mores are those
folkways which have through use attracted an attitude of
"rightness." Hence they are more compulsive.
^
Folkways and mores might be labeled cultural traits.
A clustering of traits (material, non-material, or combina-
tions of both) around a central or core trait constitutes a
cultural complex (as baseball in the U. S. A.).° Cultures
1. Malinowski, Art. (1941), 621.
2. C. B. Tyler as quoted byMonachesi, Art. (1937), 29.
3. Mead, CCPP, 17.
4. Monachesi, Art. (1937), 38 ff
.
5. Schmidt, Art. (1937), 32 ff.
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consist of combinations of cultural complexes which combina-
tions are designated "cultural patterns." A simple culture,
e. g., the Dobuan, has but one cultural pattern. A complex
civilization as in the U. S. A. may contain many such cul-
tural patterns. 6
The argument of this chapter is that the cultural pat-
terns, which form the content of the growing person’s envi-
ronment, are of outstanding importance in the development of
character dominated by love. Love is developed in relation
to other persons, a relationship which exerts a formative
influence on the character development of the individual.
If the dominant cultural patterns are organized on bases in-
imical to love, then the development of love will be a dif-
ficult and improbable achievement. Love is directly contin-
gent upon the cultural patterns conducive to it.
The first section of this chapter will establish the
influence of social environment upon character formation and
at the same time reveal the fact that love is directly de-
pendent upon the cultural patterns of the person’s environ-
ment. The second section will consider the nature and func-
tions of culture pertinent to the development of love. The
last section will consider in detail those particular cul-
tural institutions that are especially significant to the
development of love.
6. Cf. below, p. 185
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1. ENVIRONMENT AND LOVE
nove, as it has been defined in terms of a sentiment,
is a part of the organization of life known as character.
That being the case, it follows that what influences charac-
ter in general may also influence character in the particu-
lar aspect of love. Thus, if environment influences charac-
ter, it is also influential in the development of love.
Experimental evidence that environmental factors shape
and influence character is available. Dashiell has summa-
rized the effects produced in the individual by spectators,
co-workers, competitors, social encouragement and discourage-
ment, and group discussion.
7
Significant effects were ob-
served in all cases. Moore, to test ,Tthe comparative influ-
ence of majority and expert opinion," conducted a series of
experiments with 95 subjects. 8 He presented to his subjects
two concurrent stimuli of three different types: a) lin-
guistic (consisting of statements containing poor grammar or
misused words); b) ethical (pairs of undesirable traits of
character); and c) musical (-pairs of sounds on a reed organ).
Two days after the first judgments were made the procedure
was repeated to determine change due to chance. Two and a
half months later the same subjects were given an opportunity
7. Of. Dashiell, Art. (1955), 1097-1149.
8. Moore, Art. (1921).
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to register judgment on three new series of paired stimuli,
but before each pair was presented a second time the sub-
jects were informed of a majority opinion of the Question.
The procedure was repeated two days later but this time pre-
ceded by report of an opinion rendered by experts. It was
found that in matters of linguistics and ethics opinion was
reversed to agree with majority opinion to the point of five
times chance; in musical ability, two times chance. This
reveals the influence of environment and the individual’s
amenability to it
.
Similar studies by F. E. Allport, investigating the in-
fluence of group on judgments of comparison, revealed ”...
a tendency toward moderation in judgments made in concert
with others . . And individuals tended to avoid extremes
in judgment when judging socially.
9
In other v/ords the
presence of others makes for conformity.
Newcomb describes a four year study (1935-1959) of the
changes in the political and economic attitudes from freshman
to senior year at a new, progressive women’s college (Ben-
nington) .-1-0 Comparison studies were made of some students
at Skidmore and Williams. In all three colleges liberalism
increased in the years from freshman to senior but the change
9. Allport, SP, 276 ff.
10. Cf. Newrcomb, PSC.
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was more marked at Bennington. Whereas most of the entering
freshman in 1956 expressed themselves in agreement with the
views they attributed to their parents, as in favor of the
relatively conservative candidate for president, 84 % of the
juniors and seniors favored either Roosevelt or one of the
more radical candidates, Thomas or Browder. Such extensive
and persistent attitude changes were effected by teaching
and the atmosphere of the community.
Wheeler and Jordan also studied the influence of major-
ity opinion upon individual opinion. 11 From their study
they found that group opinion facilitates agreeing individual
opinion to an extent almost three times chance and inhibits
disagreeing opinion to almost one-half chance. Doroschenko
found differences among the children attending her nursery
in Kiev. 12 Those whose parents were revolutionaries and had
very little family life formed larger groups than did the
children in the second group whose parents were attempting
to preserve old traditions in family life. She observed
that the games of both groups reflected the style of living
of their respective environments.
The foregoing studies concern the influence of majority
groups within cultural areas and reveal the influence of cul-
tural patterns by implication. There is possible difference
11. Wheeler and Jordan, Art. (1929).
12. Reviewed in Murchison, HSP, 1074.
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on any number of questions and situations in any cultural
group. And if majority opinion is so influential on ques-
tions where differences are permissible to some degree, how
much more influential upon the individual are cultural pat-
terns which are such precisely because they are accepted and
made dominant by the majority in the group or society.
The most cogent evidence of the influence of environ-
ment upon character comes from anthropological studies,
these studies reveal that different cultures embodying dif-
fering cultural patterns produce personalities, consistent
within that culture, but markedly different when compared
with others. Detailed consideration of the Dobuan, a cultu-
ral group markedly unique, makes this point clear.
Dobu Island is one of the d ’Entrecasteaux group which
lies off the southern shore of eastern New Guinea. 13 The
Dobuans put a premium upon ill-will and treachery, making
them the recognized virtues of their society. They are law-
less and treacherous. Every man T s hand is against every
other man ’ s
.
Dobuan social organization consists of a definite lo-
cality of some four to twenty villages. Each locality is a
war unit at permanent conflict with every other locality.
Conflict, treachery and violence dominate within as well as
13. Cf. Benedict, PC, 130. This portrayal of Dobuan
society is taken from Benedict.
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'
.
168
between localities. Those who live together in the daily
routine are the ones who do each other supernatural and ac-
tual harm. They ruin each other’s harvests, steal by sor-
cery, ruin economic changes, bring disease and death. Indi-
viduals live and associate with those who threaten their
safety and well being.
Marriage begins v/ith an act of hostility on the part of
the mother-in-law. She stands in the doorway of her hut
where the prospective groom has been sleeping with her
daughter. The groom is trapped and marriage begins. Mar-
riage is prohibited between members of a village. Therefore
marriage brings together two hostile villages, iiach party
to marriage owes first and final loyalty to the family of
their own mother; which family line is known as one’s "susu."
The question as to whose "susu’’ rules the new family is
solved by alternately living for one year in the two villages
involved. When living in the wife's village her "susu”
rules and the husband is regarded and treated as an outsider
and must play a role of humiliation. The next year reverses
the situation in the husband's village, and so on till the
union is ended or broken.
Ownership is fiercely exclusive among the Dobuans and
is most clearly seen in the beliefs about hereditary propri-
etorship of yams, the chief source of food. The line of
yams descends within the "susu." One’s seed yams are taken
' A I : a*i 'Wtffc
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by the partners into the common gardening that accompanies
marriage. But always, each spouse grows only his or her
yams in their particular half of the garden plot. No others
could grow for him. One’s yams are made to grow by magical
incantations owned individually and secretly within one’s
’’susu.” One zealously guards the magic by which he grows
his yams. If one happens to reap an abundant harvest, he
attributes it to the success of his incantations through
which he has stolen yams from some other garden. A man has
no notion that one can plant or growr more yams than he.
Whatever surplus harvest a neighbor reaps has been magically
stolen from another’s garden.
All Dobuan existence is cutthroat competition, every
advantage is gained at the expense of a rival. But this
competition, and rivalry is seldom open; rather it is secre-
tive. It is reflected in religious or magical practices,
the two being identical among the Dobuans. There are no
supplications to any supernatural beings, no gifts or sacri-
fices. The few supernatural beings are a few secret magical
names, the knowledge of which gives the power to command.
No man gains such knowledge unless he pays for or inherits
it, and the knowledge is jealously guarded. Bvery undertak-
ing has its appropriate magical incantations. The belief is
that yams cannot grow, sex desires cannot arise, economic
exchanges be made, nor trees be protected without resource
to magical practice.
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Suspicion runs to paranoid lengths among the Dobuans.
Diseases are imposed upon one by means of another who pos-
sesses the ability to afflict a disease through the proper
magical formula. Thus disease comes through enemies against
whom one must protect oneself by means of proper counter-
incantations .
Dobuans exclude laughter and make dourness a virtue.
It is a prime obligation to refrain from pleasure in impor-
tant activities like gardening and trading expeditions.
This dourness is a close correlate with the jealousy, suspi-
cion, prudery surrounding sex. Do Dobuan would admit that a
male and female were together, even for the shortest time,
for any other purpose than intercourse. Trespassing in a
neighbor’s house or garden is forbidden. Any meeting between
man and woman is regarded as illicit. In fact a woman alone
is considered as legitimate prey and any woman who does not
flee the presence of a male is taken advantage of. Usually
a woman for protection takes with her a child when she trav-
els alone. During the season of woman’s work in the garden,
the husband stands guard in the doorway of the house, seeing
that she talks to no one
. He even keeps track of the amount
of time she is gone into the bushes to take care of the nat-
ural body functions and may, in extreme cases, accompany her
in spite of the great prudery of the Dobu. However dourness
and prudery exists with a high degree of prenuptial promis-
cuity and high estimation of sex passion and technique.
.
.
.
.
.
^
' >’
-
.
:
.
'
•
' j
.
•
•
.
.
.
.
.
171
Both men and women rate sex satisfaction high and are con-
cerned over its achievement. There is no belittling of
physical sex. The stock teaching for wives who would hold
their husbands admonishes them to keep their husbands as
sexually exhausted as possible.
The type of character that emerges from the Dobuan
cultural patterns is summarized by Benedict.
The Dobuan, therefore, is dour, prudish,
and passionate, consumed with jealousy and
suspicion and resentment. Every moment
of prosperity he conceives himself to have
wrung from a malicious world by a conflict
in which he has worsted his opponent. The
good man is the one who has many such con-
flicts to his credit, as anyone can see
from the fact that he has survived with a
measure of prosperity. It is’ taken for
granted that he has thieved
,
killed chil-
dren and his close associates by sorcery,
cheated whenever he dared. As we have
seen, theft and adultery are the object of
the valued charms of the valued men of the
community.
Dobuan life reveals how significant culture and its
patterns are in the formation of character. The cultural
patterns involve suspicion, distrust, fierce competitiveness,
brutal possessiveness, exclusiveness, fear, hatred
,
dishon-
esty, trickery, and destructiveness. Dobuan life idealizes
these virtues and character forms accordingly. Here, too,
is evidence of the importance of cultural patterns to the
14. Benedict, PC, 168 f.
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development of love. It is obvious that the Dobuan cannot
love in the sense that love means significant and abiding
mutual affection which results in co-operation, concern,
helpfulness, kindness, sympathy, and respect. Born into a
cultural group organized on the idealized character attri-
butes opposite to those of love, the Dobuan individual con-
forms to the dominant cultural forces of his group, becoming
a person in whom the attributes of love are conspicuously
absent. In fact, the kindly disposed, trusting, co-opera-
tive, happy, easy Dobuan is a sociological sport who is
regarded with contempt and derision by members of his
group. 15
Dobuan culture reveals the importance of mores in de-
termining views about right and wrong. Sumner long ago
pointed out the significant fact that mores can make any-
thing be accepted as right and prevent condemnation of any-
thing. 15 They define the limits which make right and wu?ong.
Thus a culture can through folkways and mores define patterns
15. Mead’s studies of South Sea Islanders finds Iviundu-
gumer culture similar to the Dobuan with similar correlation
in character produced within it. Much the opposite of the
kundugumer is the Arapesh culture which places premium on
social qualities of gentleness, consideration, and maternal
qualities in both sexes. Aggression and cruelty are frowned
upon. Cf. Mead, FSS.
16. Sumner, FOL, 521.
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of love as wrong or undesirable. This is the condition
prevailing in Dobuan society.^- 7
The study of Dobuan culture and the type of person it
produces establishes beyond doubt the influential relation-
ship of culture to personality formation. In addition, it
is evident that a culture, as in the Dobuan, can be inimical
to (i.. e
.
,
be unlikely to produce) the development of love.
The opposite is also a possibility. The conclusion is
obvious: to develop love one must take into consideration
culture, its patterns, folkways, and mores.
2. THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENT
We turn now to those aspects of culture that are of
especial significance to the development of love.
If inborn nature and capacity has its influence upon
personality, so also does the milieu into which one is born.
The question now arises as to relative influence of endoge*
nous (the inherent nature of personality) and exogenous
(environmental) factors in the development of character.
17. Benedict points out that normality and abnormality
are culturally determined concepts. There are cultures in
which our abnormals would function with and command respect.
A culture may value and make socially available even highly
unstable human types. Of. Benedict, .Art. (1934), 64. In
our own society the psychotic person may be seen as "one who
has rejected existing social organization and developed a
compensatory private version of culture." Cf. Dollard, Art.
(1934), 637.
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The question seeks to determine whether forces within the
personality create the particular nature of environment or
whether the environment stands in its ov/n right as moulding
influence. This is the battleground of hereditarians and
environmentalists
.
On this question the psychoanalysts have tended to the
position that biological impulse is the ultimate source of
cultural patterns.-*-® In other words it is the dynamic or-
ganization of instinctual impulses that tends to be reflected
in social structures. Thus the monogamous family results
from the father protecting his exclusive rights to his
female partner; and religion is but a reflection of a thwart-
ed infantile longing for security. Though recent psycho-
analytic literature reflects a tendency to emancipate cul-
tural patterns from biological impulse, the extremest
position is still maintained with vigor.
18. The classical expression of this position is
Freud’s Totem and Taboo (tr. A. A. Brill), London: G. Rout-
ledge and Sons, Ltd., 1919.
19. As Roheim writes: ’’What I suspect is, that if we
had a really intimate analytic knowledge of all cultures it
would be possible to prove something similar in every case,
viz., the dominant role of a specific infantile situation,
infantile anxiety or libidinal trend'.” Cf. Roheim, Art.,
(1942), 138. Roheim develops his psychoanalytic interpreta-
tion of culture in his book The Ridd le of the Sphinx (tr.
R. Money-Kyrle)
,
London: The Hogarth Press, 1934. For an
expression of the typical psychoanalytic position cf. also,
Jones, Art., (1935). For the more generally accepted state-
ment of the relation of ’’culture and mental disorder” cf
.
Hallowell, Art. (1934).
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There is no brief against the position that biological
impulse was influential in the origin of cultures. As
Benedict admits, culture originates with human impulse but
its final form goes far beyond the original impulse.- 0 This
position, supported by anthropological studies, gives due
regard to the Freudian emphasis but goes beyond its over-
simplified formulas that result in a static conceptualiza-
tion of such a mobile and dynamic force as culture is in the
formation of personality. 21 One need but consider the phal-
lic religious customs of India to realize that present forms
are far removed from origins and much more complex.
Cultural forms might originate in situations created by
human impulses, and in origin be comparatively simple. But
diversity results when individuals begin to reflect on,
criticize, accept, or reject the forms of experience. It is
increased when culture meets culture with inevitable changes,
growths, alterations, or when, within a given culture,
cultural pattern reacts upon and fuses with other cultural
patterns. 22 The new, developing configurations of culture
gather dynamic factors themselves. 20
20. Cf. Benedict, PC, 36.
21. Allport’s criticism of psychoanalytic psychology,
as too simplified to account for the complexity of person-
ality, can be applied to the psychoanalytic concept of
cultures
.
22. Cf. Benedict, PC, 37.
23. Cf. Plant, PCP, 235. This might, to adapt Allport’s
principle, be called the functional autonomy of cultural forms.
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On this question of relation of personalit 3r and culture,
we can in summary say that the relationship is one of recip-
rocal influence. "The personality is moulded by the environ-
ment, the environment is moulded by the personality . . ."24
However it is clear that culture is more influential
in shaping the individual personality than the individual
personality is in shaping culture. 25 This is apparent in
view of the fact that the individual is born into a culture
which has already clearly defined cultural patterns to which
the impressionable infant is exposed and which, as a conse-
quence, determine to great extent the direction of develop-
ment. As Benedict writes:
From the moment of his birth the customs
into which he is born shape his experiences
and behavior. By the time he can talk,
he is the little creature of his culture
,
and by the time he is grown and able to
take part in its activities, its habits
are his habits, its beliefs his beliefs,
its impossibilities his impossibilities . 26
The innate factors of personality determine one’s capa-
cities and possibilities. But to what extent one realizes
one’s capacities, and the particular direction in wrhich they
develop, is dependent on the culture which provides the raw
24. Plant, POP, 253.
25. That is, within the life span of any one indivi-
dual. Before one reaches maturity and fullest ability to
influence cultural patterns the culture has placed its
stamp on the individual through childhood.
27. Benedict, PC, 3.
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material of life. "No individual can arrive even at the
threshold of his potentialities without a culture in which
he participates." 27
It is evident, then, that environment exerts a moulding
influence on personality. This is a significant fact in the
psychology of love. It means that the development of love
is to a great extent dependent upon environmental factors,
cultural patterns and institutions. It means that cultural
patterns inimical to the love attitude must he removed or,
at least, recognized and counteracted. It means that per-
sons, individually and collectively, must extend their
endeavors to create and make dominant patterns of love.
But can cultural patterns be changed? They do change.
One needs only to remember the present day patterns of love
and sex in contrast to the so-called "Victorian" patterns
of a generation or so past to realize the changes that have
been made. But again, the point needs emphasis, change
(or growth) in cultural pattern is much more slow a process
than personality growth. And since the first few years,
childhood, are the most influential then one's formative
years are usually lived in a fairly constant environment.
27. Benedict, PC, 255. The several studies of "Feral
Man" substantiate this point. These cases of "wild" children
indicate that the lack of a cultural environment reduces
human beings to an animal level from which it is most diffi-
cult to reclaim them. Cf. Znigg, Art. (1940) for a study of
"Feral man and extreme cases of isolation."
..
*
.*1
t
.
.
, ,
:
,
•
- <
-
.
.
,
•
.
178
Cultural patterns are changed but slowly as far as the life
span of any one individual is involved.
However, as significant as possible change of environ-
ment is possible control of a person’s reaction to his
environment. At this point the individual’s influence over
environment is exerted. The same environment does not in-
fluence two persons in identical ways. The differences are
to be attributed to the relatively elusive ’’given" qualities
of personality structure. Some persons can achieve the
ability to love in a milieu totally unrelated to love (but
with great difficulty). And some, in opposite circumstances,
will achieve the ability to hate. The person who experiences
a situation unproductive of love can be removed to a situa-
tion that is productive. (Thus, children can be removed
from unloving families and placed in foster homes.) Or the
person facing conflicting demands posed by the influence of
conflicting cultural patterns (possible, as we shall see, in
our "stratified" civilization) can be counselled to the
point of resolution of conflict. Or the conflicting circum-
stances can be removed. (As when parents revise their
demands upon and treatment of their children.) These are
remedial and preventive measures which must be understood
and used in the development of love.
Since the environment moulds personality in its patterns
it is pertinent to understand the means through which it
T
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influences the developing life of the individual. Plant
finds two avenues of communication, verbal communication and
"psycho-motor tensions." 28 Verbal communication refers to
the spoken and written word through which the environment
expresses its wishes, demands, and authority. Psycho-motor
tensions refers to the unspoken emotional communications
that are expressed in appropriate muscular responses (as in
a frown or smile). These two means are not necessarily used
separately; more often, and perhaps best, together. But of
the two, communication by means of psycho-motor tensions is
by far the most impressive and influential. 29 These are the
means through which the environment can communicate the fact
of love for the individual (which love is a necessary pre-
requisite if the individual achieves the ability to love).
This means that love, especially for the child, must be
expressed both verbally and emotionally (with appropriate
motor expression — as in caresses, smiles, fondling).
Through these means of communication, environment makes
known its demand for conformity. This conforming action is
secured by support (reward) on the part of the environment
to the conforming individual or non-support (punishment) to
28. Cf. Plant, PCP, 21.
29. This is indicated by the fact that the environment
is most influential during infancy at which time verbal
communications are limited, as well as by the importance of
gesture in acting and oratory.
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the non-conforming. Thus the environment through the prin-
ciples of rewards and punishments, and especially so in the
first years of life, secures the desired responses which
crystallize in character formation. Rewards and punishments
are of great concern to those who would promote the develop-
ment of love. If love responses are not sought for or
rewarded, there is but remote possibility that they will
become dominant in character. It is therefore significant
to consider whether or not our particular culture with its
patterns emphasize love by rewarding and commending love
responses. If our culture does not so reward love then
small cultural groups (church fellowship) must be promoted
in which the appropriate rewards and punishments are under-
stood and utilized in the functions of the group.
Benedict has pointed out that culture has a dominant
configuration. 30 That. is, there is a dominant, key idea
around which a culture is organized. Thus, in her studies
she finds Kwakiutl culture organized around the idea of
rivalry; 0 -*- Dobu culture around treachery; 32 and Pueblo
culture around sobriety. 33
The dominant configuration of any culture is of concern
if love is to be developed within it. For, as we have seen,
30. Benedict
,
31. Ibid.
,
246
32. Ibid
.
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33. Ibid
.
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in considering Dobuan culture, 34 the dominant center of
organization can be quite inimical to the development of
love.
It is a relatively easy task to determine the dominant
configuration in a tribal society; a highly speculative
procedure in our complex civilization. Both Benedict 35
and Plant36 suggest that the dominant idea of Western cul-
ture is rivalry and possession. This is in agreement with
common observation and knowledge. Our culture is described
by terms such as "capitalistic
,
,T
"profit-centered," "acquis-
itive." These terms center on the fact that dominant social
striving is conceived in terms of accumulating; and social
position is indicated by possessing.
A culture that organizes around the idea of possessing
is by necessity individualistic and limitedly co-operative. 57
Possession with its rewards of power and prestige becomes an
end in itself. As such, with inevitable rivalry, it creates
a society marked by possession at the expense of the deprived;
competition at the expense of co-operation; and hostility
34. Cf. above, p. 167 ff.
35. Benedict, PC, 245.
36. Plant, POP, 236 f.
37. Co-operation is usually secured by the promise of
benefits accruing to the co-operator. The author once be-
longed to a co-operative group that voted to pay dividends
(though funds were needed for expansion) because it was
believed that material benefits were necessary to increase
the number of co-operators
.
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(sublimated in many ways) and "unrelatedness" at the expense
of love and "relatedness.”
It is to the wisdom and benefit of Christianity that it
has recognized the curse and enmity of possession for pos-
session^ sake. Christian principles do not deny possessions
or the use of power and prestige. They do, however, make
such but means to a larger end
. They are to be used in the
service of the kingdom of God
.
But the historic Church has not always realized the
antagonism of a culture organized around the idea of pos-
sessing as clearly as did its founder. As a consequence the
Church’s ability to produce character dominated by love has
not been developed to its greatest extent. The Church, the
minister, the parent must be aware of the conflict between
love and possessiveness . 08 With clear-cut understanding
they can unite to set the forces of change into operation. 59
Thus they can fashion a culture organized around the idea of
love and its derivatives.^0
Cultures can change; cultural patterns can change,
konachesi points out that change is derived from two sources:
38. But confusion of the issues often prevails. As in
the case that came to the author’s attention of the wealthy
man whose immorality was accepted because of his position
and the fact that he paid the church bills.
39. As is being done, in one way, through the various
co-operative societies.
40. An infinitely long task at best.
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invention and borrowing or diffusion. 41 By invention is
meant the effects that new discoveries (as the automobile)
have on cultural patterns. 42 By borrowing is meant the
impact of culture upon culture and the resulting diffusion. 43
But Monachesi's analysis neglects one of the most potent of
change sources, namely personality. One needs only to
reflect upon Christianity and the personality of its founder,
Jesus, to realize the pertinence of this point; or again,
Communism and the person of Karl Marx. Individuals, singly
and collectively, can seek to understand, set up ideals, and
decide on values; and through decision endeavor to achieve
those values and realize those ideals. The practical sig -
nificance of change is the fact that our culture dominated
by an idea of possessiveness ( though not prohibitive , at
least inimical to love ) can be changed .
A characteristic of Western culture of great signifi-
cance to our understanding of the development of love is
"stratification” of culture. This is to say that our complex
civilization is marked by stratas of cultures existing side
41. Monachesi, Art. (1937), 41. Tarde points out that
the basis of social change is imitation and counter-imitation.
Of. LI, xvii. This is but to view the problem from a differ-
ent aspect, that of the individual's reaction to the source
of the imitable . psychological studies that afford insight
into the dynamics of imitation outmode Tarde 's concept of
imitation as basis of social change.
42. Tarde thinks of invention in a much more inclusive
sense, as applied to "all individual initiative.” LI, xiv
.
43. Perhaps most clearly seen in the case of the Amer-
inds .
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by side. Dollard’s study of caste and class among the
negroes of the deep south clearly delineates six different
classes or castes. The Lynds 1 study of Middletown^ reveals
the differing stratas of an average American city. Where
class membership is clearly defined its mark on the char-
acter of the member individual is discernible.
The presence of culture stratas in Western civilization
is of double significance in the development of love.
Negatively, it makes for personality conflict and disorgani-
zation. Contributing to the marked culture disorganization
that prevails in America is the fact that it has become the
melting pot of many diverse cultural groups. There is the
conflict of culture with culture* 5 which conflict is expressed
in personality conflicts. There is the breaking down of
cultural walls under the influence of the American concept
of freedom which grants to some degree cultural mobility to
the individual who demands it. Thus one may progress from
one strata to another and yet aspire to a third; or one may
hold membership in several cultural groups at the same time
(church, lodge, vigilantes, unemployed, etc.). This melting
pot condition of Western civilization, though perhaps a
means to a better end, nevertheless creates confusion,
44. R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd
,
Middletown, New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929.
45. Most tragically seen in cases of foreign born
parents dealing with first generation American children.
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conflict, and disorganization. The mobile individual has no
sure cultural backing or anchorage that makes for inner
security (the sense of being wanted). Monachesi aptly de-
scribes the possibilities that can combine in an individual
under such circumstances. He writes:
The impact of cultures produces situations
in which the life pattern of the individual
is full of contradictions; he is personally
disorganized; he has no consistent way of
adjusting to life. He may come from a family
in which the father is considered the master
of the lives and destinies of its members;
he may belong to a church that places emphasis
on honesty and obedience; he may belong to a
boy’s gang that raids downtown department
stores; he may go to a school that teaches that
each individual is born free and equal; he may
be working after school in a store under an
individual who has no concern for human rights
and freedom; as he grows up, he may marry a
woman who has been reared in an entirely
different environment, with different standards
and patterns of behavior. In all of this one
may wonder what is right and what is wrong. 46
With this conflict and disorganization of culture the
issue of love is concerned. Conflict, disorganization re-
sults in frustrations which lead to aggressions — all of
which renders personality barren ground for the growth of
love
.
Those institutions whose interests are in the devel-
opment of love can do most for the individual caught in
the eddies of culture conflicts by leading him to an
46. Monachesi, Art. (1937), 50 f.
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understanding and grasp of all the conflicting factors
involved, such an understanding as empowers one to live in
the midst of cultural patterns unfriendly and unsympathetic
to love, and, at the same time, furnishing that individual
with a unifying idea that transcends the contradictory ideas
of the conflicting cultures. To this end the idea of G-od
and the Kingdom of God, demanding the supreme loyalties of
the believing individual, becomes particularly relevant. It
can become the unifying center of personality structure,
supplying a basis of security (wantedness) which is necessary
for any relationship and particularly for the relationships
of love
.
Stratification has the weakness of its vices, also, the
strength of its virtues. On the positive side the fact of
stratified cultures suggests the possibility of the creation
of a cultural group dominated by love patterns . This is the
particular opportunity of the Church in the attempt to foster
the growth of Christian personality, an opportunity too little
utilized
.
The Church, if it grasp its opportunity, may create a
fellowship (a society within society) of the faithful in
which the individual comes under the full force of love in
operation. To realize this function the Church becomes more
than an organization for the sole purposes of worship. In
..
.
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addition it becomes a fellowship which reaches into all the
areas of life of its constituent fellows.
This signifies, among other things, that the individual
Church will be a community organization in close physical
relations with its constituency. In light of this, Church
membership on the basis of sect preference militates against
the promotion of love because such a basis often renders
economic, social, political, health, recreational, and edu-
cational fellowship a physical impossibility. So, too, does
the large city Church that attracts its membership from
widely separated communities. It is obvious that the Church
needs to reconsider its structure and function in light of
its failure to aid to fullest extent the development of love
in its membership.
5. CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND LOVE
Hunan beings are characterized by needs or tensions
that demand satisfaction. Individuals find ways and means
to satisfactions. Groups of individuals gradually develop
ways and means to satisfactions that are given the stamp of
"right” and become compulsive for members of the group.
Thus there grow up behavior patterns and attitude patterns.
These sponsored by the group keep the individual in line and
determine his behavior. Habitually associated behavior
patterns and attitude patterns crystallize into agencies for
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their preservation and perpetuation. These agencies are
cultural institutions. 47
The characteristics of an institution are: an under-
lying idea (implied or expressed); a complex of folkways,
mores and customs; codes (rules and laws); standardized
habits; organization; and physical properties (tools). 48
The functions of an institution are threefold: 1) to
satisfy human needs; 2) to sponsor the mechanisms of commu-
nity existence; and 3) to serve as an instrument of social
control. 49 it is obvious that in fulfilling these functions
cultural institutions influence the development of character.
There are several institutions current in Western
civilization that have especial significance in the produc-
tion of character: the family, war, and the church. We
consider these in turn.
i. The Family and Love
many definitions of the family are offered; but too
often from the standpoint of special interests and emphases.
Barten lists several differing approaches to definition:
1) the U. S. Bureau of the census — all persons living to-
gether in the same household, nobody else; 2) the biological
47. Cf. Monachesi, Art. (1937), 41; also Hertzler,
Art. (1937), 58 f.
48. Cf. Hertzler, Art. (1937), 64 f.
49. Cf. ibid., 60 f.
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or natural — parents and offspring, if any; 3) natural
social — a group of persons who both live together and have
a marital or parent-child relationship; and 4) the social —
all individuals related to the head of the household and
living under a common roof. 50
As our purposes concern the development of love which
begins in the infancy of the individual, an acceptable def-
inition must relate to child-rearing. Such a definition,
broad in scope, giving due regard to the biological nature
of the family as well as its economic and social nature, is
that offered by Mead. The family is "the permanent group
which raises the children and gives them status in the
community. ”5^
The nature, basis, and function of the family differs
in the many cultures known. Hence a "psychology of love,"
as it relates to the family, differs in differing cultures.
We necessarily limit our consideration to the family in
Western civilization.
The family in Western cultures is predominantly patri-
archal in nature. Its basis is marriage in which the erotic
relationship is fundamental. Its function is status -giving,
child-rearing. 52
50. Cf. Parten, Art. (1932), 29 ff.
51 . Mead
,
Art
. ( 1932 ) , 23
.
52. Ibid., 23 ff.
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Western culture continues the patriarchal family but
not without changes. The care of children is still placed
largely in the hands of the mother. And present trends tend
to place that responsibility more and more completely in her
hands. America’s swing from agriculture to industrializa-
tion has, more than ever, taken the father out of the home.
This fact makes the mother the dominant influence in the
training of the child. The mother becomes most significant
in the development of love. 53
In contrast to the family organized on the basis of
blood relationship marked by convenience and necessity
(matriarchal or patriarchal) the modern family is based on
a love relationship of desirability. Thus the family of
today emphasizes the marital relationship, the "spouse-
unit," as its cornerstone. 54
Primary in the marital relationship of Western culture
is the erotic pattern, which is an influential factor in
American culture. The family becomes not a necessity for
economic co-operation but a free service of love. Progressive
53. Recent authors who deal with the development of
love emphasize this fact, making it the cornerstone of
interpretation. Cf. Menninger, LH; and Suttie, OLH.
54. This in contrast to the matrilineal family of the
JMairs of Malabar where the father is practically eliminated
from the family and the partial elimination that occurs in
parts of Indonesia, Western Melanesia and New Guinea. Cf
.
Mead, Art. (1932), 24. Also in oontrast to the patrilineal
family in which polygamy is practiced or where the family
is an economic necessity.
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equalization of the status of women is pursued. Children
are not future continuators of the family but new bonds of
love. 55
Benedict finds the basis of the American family, the
”spouse-unit ," a very precarious one. 56 Our society makes
the lot of the spouse-unit difficult by its withdrawal of
social rewards from parenthood. Bringing up children is a
financial and professional liability, not an asset. ”The
social rewards are, in contrast to practically all societies,
nil. Parents have sacrificed, and their sacrifices will not
even give them life-long intimacy with their children.” 57
Benedict’s criticism is apt but is directed more against the
discrepancy between economic and social and familial values
rather than against the spouse-unit or sex-love marriage
relationship. Such discrepancy is directly related to the
dominant motif of Western culture — possession. 58 Znaniecki
points to the advantage of the ”spouse-unit .” Its erotic
basis stabilizes a powerful social force, sex, giving it
socially recognized and organized paths for full manifesta-
tion. 59
55. Cf. Znaniecke, Art. (1941), 61.
56. Cf. R. Benedict, ”The Psychology of Love,” an
unpublished paper furnished the author by the courtesy of
Seward Hiltner, executive secretary of the Commission on
Religion and Health of the Federal Council of Churches.
57
.
Ibid
.
58 . Cf . above
,
p . 180 f
.
59. Znaniecki, Art. (1941), 61.
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The function of the family, likewise, differs in dif-
fering cultures. Many of the traditional functions have
been removed from the family in our society and placed in
the care of institutions — thus with education, home indus-
try, and recreation. However there is one universal function
of the family, as Mead points out, the status-giving, child-
rearing function. 60 it is in the realizing of this function
that love is or is not developed.
Malinowski suggests that culture influences the develop-
ment of character by moulding and organizing the emotions. 61
This is in accord with sentiment organization as the basis
of character formation. 62 And, as family is the product of
its particular culture, therefore the carrier of culture,
then the emotional relationships of the child and the home
are the focus of character training. Here culture and the
given nature of the individual first come together and re-
sult in the first and most influential patterns of behavior.
Hence, we turn to the emotional relationships between child
and family.
The attitude of parents has great influence upon the
child. Thus a psychology of love begins with the parents
before the child is born. There are those who trace
60. Cf. Mead, Art. (1932), 24; cf. also Plant, Art.
(1932), 66 f.
61. Cf. Malinowski, SRSS, 205.
62. Cf. above, p. 118 ff.
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childrens attitudes in part to prenatal influences, placing
emphasis upon the mother* s attitude toward the foetal baby.
Such relationship is certainly beyond demonstration, but in
view of the known relations between mind and body and the
possible influence of mental states upon the organism, it is
at least plausible. At any rate pre-natal attitudes carry
over into post-natal attitudes where such do have their
effect. Thus, the achievement of love in any individual
begins with the parents. 63 (Symonds points out that parents
who treat their children unfortunately and unsatisfactorily
usually have had similar experiences with their parents.) 64
There are others, especially Rank, 65 who attach great
significance to the trauma of birth. Here, they contend, is
the first anxiety reaction and it sets the pattern for all
such reactions. The least that can be said for this view-
point is that it is a guess. The most that can be said is
that it is a good guess. Treatment of claustrophobia and
agoraphobia (the conditions of which are present in uterine
life and birth) has been most successful when understood
from the standpoint of uterine life and the traumatic expe-
rience of birth. Theory on this basis adequately accounts
for
63. We say "parents" because the father’s attitudes
influence those of the mother.
64. Symonds, Art. (1937), £06.
65. Cf. 0. Rank, The Trauma of birth, London: K. Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., l9£9.
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for some conditions of these ills inexplicable on other
bases. 66 At any rate, those interested in the development
of love will take measures to provide for childbirth as
non-traumatic as is at present scientifically possible.
The newborn infant is completely dependent upon its
environment for the necessities that maintain life. And the
environment in the person of the mother usually supplies the
infant ’s needs. Human beings live in this state of dependen-
cy for a protracted period. It is this biological fact that
contributes to the mother’s significance in character forma-
tion for because of it she is usually given the role of child
caretaker in most cultures. Thus culture works closely with
biological nature which ties mother and child so closely
together.
As pointed out, the mother assumes a role of first
importance in the emotional training of the child both by
reason of biological and of cultural role. She cares for
the infant’s needs which are expressed organically and cen-
ter in the mouth (oral zone), anus (anal zone), and genitals
(genital zone). Through these zones the needs of the child
are expressed and the manner and attitude in which they are
met affects the relation that comes to exist between the
chil
66. kor example, the explanation of the curious con-
dition of being both claustrophobic and agoraphobic, krom
the author’s lecture notes of R. A* Murray’s course "Dynamic
Psychology," Harvard University, kail, 1942.
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child and its environment. In reaction to the response to
its needs the child learns to respond to the environment.
All degrees of emotional relationships are formed by-
children. But significant to the development of character
are the emotional relationships of rejection or the opposite
over-protection (the rejection-over-protection factor) and
dominance or the opposite, submission (the dominance-submis-
sion factor)
.
67 These factors refer to qualitative relation
ships yet may be thought of in terms of quantity. Fitz-
Simons has constructed a scale for the measurement of
rejection-over-protection with statements running from +4
(parent indulges child — cannot refuse requests) through 0
to -4 (parent uses severe punishment). 68
The ideal in emotional relationships is not too much or
too little, but that is an ideal difficult to realize. The
wise parent neither over-protects nor rejects his child. He
gives affection moderately, providing the necessary care for
the child 1 s growth and protection but not coddling to the
point that prevents the development of emotional maturity
and the achievement of independence.
67. Cf. Synionds, Art. (1937), 198. Symonds has summa-
rized well the emotional components in parent-child rela-
tionships. uur exposition is greatly indebted to his work.
Flflgel's PSF recognizes the above factors in a chapter on
the love and hate aspects of development and in another on
the dependence aspects.
68. Gf. Fitz-Simons, SPCR, 44 ff.
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Parents not only can tend to one extreme or the other
on these two emotional factors but can inconsistently and
alternately over-protect or reject (as when a parent who
fundamentally rejects his child compensates with over-pro-
tection due to feelings of guilt). This is called ambiva-
lence. the result can be uncertainty, confusion in the
child. (Anna Schachtel in an unpublished paper on "Some
Conditions of Love in Childhood" 69 points out that the child
certain of its rejection stands a better chance to adjust
and compensate than the child who is uncertain due to
"pseudo-love" on the part of the mother ) . Thus there are
three extreme and undesirable forms of the rejection-over-
protection factor: rejection, over-protection, ambivalence.
A parent may also be inconsistent in his dominance-submissive
behavior to the child — severe at one time, lax at another.
Thus on the dominance-submissive factor there are also three
extremes: dominance, submission, and inconsistency. 70
Fitz-Simon describes the behavior of the parent who
rejects the child. 71 Such a parent sees mostly shortcomings,
uses severe punishments, deserts child, evicts child, turns
child over to an authority, puts child in an institution.
69. Furnished the author by the courtesy of Seward
Hiltner, executive secretary of the Commission on Religion
and Health of the Federal Council of Churches.
70. Cf. Symonds, Art. (1957), S00.
71. cf. Fitz-Simons, SPCR, 154 ff. Newell, Art. (1954),
also considers this problem.
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does not provide financial support, criticizes child, threat-
ens to evict child, deliberately frightens child, locks
child up, threatens to report child to authority, pays no
attention to child
,
spanks child
,
does not provide advan-
tages, does not spend time with child, neglects child,
compares child unfavorably, is hard on child.
Fitz-Simons also describes parental behavior indicative
of over-protection. 72 Such a parent indulges the child
(can’t refuse requests), cares for child f s physical needs to
an unusual degree, sleeps in same bed with child, spends all
possible time with child, pushes child, gives money and
special privileges, spends time playing with or amusing
child, gives in to child, excuses child, defends child,
sleeps in same room, sees few if any faults, protects child
from unhappiness, protects child from what he considers
harmful, makes effort to improve child’s condition.
Symonds describes the aggressive-compulsive-dominating-
hostile behavior on the part of a parent in these terms:
parent pushes child, threatens punishment, nags child,
spanks, whips child, is hard on child, criticizes child,
threatens to evict child, deliberately frightens child,
uses severe punishments, turns child over to authority,
72. Cf. Fitz-Simons, SPCR, 131 ff. hattwick, Art.
(1936), also considers this problem in more general terms.
i .
1-- ' »r ~
-i
"
: •
' ‘
'
; ‘
’
’ / • •• '
•
tfoa «eo.$ «ee>;
‘
‘
• *
'
' i.
t. - 4 • yc •' • - > :>
-
-
‘
•
.
' " 1 •
.!
:
: ,
.
r
i
,
•'
')
,
.
r
j o v ' r-‘ "
.
.
'
r
-
•
.
‘
:V
i 6 - t r '1 ‘ . , ( :
.
•
-r - -: ir ~>1 OCT
: 1 ' .
.
.
' •
1
.
•
.
• 1
. k
198
plans for child, cares for child T s needs to an unusual
degree, gives toys and special privileges. 73
Symonds also describes the submissive-neglectful behav-
ior on the part of a parent in these terms: parent indulges
child, cannot refuse requests, gives in to ehild, does not
provide financial support, deserts child, neglects child,
does not spend time with child, pays no attention to child. 74
The foregoing descriptions deal with extreme parent-
child emotional relationships. The type of child produced
in reaction to each is significant to the achievement of love.
After surveying the studies on this subject Symonds concludes
that it is difficult to draw more than hypotheses. 75 The
several studies offer contradictions as well as agreement.
but, in general, it is indicated that if either or both
parents reject the child he is likely to be characterized as
. . . aggressive, rebellious, hostile,
jealous, attention-getting, hyperactive,
or annoying in school. The rejected
child may show such delinquencies as
truancy
,
thieving
,
and finds satisfaction
in having his mother upset about him.
The rejected child tends to show the
patterns known as emotional instability .
In general the rejected child shows
defense mechanisms. 76
73. Gf. Symonds, Art. (1937), 204.
74. Of. loc. cit.
75 • Loc • cit
•
76*. Ibid., 205. Partridge, Art. (1939), 51 ff
. ,
points
out that among other causes truancy is due to lack and need
of affection from parents. Lander, Art. (1941), 153, in a
study of 116 delinquent Jewish boys found as traumatic fac-
tors — maternal rejection in 47 % of the boys, and paternal
rejection in 34 $>.
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The rejected child is the unwanted child; the child
that has sought for affection and been refused. 77 This
means that the child's first attempt to establish an affec-
tional relationship has been refused, an extremely traumatic
experience. It is possible that the child, later becoming
the adult, will never attempt to establish other affectional
ties for fear of rejection. It may be that the individual
will go through life constantly seeking, demanding affection
(that whieh it was denied) but always unable to accept it
when offered. Rejection can lead to an underlying sense of
betrayal, to which knight traces some cases of chronic
alcoholism. 78 The infant's first affectional relationship
with parents is basic to the feeling of "wantedness" which
is necessary to proper self-respect (self-love) which, in
turn, is necessary if one establishes a love relationship
with others. 79
Symonds finds the over-protected child characterized as
. . . over-dependent, infantile, possessing
feelings of inferiority, withdrawing, poor
social adjustment, poor work habits, having
poor vocabulary, or being poor in arithmetic.
These may all be classed as escape mechanisms. 80
77. Psychoanalysts rightly emphasize the fact that the
infant can first experience rejection through oral depriva-
tion in nursing.
78. Of. Knight, Art. (1957), 545.
79. The feeling of "wantedness” is basic to the sense
of security.
80. Symonds, Art. (1937), 205.
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Levy finds that when maternal over-protection is domina-
ting, submissive traits result (obedience, authority-accep-
tance, dependence, and in boys — effeminacy). When maternal
over-protection is indulgent, aggressive traits result
(commanding, bullying, seeking "limelight”). Levy, Aichhorn
and others find the pattern, father aggressive and hostile,
mother over-protective and sibling rivalry, leading to
pronounced aggression which leads boys to rebellion against
society and into delinquency. MacDonald reports the pattern,
mother aggressive, hostile and rejecting, father submissive,
related in six cases to boys who were passive and effeminate
but who, when thrust into masculine situations, would make
uncalled for physical attacks accompanied by cruelty and
showed conduct such as stealing, lying, truancy, and sex
misconduct
.
8^
It is obvious that extreme emotional responses on the
part of the parent in parent-child relationships calls forth
emotional responses which when crystallized into sentiments
render the child incapable of achieving the ability to love.
Love implies a relationship characterized by emotional
warmth, mutual respect and concern, acceptance, co-operation,
and consideration. Rejection, over-protection, ambivalence,
dominance, submission or inconsistency make for frustration,
81. The foregoing conclusions by Levy, Aichhorn and
MacDonald are summarized in Symonds, Art. (1937).
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sense of betrayal, defensiveness, aggressiveness, hostility,
resentment and the like. These militate against any and all
relationships. The child needs to be loved (accepted) but
not over-accepted. Likewise, it needs to learn to respect
authority (through dominance) yet achieve independence
(through parent’s submission). Judicious balance, weighted
on the side of love, is the guiding principle in parent-
child relationships.
We would emphasize the significance of parental love
toward the infant and child as necessary to the development
of love. Its significance lies in the fact of the child’s
great impressionability. The dependency nature of infancy
forces the infant and parent to establish some kind of
relationship. The nature of this relationship tends to
leave its imprint on the developing character of the child
by reason of the fact that in the give and take of this
relationship character is formed.
Experimental evidence supports this point only by
implication. Lurie, .Levy, Rosenthal, and Lurie in a study
of 255 boys and 145 girls, 400 problem children, found the
home as causative factor in 331 cases and a combination of
home and neighborhood in 67 cases, a total of 398. 82 Lander,
in the study cited above, found that of 116 delinquent boys
82. of. Lurie, Levy, Rosenthal, and ourie, Art. (1943)
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55 had experienced maternal rejection and 40 paternal rejec-
tion. 83
Clinical evidence is more readily at hand to attest to
the significance of parental affection, Bowlby in a paper
on 150 eases studied at the London Child Guidance found
environmental factors predisposing to pathogenic character
of two major classes: 1) those operative during earliest
years of life and which appear to influence the whole cast
of the child T s character; and 2) those which occur later in
the child's life and act as precipitants . Among the environ-
mental factors operative during earliest years, he finds two
groups: 1) specific events — death of mother or prolonged
separation from mother; and 2) the general color of the
mothers emotional attitude toward the child as expressed in
the feeding, weaning, and toilet training processes. 84
Partridge finds that one cause of truancy is lack and need
of affection from parents. 88 jinight finds that chronic
alcoholism is a flight from reality, the underlying person-
ality disorder of which has its origin in a feeling of be-
trayal in infancy. 86 Pease in tracing the etiological
factors of an adolescent psychotic points to the lack of
83. Gf. Lander, Art. (1941), 153.
84. Of. Bowlby, Art. (1940).
85. Of. Partridge, Art. (1939), 51 f.
86. Of. Knight, Art. (1937), 545.
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affection in the infancy of the young man.87 The young man
in question, as revealed in his diary, was searching for
love (acceptance), but, not having experienced it, he didn’t
know what it was he needed. Reik in discussing the influ-
ence of the "father complex" on the nature of the "child
psyche" points to the poet Stendhal who detested his father
and always remained an atheist out of hatred to his parent’s
God.88 Binsie writes of a case in which the patient’s
"impulse to blaspheme the Lord represented an intrusion
into consciousness of the earlier developed hatred of his
father."89
The foregoing by no means exhausts the field of clini-
cal evidence that bears on the significance of parental
affection (acceptance) for the child. But it does establish
the significance of such relationship, particularly the
significance of real parental affection to the achievement
of the ability to love.
It should be emphasized that the infant reacts emotion-
ally almost at, if not at, birth. The psychoanalysts empha-
size the importance of feeding (oral activity) as the focus
of the infant’s experience of acceptance or rejection.
87. Cf. Pease, Art. (1929).
88. Cf. Reik, Art. (1919). See abstract in the Psycho
analytic Review
, 6, 1919, 212-213.
89. ninsie, Art. (1926), 151.
.' •
:
;
,
’ '
' v ! : .
V
' ’
•' '
; : .
-*
‘
r
«-
: j :
• 3 -Y Y r
.
'
.
T '
.
.
•
‘
’
• •
'
. V )
.
•
.
'
ott y YY Y orfo *io
>
.
‘
.
‘ 103 ' x< >1 '
.
.
.
. . r
.
•
.
.
.
. .
’ '
' V
204
Without accepting the sexual interpretation of oral activi-
ty, 90 we can accept the fact of its significance to the
establishment of affectional ties. Likewise, the infant
probably first experiences parental demands in the process
of toilet training (first contact with dominance-submissive
benavior on the part of the parent ) . Reaction to these
demands can aid or hinder the development of love. Feeding,
weaning, and toilet training are areas of experience signif-
icant to the achievement of love for they are areas wnerein
the infant learns or does not learn love and wholesome
response to authority — in other words, learns to establish
qualitative relationships with others.
In summary we say that the family has two major respon-
sibilities in the development of love: first, the responsi-
bility of developing the innate abilities of the individual
to the point where he is capable of loving. The entire
development is not the sole obligation of the family group,
uther institutions play influential parts, but the family
starts the process or places obstacles in the path of devel-
opment. The goal of this familial responsibility is the
achievement of the ability to invest one's love independent-
ly of family ties. This is maturity.
90. Of. above, p. 75 ff.
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Second, the family has the responsibility of directing
the love of the individual to culturally acceptable objects.
Unless this is done the ability to establish affectional
relationships is seriously threatened if not obviated. The
homosexual can love but the unacceptability of his love
object estranges him from his fellowmen. The mother-fixated
person cannot love another person with real love, unaccep-
tability of love object renders the lover unacceptable,
hence his love becomes a disruptive factor rather than a
uniting relationship.
ii. Love and International Conflict
General economic and social conditions leave their
impress on the development of personality.
Lazarfeld reports a study of the unemployed village of
Marienthal, Austria, which consisted of a population of
1500. The entire population had been unemployed for three
years prior to the study. They found that the narrowing of
the economic scope of these people was paralleled by a
contraction in psychic life. There was a narrowing of the
psychological sphere of wants. The youth had no concrete
plans for the future. ivicGrath studying "some effects of
good housing on family life" found that better housing
91. Of. Lazarfeld, Art. (1932).
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correlated with gain in health, efforts at betterment, and
emotional stability. 92 Springer in a study to determine
differences in emotional stability of groups of children
from different social levels found that emotional stability
was closely related to the general social status of the
QfZ
individual. Children coming from a generally poor social
level were found to be more maladjusted and emotionally
unstable than those coming from good middle-class homes.
The above studies point to the fact that economic and
social conditions have influence on the character of the
individual.
Sorokin cogently points out that major social crises
such as calamity (war, famine, pestilence) exert drastic
influence on the values and ideals of a person. 94 In the
presence of calamity morals totter with values and ideals
forsaken.
Calamity has two general effects on the moral and
religious life. The first is a polarizing effect. Calamity
generates two opposite movements in different sections of
the population: one, a trend toward irreligiousness and
demoralization; the other, a trend toward extreme religious,
spiritual, and moral exaltation. 95 The effect of polarization
92. McGrath, T. K.
,
Unpublished Thesis, Smith College.
93. Springer, Art. (1938), 327.
94. Cf. Sorokin, MSC.
95. Ibid.
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brings into clear focus the basis of individual character,
revealing weaknesses and strengths.
The second general effect is that calamity molds reli-
gious and moral conduct in its own image. 96 This is the
effect most pertinent to the development of love. It has
been pointed out that cultural patterns influence the senti-
ments of the individual, 97 hence the family, and the family
influences to great extent the growing child. In this
process of influence it is fact that like tends to produce
like (the individual tends to conform to cultural pattern).
War which brings hatred, hostility, and aggression tends to
mold character in its image.
Wot only does war mold character in its patterns. It
also upsets the emotional equilibrium of mature individuals.
Persons who have achieved control of aggressions and hostil-
ities suddenly find their control gone. As Lerner writes:
What war always does is to wear away
the normal veneer that covers our
violence-potentials, and give a
direction and a name to our impulses
toward violence. 98
96. Sorokin, MSC, 156 and 161.
97. War tends to dominate completely the patterns of
the cultural groups so involved. As Sorokin summarizes it:
"War suppresses or undermines many an activity incompatible
with its prosecution
,
and introduces or reinforces many
activities either necessary to or compatible with~its
prosecution ." Cf. MSC, 88.
98
. Lerner
,
Art
.
( 1941 ) , 186
.
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nence there appear tendencies and actions incompatible to
and destructive of the former character organization. War
encourages and releases latent hostile impulses in the
individual. And this release with consequent hostile action
reaffirms old and less acceptable tendencies that can crys-
tallize in the formation of new sentiments, new character
organization. The effects of war can convert a person to
the opposite of love.
It is self-evident that war and the pursuit of war
calls for the exercise of sentiments opposed to those of
love; namely, hostility, fear, aggression, hatred and the
like." hence Sorokin* s point emphasizes the fact that war
surpresses love and its correlates of action and furthers
those of hatred. .Factual evidence attesting to this point
can be seen in the Japanese atrocity stories which emphasize
the vices of a people to the exclusion of virtues; the
"indoctrination” course that makes a civilian a soldier
capable of activities and actions heretofore never contem-
plated, increased juvenile delinquency, the suppression of
pacifism, increasing anti-Semitism, and open race conflicts.
War teaches the way of aggression, hostility, and
retaliation — correlates of hatred. This the public learns
99. It must be admitted that war brings within a
nation an unusual degree of co-operation. But we point out
that it is co-operation based on fear of an enemy and pos-
sible consequences, hence it cannot be lasting.
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by indirection. The soldier is taught ("indoctrination")
directly. And this teaching of both civilian and soldier is
greatly reinforced by the traumatic conditions of war time.
Those interested in the production of character domina-
ted by love can ill afford to overlook the characterological
consequences of the institution of war. The future will
find millions of soldiers returned to civilian life but
probably without benefit of "indoctrination for peace." It
will contain future American Legion organizations which will
defend and extol the war machine and its way of violence
(which, indirectly, is but self-glorification). It will
contain a future generation fathered by the soldiers of the
present.
It is plain that war militates against a society domina-
ted by love and does not produce character dominated by love.
The way of war must be set aside. And until it is, every
effort must be expended to offset its resulting conditions.
VJar is no biological necessity. 100 young, 101 Mennin-
ger, 102 and buttie105 point out that war has its origins in
hostile impulses that develop due to the early frustrations
in the life of the individual in relation to his environment,
frustrations result in patterns of hostility, aggression.
100. Malinowski, Art. (1941), 2£; cf. also 24 f.
101. young. Art. (1941), 4 ff.
102. Menninger, LAH.
103. Suttie, 0LH.
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and hatred. These patterns must be dealt with. War offers
the individual an outlet for them.^04 pt follows then that
efforts to remove war must follow three general courses,
iirst, efforts must be directed toward control of childhood
to the extent that frustrations are removed or adequately-
handled by the child to the extent that hostility and hatred
do not rise as a result. Second, efforts must concentrate
on a substitute for war, such that will permit the individual
to vent his hostile feelings on culturally approved and
useful objects in a fashion that harnesses the energy of
hostility to useful ends. As William james wrote, "a moral
equivalent for war" must be found. And third, efforts
must provide the individual a cause or a program that will
attract and use his love .106
104. Of. Young, Art. (1941), 8.
105. As Malinowski writes: "Today, through the in-
credible efficiency of propaganda and of totalitarian indoc-
trination, pugnacity can be manufactured, and can transform
a whole nation from peaceful citizens into militant units of
an enormous belligerent machine. Yet if pugnacity is not an
inherent factor of human nature but something artificially
manufactured, it can be prevented as well as promoted. This
is a theoretical conclusion of the utmost practical impor-
tance in our planning for future peace. Wars nowadays are
artificially created. By the same token they can be cul-
turally prevented. This is one of the main tenets in our
constructive belief in the future. It provides us with a
charter for a sound and secure implementation of future
plans for perpetual peace and of a peaceful commonwealth of
nations." Art. (1941), 25.
106. Royce’s words have bearing on this point. "My
greatest question is not: ’Do I love my neighbor or do I
hate him?* but ’Have I, or have 1 not the right, the worthy,
the saving relation to my community, to my family, to my
country, to mankind? 1 " Cf. WI, 26.
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War brings conditions of pestilence and particularly of
famine as today in Europe. These are secondary effects of
war and have significance for the development of love. As
Sorokin points out such conditions tend to reduce men to the
animal level, to the satisfaction of those needs that are
elemental to life, Love and its activities are among the
higher refinements of human nature. In times of war and fam-
ine they are the first to go. Values and ideals thus aban-
doned due to the exigencies of famine are not resumed in the
presence of sufficiency. Once lost they are regained only as
they are rebuilded. Hence their loss is at once as permanent
as real. The loss of the values and ideals of love by one
generation is felt by succeeding generations. For the loss
of such does not leave a spiritual vacuum, rather the oppo-
site of love enters life. So that loss is a double loss.
In the interests of love and its development it is obvi-
ous that whenever and wherever famine and its consequences
can be avoided it is highly desirable. The inevitable
conclusion is that nations with the supplies should under-
take programs of mercy, bending every effort to do so.
iii. The Church and Love
A normal healthy body is basic to the development of
love.^7 ^he church, then, must be interested in the health
107. See above, Chapter Three
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of all those in whom it would encourage love. It can safely
relegate matters of health to those institutions (agencies,
hospitals) specializing in it. hut never can the church
become ignorant of the relation between body and mind. jvior
can it escape obligation to bring alleviation to social
(slums) and economic (poverty) conditions that foster ill-
health and improper bodily growth. To this end the church
must crusade against social evils; must work for the cause
of labor. The servants of the church must be quick to recog-
nize the signs of disease or bodily dysfunction (especially
in the very young) and relate the ill person to the proper
sources of treatment. This they must do to aid every person
in developing a healthy organic basis for love.
Proper mental and emotional development is necessary to
love. Hence the church must understand the nature of char-
acter formation and the relative values of environmental
pressures in that formation. It must understand economic,
social, and political pressures that shape the nature of the
family and determine its functions. In this respect the
church needs to rediscover the home and famiiy. In its
present program, reaching the child directly for one hour
per week in the church school, the church is exerting little
influence on character formation. Much could be done through
a program that reaches parents on the issues of parent-child
relationships in the home.
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The church must pursue courses of direction, prevention,
and remedy. Direction and prevention can be served by an
enlightened church leading parents to understanding. Reme-
dies can be affected by church sponsorship of child guidance
clinics or church co-operation with child guidance experts.
It is obvious, however, that the church little realizes the
significance of parent-child relationships and does little
about them, tut until the church awakens to this fact and
to its opportunity in this area, its efforts at religious
education will remain ineffective.
The efficient church will understand the nature of the
culture in which it exists as an institution. It will see
its part and function. In our culture the church must
recognize the dominant motif of culture and its discrepancy
to the motif of love. The church will teach its people the
art of loving in a culture to great extent unfriendly to
love and at the same time use its position and influence to
center culture on love and away from the idea of possession.
The church, so often conservative, must become progressive.
In the interests of love the church will realize its
stake in the question of war and peace. War, it cannot be
denied, promotes hatred, aggression, hostility, revenge and
the like. All of which means the absence of love. Ten
million young men (in our country alone) have been " indoc
-
trinated" with tne attitudes that make good soldiers. The
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influence of that indoctrination fixed by the accompanying
traumatic experiences of war will in many cases be permanent.
The church must, if it develop love, work for the causes
that make for peace and which will prevent the indoctrination
of a future generation. It must raise its voice in active
support of peace terms that make for a just and enduring
peace, unless it do this, the church is3 laying foundations
on sands. By its refusal to work for a just peace the
church will contribute in the coming generation to the cre-
ation of character dominated by hate more than years of
effort will contribute to love.
In general, the church is open to criticism for its
failure to utilize influences and opportunities, but more
for its failure to reach the individual in his most forma-
tive years (infancy) through the institution (home) that has
most influence on his developing personality.
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CHAPTER VII
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF LOVE
This chapter aims at integration of psychological
studies and theory in a description of the development of
love into Christian love. This is a synthesis in which the
conclusions of this investigation become clear.
1. SYNTHESIS
i. Principles Guiding Synthesis
Guiding principles for this synthesis come from the
chapters on "Christian Love" (Chapter II) and the psycho-
logical bases of love (Chapters III, IV, V, and VI).
Investigation of the concept of Christian love revealed
that it concerned, primarily, the objects of love. The New
Testament association of feelings of trust, tenderness,
kindness, loyalty, humility, and concern with ideas of faith,
mutual interest, duty, forgiveness, helpfulness and sacri-
fice in the concept of love reveals that Christian love and
psychological love have much in common. Christian love
differs from pagan love in the nature of the love objects.
Christian love presupposes love of parent, sibling, spouse,
child and friend, but beyond these it extends love to enemy,
humanity, and God. In short, Christianity elevates the
sentiment of love to the point of control of character.
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In psychological terms, love becomes the master sentiment.
Therefore the key to the development of Christian love is in
the extension of love to man and God. Synthesis must reveal
the growth of the ability to love and the extension of that
ability to the objects of man and God.
Investigation of the psychological bases of love estab-
lished four interrelated aspects (physical, psycho-dynamic
,
personological, and environmental). Considerations of these
four aspects reveal that love is the result of development
that has its beginnings in the first days of life. Thus
infancy and childhood, in which the physical basis is most
influential, is the area of origin for love. As Stuart
writes of love, "though its flowering reach to the heaven
of heavens, its roots are deep in the age-old earth." 1
Of the four bases of love it is apparent that the self-
activities of reason and judgment 2 are absent in childhood.
Rational, coherent considerations that lead to independence
of thought, feeling, and action are the marks of maturity
and adulthood. Therefore the influence of self through its
abilities of reason and judgment, absent in childhood and
present in adulthood, will make a difference in the nature
of the love possible to the child in contrast to that pos-
sible in the adult. Synthesis will portray development
1. Stuart, AP, 132.
2. Cf. below, p. 228.
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of love against the background of two life periods, child-
hood and adulthood.
It is a commonly accepted fact that infancy and child-
hood are the life periods most crucial in the development of
love. 3 it is also commonly agreed that mature character
organization is markedly different from that of childhood.
Relative to character dominated by love this investigation
finds the chief psychological basis for this difference in
the above mentioned abilities of the self, reason and judg-
ment. 4 'i'he self refines and enlarges the love developed in
childhood, however witnout childish love the self would
have no love potential to develop. Thus it can be said that
the ability to love is achieved in childhood, and to this
maturity adds the control of love . As the ability to love
develops in childhood and control of love in adulthood,
synthesis will begin with birth in a description of the
development of the ability of love and end with the achieve-
ment of adulthood. In this genetic process it will be made
clear how Christian love is achieved.
ii. Theory of the Development of Love
.Leading to the Achievement of Christian Love
Childhood develops on the physical, psycho-dynamical,
and environmental bases. The physical influence is to be
3. So Suttie in OLE, Menninger in LH, and Stuart in AP.
4. Cf. below, p.
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seen in the need and need satisfaction of the oral, anal,
and genital areas. The psycho-dynamical process is to be
inferred from the typical responses to pleasure satisfactions
and pain frustrations. The environmental basis is to be
found in the family, primarily in the mother. Interaction
and development on these three bases adequately accounts
for the ability to love developed in childhood.
Each child is born with at least one stream of life-
energy (honne, elan vital, libido), the primary aim of which
is to keep one in life. 5 however, typical Freudian theory
posits two streams of life-energy, the sexual instinct or
libido, and the death instinct. The question arises whether
character is developed from the basis of a single life energy
with capacity for development in many directions (as Suttie
and Stuart) or from the fusion of two basal energies, love
and hate (as Menninger following Freud).
Menninger points out that the child begins life in
anger. From this plus the fact that the normal child dis-
plays a great deal of aggression and hostility he concludes
that the child is born equipped to hate and equipped to
love. 6 There is no disputing the fact of birth anger and
childish agressiveness but Freudian interpretation of the
facts is open to much criticism. Interpretation is made to
fit pre-existing theory rather than the facts. It is assumed
5. Stuart, AP, 21.
6. Of. Menninger, lH, 10, 96.
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that contradicting tendencies (love — hate) have separate
origins. But the assumption is not valid. Suttie points
out that hate is the obverse of love. Bate and aggressive-
ness are results of thwarted love: anger and hate are the
frustration reactions of love. 7 Thus hate is the result of
frustrations of the aim of life energy and love the result of
satisfaction, achievement. This interpretation is in keeping
with the nature of reaction to frustration. It is commonly
agreed that frustration creates hatred and correlates of
aggression and hostility, while satisfaction tends to create
love and its correlates. Birth which suddenly thrusts the
child from its warm and secure foetal environment is a
frustrating experience which adequately explains birth anger
without recourse to a hate or death instinct. The co-exis-
tence of satisfying and frustrating experience accounts
for the fusion of love and hate. One stream of life energy,
organized into love in satisfying experiences and into hate
in frustration situations, adequately accounts for the
phenomena of love and hatred on a more simple and adequate
basis in keeping with the general law of parsimony. 8
7. Of. Suttie, OLH, xvi and 31.
8. Of. Vaughan, GP, 492: "In no case may we interpret
an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychi-
cal faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the
exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological
scale." However, as Vaughan points out, the lure of simplic-
ity must be guarded against lest it simplify the mysteries
of life to the point of incomprehensibility.
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The traumatic experience of birth is further accentua-
ted by the traumatic nature of the infants first experience
with the world. All security has been broken, the means of
life severed. But the life energy is not aimless, it is
purposive. 9 Its primary purpose is to maintain life. 10 The
old uterine relationships, means to life, have been broken
and new relationships conducive to life must be established.
Thus the life energy is expressed in a "need for relation-
ship."11
The means for expression of this need for relationship
are organic needs and activities. 12 Life energy expressed
through organic areas (oral, anal, and genital) establishes
relationship with the mother, the person to whom cultural
pattern assigns the role of child care. Life needs are
first expressed through the physical organism but the needs
are more than a matter of sensory gratifications connected
with the mother* s body. That this is the case is substan-
tiated by the fact that the need for relationship remains
after sensory gratifications connected with mother become
superfluous and abandoned. 1S
9.
Of. below, p. 243.
10. Of. Stuart, AP, 25.
11. Suttie, OLH, 16.
12. Of. below, p. 222.
13. Suttie, OLH, 16.
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This interpretation adequately explains the known facts
in contrast to the unacceptable freudian position which
bases the relationship of child to mother upon tne sexual
nature of organic needs and activities
.
14 Love is not
purely sexual, nor is hatred the result of an independent
instinct. Love is the result of a need to live that is
satisfied, hatred the result of frustrating that need. Love
is life, nappiness, and achievement; hate is failure, stag-
nation, and death.
The nature and demands of life condition cultural
patterns to the extent that life creates the need for rela-
tionship so vital to its continuance. Different cultures
assign to various classes of persons the role of child care,
in Western civilization cultural patterns place the care,
and thus to a large extent the destiny, of the child in the
person of the mother.
It is the child in whom life energy carries the poten-
tial of love or hate but the realization of the potential
is primarily due to the nature of the environment, the
mother. Menninger effectively emphasizes the fact that the
key to the development of love is in the love response on
the part of the mother. 15 Tlie emotional response of the
14. Of. above, p. 75 ff.
15. Menninger, LH, 23, 35, and 42
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mother to the child is basic in organizing life energy into
patterns of love or hate, for w . . . it is the first formed
and directed emotional relationship.”16 Thus the develop-
ment of the ability to love is accomplished through the
attractiveness of environment.
The stimuli to mother's emotional response to child
are organic needs and activities. The nature of her emotion-
al reaction is expressed tnrough the nature of the care
given to organic needs. In satisfying baby's needs, mother
becomes associated with the emotions of pleasure and satis-
faction. 17 In this way the transition of life energy from
physical basis to personal basis is accomplished, however,
it is to be emphasized, from the beginning there is something
more than mere physical needs, for the physical is a means
of expression of need for relationship. 18 A rejective
emotional response by the mother tends to organize life
energy into patterns of hate.
The infant cannot use its eyes together to secure
stereoscopic vision with a sense of depth and distance;
cannot have any idea of space or time; cannot yet distin-
guish features that for us constitute personalities; and
"I Q
language is meaningless. 57
16. Suttie, OLH, 29.
17. Stuart, AP, 42.
18. Suttie, OLH, 31.
19. Of. ibid.
,
25 f
.
jjTom these known conditions it
-
. : .
.
• i
.
•
•: '
. - t • -!') > ; •• £. * .!» *' ” L ’ J O'. 1 P.
.
? "1 '
> £ 7 • ' ; i: J • ' . \ ' .
,
•- 7 •
. |.J 7 • ? ' • ! • "X ' ’
‘
.
F
>
* '
'
-1
>
' ^ *
.
•
•
...
.
,v ' ...
.
...
-
f .*
•
‘ ‘
'
•
:
' o • • ' • i '. '') '.-..Lx;
:L i . L
. 1
. I
. t .
. .
'
.:
-
,
*
.
.
223
can be inferred with probability that the infant at first
cannot distinguish between itself and mother. It is, then,
in harmony with known fact to assume that self-love and love
of mother arise together . ^0 self-love is not inherent but,
as love of mother, is directly dependent upon tne emotional
response of the mother.
Usually the affectional response of mother to infant is
expressed through care for oral, anal, and genital needs.
It is not, as the Freudians would claim, mere satisfaction
of organic needs but also of accompanying emotional atti-
tudes expressed through tone of voice, facial appearance,
and bodily posture. 21 If the mother accepts the child with
warmth, affection, tenderness, then the child forms similar
patterns in response .through imitation. 22
Thus an elementary form of the first aspect of Christian
love, self-love, is achieved early in life. The original
combination of self-love and love of mother indicates that
self-love is basic in the development of Christian love. If
the child has difficulty in loving self, he will have diffi-
culty in loving others. Clinical experience supports this
position. The neurotic personality is one divided against
20 . So Suttie
,
OliH
,
26 .
21. Cf. above, p. 179.
22. Cf. above, p. 200 f.
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itself, one who cannot accept and live in peace with itself.
And it is common knowledge that one who cannot accept a part
of self-organization projects blame to others, criticizing
appearance of the unacceptable part in others. Thus rela-
tionships are made difficult and broken because of lack of
self-esteem, self-respect. 2^
in summary, the development of love begins with birth.
The child is born with a characteristic life-energy posses-
sing potentiality for love or hate. It is the affectional
response of tne mother (environment) toward the child that
he imitates toward himself at the same time that he, through
imitation and response to satisfaction of needs (physical),
associates energy (psycho-dynamic) with satisfying objects
and ideational representations, all of which in combination
form the sentiment of love. Thus the several bases contrib-
ute jointly in childhood to the achievement of the ability
to love.
in the process of love development which continues
tnroughout childhood tne primal attachment to mother is the
prototype for other relationsnips. 24 Without the first
23. Self-love can be developed to abnormal stages. As
herein conceived self-love is thought of in terms of self-
acceptance, self-respect, and self-esteem. It is clearly
different from those forms of self-affection commonly de-
scribed as "egoism,” "ego-centrism," "selfishness," and
"self-centeredness," which are rightly condemned.
24. Suttie, OLH, 16.
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relationship others are impossible, rut in the further
development relationship with mother can hinder as well as
aid. Mother may cling to the love relationship which is
satisfying to her, fostering the continued dependence of the
child. The result can be mother fixation which means that
the individual does not develop beyond love for mother.
Self-love and love of mother are the only achievements
possible in such fixation.
As the child grows he must find his way in a world of
personal relations and laws, ne still needs guidance and
encouragement. If mother continues to supply these needs
then the mother sentiment is strengthened with new emotions,
respect, admiration, tenderness, gratitude. 25
The mother’s encouraging the child’s establishing of
relationships to others leads, perhaps first, to relationship
with the father. As Stuart points out, the father sentiment
is important to the development of love. 2^ The Father stands
for authority, for God. If he is feared and hated then the
child will grow up to fear life and hate authority. 27 The
father relationship results in the dominance-submission
balance in emotional relationships; while the mother rela-
tionship results in the acceptance-rejection balance.
25. Stuart, AP, 45.
26 . Ibid
. ,
44
.
27. Uf. above, p. 200.
28. Cf. above, p. 195.
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In most cases the nature of life creates an emotional
atmosphere of acceptance around the newborn infant. 20 So,
in most individuals the ability to love is developed to some
degree. The first love relationship centers around self and
mother, sut developing physical and mental abilities in
ever widening areas of experience necessitate emotional
relationships of some sort with persons beyond the immediate
family.
The child tends to imitate those with whom affectional
relationships have been established, especially when they
are also dependency relationships (necessary to the mainte-
nance of life). Thus the child tends to extend love to
those objects loved by those whom the child loves. This
means that of the four components of the sentiment of love
(self, objects, ideas, feelings) new objects receive a
transfer of feelings and ideas that the self originally held
for old loved objects (mother). 30
For the extension of affectional relationships to new
objects it is necessary for the new objects to react to the
growing child in respects similar to the original objects of
love. Thus similar objeots loved by mother receive the first
extension of the love relationship. It is quite natural
29. Allport points out that giving birth and care to a
child creates love even in one who at first resents the
child. PER, 197.
30. Of. above, p. 120.
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that close family friends (relatives, siblings) become the
objects of the increasing extension of love. The signifi-
cance of the child T s first love relationship with mother
becomes increasingly evident. 31
The period of childhood sees, under the encouragement
of mother, the establishment of patterns of outgoing affec-
tion. Love relationships beyond mother can be limited to a
few as immediate family or encouraged to include many out-
side the family circle. Wise parents will encourage an ever
widening range of affectional relationships, for a wide
range of persons experienced enlarges the ideas and broadens
the range of feelings associated in the sentiment of love.
Many persons, necessarily different, mean varying ideas and
feelings. For example, relationship with father adds ideas
and feelings of respect and humility; sibling relationships
can add ideas and feelings of camaraderie and co-operation.
Thus the pattern of love becomes more readily extended and
at the same time more significant. As the Christian concept
of love associates many ideas and emotions in the sentiment
of love, 32 it is necessary that childhood experience include
relationships with many objects.
31. This portrayal of widening love relationships
corresponds closely to the position of many psychoanalysts,
especially as set forth by Fltigel in PSF.
32. Cf. above, p. 15 f.
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Christian love for man may be subdivided into love for
friend, for enemy, and for humanity. It is obvious that in
each of these differing objects the nature of love is also
somehow different. Childhood, as shown, includes partial
achievement of Christian love for man, love of friend.
Love of enemy (frustrating object), love of humanity
(all conceivable men), and love of Cod, it is herein con-
tended, are impossible to the child. As will be shown, the
ability to conceive enemy, humanity, and Cod as objects of
love correlates with the ability to reason and decide as an
independent person. It is possible to contend that the
growing child could love enemies through imitation of the
love of loved persons, .but love of enemy through imitation
could only be love of another 1 s enemies. 33 i?‘or, basic to
love through imitation is the attractiveness of the object.
In case of an enemy object there is no attraction, but only
frustration which elicits anger and hatred. In support of
this position may be cited the fact that a child can love
one parent and hate the other even though the loved parent
loves the other parent. But imitation of love for enemies is
a step toward achievement. It creates a "readiness sentiment"
of love for enemy. That such occurs is to be seen with the
opposite of love, hate. Present day war news and propaganda
33. Although love of those who harm the loved one is
very difficult at any stage.
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engenders a readiness for hate of enemy, especially in the
youth, .but the real war enemies are not experienced with
the result that they do not receive the action generated by
hatred; in other words the real enemy does not become the
real object of the sentiment of hatred. Hence the sentiment
of hate engendered by war takes up as objects enemies that
are experienced, resulting in anti-Semitism and race riots.
As it is with enemy so it is with humanity and God, but
with some differences. The difficulty of developing Chris-
tian love of humanity and God in childhood lies in the
inability to conceive abstract objects in such a way to make
them worthy of love in their own right. In the case of love
to God the child with encouragement can imitate the parent’s
love of God. The childish God is conceived in terms of
father (Protestant) or mother (Catholic) or both. As the
only father and mother the child is capable of conceiving
are his own, God is often apt to be but father or mother
apotheosized. This is childish, na?ve, love of God, helpful
and necessary. Such love has an important function in the
development of Christian love. It forms the first pattern
of love to God. It is Christian in that it furthers devel-
opment to the point of achievement of Christian love. Hit
development arrested on the naive level is not Christian in
view of Hew Testament standards.
To this point it appears that the ability to love,
developed in childhood, is not Christian love. As yet, the
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distinctive objects of Christian love, man and cod, have not
been fully attained. Nor have some of the distinctive ideas
and feelings of Christian love adequate bases for develop-
ment; such as complete devotion, unswerving loyalty, and
self-sacrifice. The nature of Christian love indicates that
further development and new abilities are needed. Psycho-
logical basis for continued development and complete achieve'
ment of Christian love is the personological aspect, self.
before continuing this theoretical description it is
necessary to point out that the usual formulations of the
process of love development fall short of portraying the
achievement of Christian love in its distinctive aspects.
The development of love in childhood can achieve only love
of self and love of friend. Childhood can result in the
achievement of only the ability to love; the heights of love
remain for the future, but Menninger * s
,
34 and Suttie’s, 35
and Stuart’s36 formulations of the development of love
describe only the achievement of the ability to love and
assume without mention that all love, Christian included,
is thus adequately explained. 3 ^ None takes into account the
influence that self can, indeed must, exert upon its own
34. In Menninger, LH.
35. In Suttie, OLE.
36. In Stuart, AP.
37. The positions of those three authors is considered
in more detail in the next section.
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development, if Christian love be adequately realized. The
formulation of the self's role in realizing Christian love
is one of the distinctive features of this synthesis.
The ability of self-reflection*^® developed to the point
of independent thought and decision is the mark of adulthood.
Insofar as self is influential in, and necessary to, the
achievement of Christian love, adulthood, in contrast to
childhood, is the second general phase of development.
As suggested, the personological basis accounts for
additional development that makes possible the realization
of the distinctive objects of Christian love and, also, some
of its distinctive characteristics.
Love of enemy means love of a frustrating object, one
which naturally elicits patterns of hate. This means that
the loving person must be able to see the attractiveness of
the unattractive object. In extreme cases, love must create
attractiveness in objects where it does not exist. Love of
enemy also means the willingness to neglect or discount
displeasing qualities and to emphasize desirable qualities.
Now the ability and willingness to see the attractive-
ness of the unattractive objects and the emphasis on desir-
able to the neglect of undesirable qualities are possible
through critical examination of self in view of (so far as
38. Cf. above, p. 149 f
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known) the whole of experience, the whole of history, and the
experience of others. Such critical examination reveals the
possible relationships to enemies and the desirability of
the relationship of love. Thus love of enemy involves
self-control through self-reflection.
Self-control applied to love means the willingness to
forego the natural desire for immediate pleasures and satis-
factions for the greater though more distant ones. This is
the basis for self-denial and sacrifice, prominent char-
acteristics of Christian love.
Love of humanity (all conceivable men) is impossible,
for no human person can experience all persons on earth.
As love is a sentiment that relates persons, 39 no one can
love everyone. But love that originates in personal rela-
tionships can be directed to abstract objects. As Menninger
points out, the individual loves certain direct objects
(primarily wife and family, secondarily a group of intimate
friends) and also "such non-human love objects as are avail-
able and meaningful to him."^ Thus the individual with the
ability to love can organize his love around a concept of
all men. here, too, the direction of love is contingent
upon self and its abilities. The concept of all men needs
39. Of. above, p. 131 ff.
40. Menninger, LH, 130 f.
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to be coherent enough to possess meaning and appear attrac-
tive (worthy) of love.
The concept of humanity takes the form of a composite
individual with qualities worthy of love. The result might
be termed a "readiness sentiment of love," which means that
any and all individuals coming within the range of experience
can fit into the composite individual pattern and thus be
loved. So, love of all mankind, an aspect of the Christian
doctrine, is psychologically a readiness to love that can be
directed to any person at any time. And extension of love
to humanity adds the quality of universality.
The relationship of love with God is the highest value
of Christian experience. To achieve love of God he must be
conceived as a person independent, though related, of par-
ents, that He may be loved for His own worth and in His own
right. There is needed, therefore, a growing experience of
God. The development of the self’s ability to reason is a
means to widening experience.
Through reflective thought, therefore, the individual
enlarges the sphere of experience. Thoughtful consideration
of the whole of experience adds the quality of universality
to self-experience. Applied to thought of God, this means
that He is thus seen in His universal aspects. In this way
self-experience and love of God are understood as but indi-
vidual experiences in themselves a part of the whole. The
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self realizes that other selves also love God and are loved
by Him. Thus one discovers the fellowship of Christian love
and becomes a loving citizen in the "beloved community"
where love is law.
The ability adequately to conceive God as a person
worthy of love means seeing beyond the immediate and the
finite, to the eternal and the infinite. Thus God becomes
the object of complete devotion, receiving lasting loyalty.
It is to be pointed out that the nature of the objects
of Christian love, especially God, influences the quality
of the love relationship formed. 4 ^- Self through its capacity
for reflection discovers and makes possible the extension of
love, nut self only discovers, it does not create God. And
the discovery, in turn, through the same abilities of the
discovering agent, influences the love relationship. And
the self must continue its efforts at discovery so long as
God is not fully discovered. As long as discovery is still
possible love can continue to develop. Thus the magnitude
of God indicates tnat Christian love is a lifelong develop-
ment.
41. It is also to be noted that love directed to
certain objects excludes love of other objects. The nature
of the objects make them exclusive. Thus, "No one can
serve two masters; either he will hate the one and love the
other . . . You cannot serve both God and Mammon." (Mt.
6:24; ik . 16:13).
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The self’s capacity for self-reflection is thus seen as
necessary to the achievement of Christian love. The ability
to conceive enemy, humanity, and God as objects worthy of
love is the basis for independent decision to love man uni-
versally and God supremely, with complete devotion, loyalty,
AO
and sacrifice.
2 . CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing synthesis several conclusions emerge,
i. The Four Psychological bases of Christian Love
This investigation has considered and established four
interrelated aspects of personality that are basic to the
achievement of Christian love; 1) the physical; 2 ) the
psycho-dynamic; 3) the personological; and 4) the environ-
mental. The achievement or Christian love seems to be
adequately explained by these psychological bases. These
four bases suggest four general principles.
(1) The physical principle. Personality has a
physical basis, psyche is never unrelated to soma, bove
as an organization of character has physical relations.
42. The self can decide to love supremely other objects
than God. This is the tendency that I Jn. 2:15 warns
against — "love not the world, nor yet what is in the
world; if anyone loves the world, love for the Father is
not in him."
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However the precise relationships of body and mind are not
as yet clear. Therefore only general statements can be made
concerning this relationship. The principle: Love has a
physical basis and is
,
therefore
,
contingent for its fullest
development upon normal
,
healthy bodily development .
(2) The psycho-dynamic principle. Character forma-
tion consists in the organization of life energy into senti-
ments. character dominated by love involves the organization
of psychic energy into these behavior patterns which are
designated as love. The nature of human life (in Western
civilization) furnishes definite experiences (family) which
the newborn infant must work through. In these experiences
psychic energy is organized into the patterns of love, hate,
or combination of both. The principle: Love is a qualita-
tive organization of psychic energy
,
the basis for which is
formed in the experiences of infancy and childhood .
(3) The personological principle. The focus of per-
sonality, of character formation, is the self which exer-
cises distinct abilities, among which are reason and judgment
which result in values and ideals. The self can reflect
upon its own qualitative organization and, in light of that
reflection, accept or reject self. In this ability to accept
or reject lies the self T s ability to control and influence
the qualitative development . of self. By means of reason and
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judgment the self can direct its ability to love toward
enemy, humanity, and God. The principle: The highest
development of love is possible by means of the direction
and control that self can exercise through development of
its abilities ,
(4) The environmental principle. Culture with its
patterns and institutions can emphasize any one of a number
of possible character organizations to the exclusion of all
others. The centering of cultural patterns on a definite
type of character results in the creation of persons with
the selected type of character. The principle: For the
widest possible development of love in the individual and
society
,
culture and its patterns must be organized around
the key idea of love .
ii. Empirical Validity of psychological and
Theological Theories of Love
It appears that Christian love involves the whole of
life and the whole of experience. Love begins to develop at
birth and continues to develop as long as the person has the
possibility of further insight into the nature of God. Love
is a continuous process. On the basis of this fact varying
psychological and theological formulations of love can be
criticized
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(1). Psychological Theories of Love
Three psychological formulations of the development of
love are considered: those of Karl Menninger, lan Suttie,
and Grace Stuart. Menninger is a neo-Freudian, yet in his
formulation of love quite the orthodox Freudian. Suttie,
late .British psychologist, claiming membership in no school,
departs from his original agreement with Freud and in his
interpretation of love stresses development in social rela-
tionships. Stuart is an eclectic, an able synthesizer.
(i). Menninger 1 s Theory
In his recent book, uove Against Late, Menninger is
concerned more with the negative aspect of love, 1. e. t hate
due to frustration and how the vicious circle of frustration
may be broken to permit the development of love. His approach
carries forward his emphasis upon the destructive tendencies
in human nature as formulated in his earlier book, Man Against
Himself. 43
Basic to Menninger's position is his acceptance of
Freud's dichotomy of life (eros)and death (thanatos) in-
stincts. 44 Life is characterized by two fundamentally
opposing drives, that toward life and that toward death.
43. Harcourt, Brace and Co*., 1938.
44. Cf. above, p. 101 f.
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Character is constituted by the fusion of these two drives
toward love and hate. 45
The child is born equipped with the ability to hate as
evidenced by the fact that birth is reacted to with anger on
the part of the infant. 46 ±jeyond birth it is the relation-
ship with the mother that fixes patterns of hate and love.
And no matter how ideal the mother is ", . . the child is
bound to have both positive and negative feelings toward
her.”47 The problem of love development is, therefore, to
provide socially acceptable sublimations of the hate ten-
dencies, ”... some things should be hated and fought
against,”48 and the encouragement of love tendencies by
means of love rewards (pleasures). 49
But the sublimation of hate and the encouragement of
love encounters more than natural difficulties in our civi-
lization. ’’Civilization demands more thwarting of immediate
gratifications than does most savage life . . .” 50 The
nature of modern life creates frustrated individuals,
frustrated men frustrate wives who frustrate children who
grow up to continue the vicious circle, uur hope lies in
45. Cf. Menninger, LH, 13, 262 ff.
46. iH, 9 f.
47. LH, 13 f.
48. iH, 14.
49. Cf. LH, 23.
50. LH, 23.
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breaking the vicious circle which can be done through faith,
hope, love, work and play.
criticism of Menninger 1 s position does not turn on the
facts involved out rather upon the basic theoretical formu-
lation of the life and death instincts and its inadequacy in
accounting for Christian love.
The fact of man’s destructive tendencies cannot be de-
nied but it is not necessary to assume an instinct of hate
to account for them. As already pointed out, a much more
simple yet adequate interpretation is embodied in the concept
of one stream of life energy with potentiality for hate and
love
.
51
however Menninger does emphasize the cultural impedi-
ment ia that block the development of love and the need for
improvement. At the same time he is practical in pointing
to the resources at hand — faith, hope, love, work, and
play — for counteracting those frustrating experiences that
organize life energy into patterns of hate.
But even if agreement with Menninger’ s basic hypothesis
were possible, his theory is not extensive enough to account
for the development of Christian love. He is concerned only
with the ability to love. But, as this investigation reveals,
Christian love depends for its achievement upon the proper
51. Cf. above, p. 101 ff
. ,
218 f.
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control of love. Hence Menninger’s formulation is inade-
quate to the explanation of love of enemy, humanity, and
God.
(ii). Suttie* s Theory
Suttie contends that the infant mind has a general
directing purpose expressed in a "need for companionship"
which is the starting point of human life and development. 52
Thus, mental development begins in a social relationship.
This need for relationship becomes need for mother and is
presented to the child mind as a need for company and as a
discomfort in isolation. 53 The mother relationship is one
of love which gives security. And as it is the first formed
and directed emotional relationship, 54 it becomes the proto-
type for other relationships. 55 Love is, then, the satis-
faction of the need for relationship, and hate the result of
thwarted love. Anger and hate are the frustration reactions
of love. 56 Anger is aimed at inducing the mother to accom-
plish wishes for the child. And hatred is a reproach to the
hated person, "... owing all its meaning to a demand for
love." 5 ^
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
Of. Suttie, OLH, xiv, 26.
OLH, 16.
OLH, 29.
OLH, 16.
OLH, xv i
.
OLH, 23.
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Differences between the positions of Menninger and
Suttie are found in basic hypotheses and resultant interpre-
tations of hate. Menninger' s postulation of the hate instinct
and emphasis upon the greater tendencies toward hatred sug-
gest that it is stronger than love which needs to be care-
fully tended against the encroachments of the hate tendencies.
Suttie postulates what is similar to a stream of life energy,
which naturally seeks expression in love relationships.
Hate is then interpreted as subsidiary to love, being the
frustration aspect of love. Suttie' s position emphasizes
the drive to life, love, in contrast to Menninger' s emphasis
of the drive to death. And inasmuch as most life seems to
be dominated by the desire or will to live, evidenced by the
comparatively few suicides, Suttie is more correct in his
emphasis on love.
Suttie 's position emphasizes the role of environment
(social relationships), which this investigation finds basic
to the development of love. However, as said of Menninger,
so with Suttie — his theory concerns only the origins of
love, the ability to love, and does not adequately portray
the psychological bases necessary to the achievement of
those love objects distinctive of Christian love.
(iii). Stuart's Theory
Stuart contends that each creature has one stream of
life energy which in normal life flows into a number of
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channels. 58 This life stream is purposive; it aims to keep
one in life by predisposing the individual, through the
instincts, to take interest in those things which bear on
its self-preservation. 59 The life energy feels; liking what
satisfies, disliking what denies.
The stream of life energy is, according to Stuart,
organized in terms of sentiment formation. But sentiments
are organized around persons. The transition of energy
from its physical associations to the personal is aided by
the intimate connection of things with people (food — mother).
The mother satisfies the baby‘s needs and the successive
emotions of pleasure and satisfaction which arose in con-
nection with some physical need becomes associated with
mother. This results in the mother sentiment. But life
continues to expand. The infant grows up finding it neces-
sary to move about in a world of personal relationships and
laws. He continues to need help. If the mother continues to
supply his need for help, not fostering infantile dependence,
then the mother sentiment is strengthened with new emotions —
respect, admiration, gratitude. 61 Development beyond the
mother sentiment largely depends on the mother. She can
encourage the child to form new relationships, thus form new
sentiments
.
58. Stuart, AP,
59. AP, 25.
60. AP, 42.
61. AP, 43.
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In summary, Stuart’s basic concept postulates a single
stream of life energy which is organized into sentiments
through personal relationships, primarily relationship with
mother. Stuart begins her description of the ’’need for love”
under Freudian impetus, but her development of the theme is
not limited. She differs in starting point, postulating a
single stream of life energy as over against the Freudian
dichotomy of instincts, in this she agrees with Suttie.
The breadth of Stuart’s approach to love is seen in her
utilization of the concept of sentiment organization which
theory accounts for the many possible variations in char-
acter.
However tnere are important psychological bases, as
revealed by this investigation, that are not explicitly
developed. Stuart finds that the theory of sentiments
leaves a gap; it does not make plain the influence of envir-
onment. 62 She goes on to portray environmental influence in
terms of the mother-child relationship. Hut the breadth,
basis, and means of environmental influence are insufficient-
ly treated.
Hor does Stuart give due credit to the influence of the
physical basis of love. She portrays the transition from
physical to personal through social relationships. But she
62. AP, 52 ff
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fails to indicate the possible influence of physical con-
ditions upon the personal relationships.
Stuart also merits the criticism made of toenninger and
Suttie. She fails to portray or suggest the vital influence
of self in its own development of love. Her theoretical
formulation, dealing primarily with infantile experience in
relationship to mother, concerns the ability to love. Con-
trol of love, which enables the person to conceive enemy,
humanity, and God as objects of love, is not dealt with
explicitly or implicitly.
(iv). General Evaluation of Psychological Theories of Love
Consideration of Menninger T s, Suttie* s, and Stuart *s
theoretical treatment of love in view of the results of
this investigation reveal their empirical inadequacy. This
investigation has established the personological basis of
love, " and found that the influence of reason and judgment
establish adequate basis for the extension of love to enemy,
humanity, and God. Thus the development of love due to the
influence of self and its abilities is termed ’’control of
love;” this in contrast to the "ability to love" developed
in childhood. The theories of love considered are thus seen
to be concerned only with the ability to love and, insofar
63. Chapter V, p. 137 ff.
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as they do not adequately provide for the development of
control of love, they are inadequate to explain the achieve-
ment of Christian love.
(2). Theological Theories of Love
Psychological investigation has revealed that love is
a possibility to all normal persons; that love is a develop-
ment involving all of life; that control of love to the
extension of love to God, humanity, and enemy is also pos-
sible but dependent on development. In short, Christian
love is a continuous development, possible to every person.
Christian love, the result of control of love, is con-
tingent upon the ability to love developed in childhood.
Psychological investigation reveals that the ability to love
precedes any extension of love to the objects distinctively
Christian. This means that Christian love has its origins
in human personality; that in Christian love human co-opera-
tion and development are necessary. 65
Theological formulations of Christian love, then, must
adequately account for the above facts. On the basis of
•••
64. I Jn. 4:20 which states, "If a man say, I love
God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar," indicates that
Christian love involves the whole of love development.
65. The Johannine concept of Christian love as a gift
"bestowed" by God ("Behold what manner of love the Father
has bestowed upon us . . ." American Version, I Jn. 5:1)
is contradicted by the finding that Christian love is a
lifelong development within the individual.
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psychological investigation the following theological formu-
lations may be criticized.
(ij. The Theory of Augustine and Aquinas
The general positions of Augustine and Aquinas66 are
empirically valid in that they give due regard to the devel-
opment of Christian love in persons.
God’s love is the prototype for Christian love and
creates love in man. 67 but the nature of love, conceived
by Augustine as caritas and cupiditas t indicates that all
love has a common origin, and that Christian love, caritas
,
differs by virtue of its objects. 68 Self-love is not denied
by Augustine or Aquinas.
Thus, the theological interpretations of love by Augus-
tine and Aquinas does not violate fact; they are empirically
valid. Their position is in harmony with the fact of devel-
opment of love in persons and human co-operation in tne
achievement of Christian love.
lii). The Theory of Luther
Luther’s conception of Christian love denies the neces-
sity of human co-operation and development. Man’s love
66. Cf. aoove, p. 40-45.
67. Cf. above, p. 41 f
. ,
45.
68. Cf. above, p* 42.
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comes not from himself but from God, He is simply the
channel for God’s love, 69 According to Luther, self-love
is crude, selfish, and utterly perverse. As such it is to
be totally annihilated. 70
Thus Luther T s theory denies that Christian love is a
development in human persons that begins with the origins
of life; that man has any responsibility in the achievement
of Christian love, in view of psychological studies Luther’s
theory is empirically invalid, although he is right in hold-
ing to an objective basis for love.
(iii). The Agape Doctrine
The agape doctrine of Christian love, formulated by
Anders Hygren, has much in common with Luther’s theory of
love. Agape love is to be understood in contrast to eros
love. Both concepts of love seek to explain man’s relation
to the divine.
Eros is man’s effort to ascend to God. It is man’s
achievement in his endeavor to find salvation. It is human
and "caused,” that is, it is called forth by the value of
its object. 7 -*-
Agape is God’s way to man. It comes down from above.
It is God’s own love and is "uncaused," that is, it doesn’t
69. Cf. above, p. 46.
70. Cf. above, p. 47.
71. Nygren, AE, I, 165.
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depend on the value of its object. 72 Therefore man's love
is eros love, and God's love is agape love, and Christian
love is agape . In other words, Christian love does not
depend on man, his abilities or development. Christian
love, when it appears in man, is God loving through man. 73
Thus Christian love is impossible to human efforts. It is
useless to speak of developing Christian love for man can
develop only eros love.
It is plain that the agape doctrine of Christian love
contradicts empirical evidence. Psychological studies reveal
that Christian love is a development achieved on the basis
of human abilities; that man does have a very significant
part in the development of Christian love. These the agape
doctrine deny and, insofar as it does, it is empirically
invalid
.
Although not within the scope of this investigation it
is pertinent to point out that the agape doctrine of Chris-
tian love which denies the worth of human love contradicts
squarely the Christian emphasis on the supreme value and
worth of the person.
(iv). The "Impossible Possibility" of Reinhold Niebuhr
psychological investigation shows that love contingent
upon proper development is a possibility to every normal
72. Wygren, AE, I, 169 f.
73. Cf. above, p. 37.
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person. This fact conflicts with Professor Niebuhrs tran-
scendent ethic of love.
Niebuhr shows what he calls the impossibility (he should
have said the difficulty) of the Christian love ethic in
everyday human affairs. Jesus* ethic condemns every form of
self-assertion, even the concerns necessary to provide one
with necessities of life. 74 In other words, the ethic of
Jesus was not meant to apply to the relationships between
men. 755 It is impossible to do so. as Niebuhr states it:
The ethical demands made by Jesus are
incapable of fulfillment in the present
existence of man. They proceed from
a transcendent and divine unity of essen-
tial reality, and their final fulfillment
is possible only when God transmutes the
present chaos of this world into its
final unity. 76
Niebuhr sees the difficulties in the achievement of
Christian love but magnifies them to a position of dominance
in his interpretation of Christian ethics. There is no
denying or minimizing of difficulties permissible, but their
actuality is not sufficient basis for denying the possibility
of achievement of Christian love. With emphasis on the
possibilities and realizations of love one could as well
argue for the "possibility of the impossible."
74. Niebuhr, ICE, 41.
75. "The points of reference are vertical (to God) not
horizontal." ICE, 46. Material in the parentheses is in-
serted by the author.
76. ICE, 59.
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Basically Niebuhr’s concept of Christian ethics means
it is impossible to achieve Christian love. It is man’s
nature to be otherwise than loving. But psychology points
out that the individual is not born with character in com-
plete organization, only the possibility of developing any
one of a greatly varied number of possible characteristics.
The individual is not born with the capacity of hate and
love but with potentialities for both. Niebuhr’s interpre-
tation of Christian ethics does not include the possibility
that psychology finds as fact, namely, the possibility of
achievement of Christian love by every normal person, hence
his position is empirically invalid.
Niebuhr and Menninger have much in common. Menninger
bases his theoretical formulation of love on the instincts
of love and hate. He emphasizes the negative side of love,
treating the development of love from the standpoint of
eliminating hate-producing frustrations. Niebuhr could ac-
cept Menninger’ s emphasis on the hate tendencies but probably
would deny that they could be eliminated or controlled (sub-
limated), as does Menninger.
To continue interpretation of Niebuhr’s position,
psychological analysis could venture a guess, and without
thorough information it can only be a hazardous guess, as to
the experiential origins of his Christian ethics. Niebuhr
has, probably, personally experienced the inadequacy of the
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ethic of love in immediate situations. That this is the
case is suggested by his statement:
252
‘i'he conflict is between those who have
confidence in human virtue which human
nature cannot support and those who have
looked too deeply into life and their own
souls to place their trust in so broken
a reed. 77
Therefore, in the presence of inadequacy (which, by the way,
is to be interpreted as inadequacy on the part of the person)
the individual must reconcile his experience with Christian
faith or lose himself in conflict and confusion. That
lNiebuhr has struggled for reconciliation is suggested by his
estimate of religion:
Religion may be regarded as the last and
final effort of the human spirit to es-
cape relativity and gain a vantage point
in the eternal. 78
bo the conflict between experience and faith is resolved by
the interpretation that makes Christian ethic of love a
necessity not in human experience but in the transcendent
world
.
Niebuhr could have maintained belief in the relevance
and possibility of Christian love had he not been overwhelmed
by the tragic uses of violence. Implicitly he recognizes
that violence violates the ethic of love but in his experi-
ence violence is the only conceivable means of combatting
77. Niebuhr, ICE, 121.
78. ICE, 127.
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violence. 79 hence the need to affirm the rightness of force
which he accomplishes at the cost of a transcendent ethic of
Christian love. In summary, this conjectural interpretation
of Niebuhr’s position finds that he is one who found it im-
possible to realize the law of love in his experience, hence
he rationalizes his experience to the point of projecting
failure upon the (irrelevant) ethic of love, thus absolving
self and maintaining integrity and faith.
iii. Schematization of the Achievement of Christian Love
The foregoing synthesis can be summarized in key terms
that adequately portray the formulation of the development
of love and the achievement of Christian love. Thus this
investigation contributes a group of related concepts that
may well serve as basis for other and future psychological
investigations of Christian love.
The main body of this investigation establishes the
four psychological bases of Christian love: the physical,
the psycho-dynamic
,
the environmental, and the personologi-
cal.
79. As Niebuhr states in speaking of national con-
flict: "They present a tragic revelation of the impossi-
bility of the law of love because no party to the conflict
has a perspective high enough to judge the merits of the
opponents position.” ICE, 126. The use of the adjective
"tragic" is to be noted. It suggests a sense of personal
disappointment
.
‘t
;f. i S. •• , .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
o'
-
254
Synthesis leading to theoretical formulation revealed
that childhood involves the physical
,
the psycho-dynamic
,
and the environmental bases; while adulthood involves the
addition of the personological basis.
The bases involved in childhood, largely under the
attractive influence of the mother, combine to develop the
ability to love . The ability to love is achieved by means
of attraction on the part of the environment (mother) and
is developed in relation to self and intimate friends (mother,
siblings, relatives, etc.). Thus the love objects of child-
hood are self and friend . Childish love lacks the qualities
possible through experience and critical thought. Hence it
may be called naive love. Adulthood is marked by the devel-
opment of the self's critical abilities, the personological
bases. Self can influence its own development. It can
direct its ability to love to new and greater objects; to
enemy
,
humanity
,
and Cod . Thus adulthood achieves the
control of love. The qualities added to love through the
personological basis, critical thought, justifies the term,
rational love.
The following table presents the concepts enumerated
above in horizontal columns that indicate relationships and
vertical columns that indicate lines of growth.
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TABULAR SCHEMATIZATION OF CONCEPTS
SUMMARIZING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CHRISTIAN LOVE
Life
Period
Bases Love
Involved Object
Means of
Approach
Level of
Development
Type
of Love
Infancy
and
Childhood
Physical Self
Psycho-
dynamic Friend
( parent
,
Environ- sibling,
mental relative,
etc.
)
j
Attrac-
tiveness
(leads to
imitation
of and
identifi-
cation
with
object)
Ability
to
Love
Naive
Love
Direction
Enemy (reasoning
Late leads to Control
Childhood values and Rational
Person- Humanity ideals of
Adoles- ological which form Love
cence basis for Love
God judgment
Adulthood and self-
committal
)
.
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ABSTRACT
Chapter I introduces the problem of this dissertation:
the understanding of Christian love through psychological
interpretation. Love is defined as an organization of char-
acter that leads to a relationship (lover beloved) char-
acterized by feelings that make for acceptance and mutuality
and by actions that seek the best interest of those involved.
Chapter II considers the Christian doctrine of love.
The elements of the doctrine are God’s love for man, man f s
love for cod, and man’s love for man. Love is a prominent
teaching in the New Testament and the various authors agree
as to its significance and place in Christian character.
historical development of the doctrine is considered
through Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther. In their interpre-
tation of love Augustine and Aquinas carry out the New Testa-
ment emphasis on the worth and integrity of the human person.
Luther, however, is influenced more by the concept of man’s
sinful nature. Present day thought emphasizes love as the
foundation of Christian character, however, differences
concerning the nature of love still follow the lines laid
down cy Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther. The question of the
nature of love turns about the New Testament usage of agape
in contrast to the common Greek term, eros . Agape indicates
the effort to avoid the then common degradation of the term
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eros . To interpret usage of a new term to denote a totally
different love strains the evidence.
Christian love involves the four elements (self, feel-
ings, ideas, objects) that psychological science finds in a
sentiment. Thus Christian love is legitimately investigated
as a sentiment of love. Psychological science can investi-
gate Christian love as man's, but not as God f s experience.
Chapter III investigates the physical basis of love.
Physical structure and function are influential in character
development. iMormality is necessary to the proper develop-
ment of love. Physical structure and function have greatest
influence on character development in the early stages of
life. As psychoanalysis has investigated the influence of
childhood experience the concept of psychosexual development
is considered. The activities and interests involved in the
oral, anal and genital stages are of great significance to
the formation of character. But they cannot be regarded as
exclusively sexual in nature, in the narrowly genital sense
adopted by Freudian interpretation. Nor can the universality
of the Oedipus situation and the castration complex be
accepted.
The question of relationship between sexuality and love
is considered. Sexuality is a basic component in love, not
because love is identical with sex, but because sexuality
and love are associated in the parent-child relationship,
*v J
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and Western cultural patterns associate the two. Physical
basis is the point of origin, not the end, of love, but it
deserves more consideration that commonly accorded it in
Christian thought, in spite of Freudian overemphasis.
Chapter IV considers the psycho-dynamic basis of love,
the organization of psychic energy in the sentiment of love.
Psychic energy is considered from the standpoint of theories
of instinct (McDougall), libido (Freud), drive (Murray), and
traits (G. W. Allport). The instinct and libido theories
are found to be more valid relative to the early periods of
life; drive and trait theories to the more advanced levels
of personality development. The concept of sentiment forma-
tion explains the organization of undifferentiated psychic
energy into love energy. Any particular sentiment may domi-
nate character due to the influence of innate need, cultural
pattern, or self-direction, or by combination of all. The
organization of psychic energy into sentiments is described
by the concept of sublimation. Relative to objects loved
two stages of development are presented: first, the auto-
erotic (self as object); and second, the alloerotic (object
love)
.
Chapter v investigates the personological basis, that
is, the role of self in the achievement of love. Objective
studies warrant the conclusion that one aspect of person-
ality is best conceived as the self, which places its stamp
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on the total organization of experience. In the achievement
of love the activities of self-esteem, self-reflection, and
social regard are influential, unconscious processes are
influential through motivations felt by the self. Of par-
ticular significance is self-reflection which involves the
ability to reason and judge. Through reason and judgment
the self achieves values and ideals. By means of these the
self can influence and change its own organization and de-
velopment .
Chapter VI considers the environmental basis of love.
Consideration of Dobuan society shows that culture can help
or hinder the development of love. Culture influences per-
sons to conform to its patterns. Therefore, if the dominant
cultural patterns are organized around motifs inimical to
love, development will be a difficult and improbable achieve-
ment. A culture is organized around a key idea (motif);
Western culture around the motif of possession which to
great extent conflicts with the motif of love. Western
culture is characterized by stratification (strata of cul-
tures existing side by side). This creates confusion and
conflict but, on the other hand, it affords opportunity to
organize and maintain small but effective Christian societies
wherein love is dominant.
Prominent within a culture are its institutions. Three
of these are examined in relation to the development of love:
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the family, war, and the church, in Western culture the
family, Cased on the spouse unit in which the erotic rela-
tionship is fundamental, is the meeting place of cultural
patterns, and in it character develops through the formation
of sentiments in parent-child relationships. The family has
two major responsibilities in the development of love:
first, to develop the innate abilities of the child to the
point where ne is capable of loving; and second, to direct
the love of tne growing child to culturally approved objects.
War increases hatred, hostility and aggression and
creates companion calamities such as famine and pestilence.
In the interest of love, war must be set aside and the
effects of war counteracted. The church needs to understand
the total process of developing love. It is to be criticized
for its failure to grasp and utilize its greatest influences
and opportunities.
Chapter VII presents a creative synthesis by means of a
theoretical description of the development of love that
relates psychological interpretation to the Christian doc-
trine of love.
The infant is born with potentiality to love and hate.
Mother, through care tendered physical needs, expresses love
or hate toward the child. The child in response to satis-
factions and pleasures develops patterns of love. Patterns
of hate are reactions to frustrations. The environment
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"attracts” love responses on the part of the child. Thus
the ability to love is developed. This ability to love is
adequately explained by the interdevelopment of the physical,
psycho-dynamic, and environmental bases. Infancy and child-
hood develop love to self and friendly object (mother, sib-
ling, intimate friend). Childhood love, in contrast to love
achieved in adulthood may be described as naive.
The formulation of the process of development of love
in childhood contains many points of agreement with similar
formulations offered by Karl Menninger, Ian Suttie and Grace
Stuart. However these authors do not adequately explain
development of love to the point of achievement of love
objects distinctively Christian.
Christian love requires additional explanatory concepts.
These are found in the personological basis. Through the
abilities of reason and judgment the self is able to influ-
ence its own development to the point of realizing enemy,
humanity and God as objects worthy of love. Self-activity
can overcome the natural or childish reaction to the enemy
object that frustrates; can construct a concept of all men
that associated with love creates a "readiness sentiment" of
love (any person experienced is thus capable of being loved);
can also conceive God as an object worthy of man’s love.
Thus the self takes the ability to love developed in
childhood and extends it to enemy, humanity, and God. Self
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adds the quality of control. And through control which
extends love the qualities of loyalty, sacrifice, and uni-
versality are added to the sentiment of love. As self-
capacities mark the transition from childhood to adulthood,
Christian love is the result of a development that is life-
long. The qualities added to love in adhlthood warrant its
description as rational love.
From the foregoing synthesis several conclusions emerge.
i. The four psychological bases of love suggest four
general principles.
1) The physical principle, Love is contingent
upon normal, healthy bodily structure and function.
2) The psycho-dynamic principle. Love involves an
organization of psychic energy.
3) The personological principle. The highest
development of love is possible by means of self-direction
and self-control.
4) The environmental principle. For the widest
possible development of love, culture must be organized
around the key idea of love.
ii. Love is a continuous process involving the whole
of human life and experience. This fact serves as a prin-
ciple by means of which the empirical validity of psycho-
logical and theological theories may be determined.
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Karl Menninger’s, Ian Suttie’s, and Grace Stuart’s
psychological formulations of love are inadequate to explain
the whole of love development and the achievement of Chris-
tian love. They explain the ability to love developed in
childhood, but fail to account for the achievement of enemy,
humanity and God as objects of love.
The theological theories of Augustine and Aquinas are
valid in that they account for the fact of human development
and co-operation in the achievement of Christian love. The
theory of Luther, the Agape doctrine, and Niebuhr’s ’’Impos-
sible Possibility” are empirically invalid in that they fail
to recognize human potentiality and development in the
achievement of Christian love.
iii. This investigation establishes a group of related
concepts that may serve as terminological basis for future
psychological inquiries into Christian love. The following
table presents the concepts in horizontal columns indicating
relationship, and vertical columns indicating lines of
growth
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TABULAR SCHEMA!'IZATION OF CONCEPTS
SUMMARIZING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CHRISTIAN LOVE
—
Life
Period
h i
Bases
involved
Love
Object
Means of
Approach
•
Level of Type
Development of Love
-
Physical Self Attrac-
tiveness Ability
Infancy Psycho- (leads to Naive
dynamic Friend imitation to
and (parent
,
of and pove
Environ- sibling, identifi- pove
Childhood mental relative, cation
etc
.
)
with
.
.
object
)
Direction
Enemy (reasoning
Late leads to Control
Childhood values and Rational
Person- Humanity ideals of
Adoles- ological which form pove
cence basis for Love
God judgment
Adulthood and self-
committal)
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